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ANNEX 
The  problems  of  drawing  up  a 
catalogue  of  fundamental  rights 
for  the  European  Communities 
A  study  requested  by the  Commission  and  drawn  up 
by  Professor  Rudolf  Bernhardt, 
Director  of the  Max-Planck-Institute 
for  Foreign  Public  Law 
and  International  Law,  Heidelberg 
The contributions relating to the individual legal systems of the Member States have 
been  produced  by colleagues from the  Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign  Public  Law 
and  International  Law,  namely  by  Dr  K  Oellers-Frahm  for Italy,  by Mr A.  Berg  for 
Denmark,  Dr  M.  Bohe  for  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom,  Dr  K  Hailbronner  for 
France,  Mr  H.  Kruck  for  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  and  Professor  H.  van 
Mangoldt for Belgium. 20-21
The Commission of the European  Communities, represented  by  the Director-General 
of the Legal  Service, has  asked  me to  submit a study on the problems of a catalogue 
of fundamental rights for  the European Communities. The task of the study has been 
defined  as  follows: 
'The study  commissioned  should  show, on the basis  of existing  knowledge  of com-
parative  law  and codification  in  the field  of international  law,  the problems  posed  by 
the elaboration  of a catalogue  of fundamental  rights  for  the European  Communities. 
It should start with a short survey of the protection of fundamental  rights within the 
different Member States and the present protection of fundamental  rights under Com-
munity law.  More detailed research on some specific fundamental rights having special 
relevance  to  Community  law  (for  instance,  the  protection  of legitimate  confidence 
placed  in  a  legal  position  already  established, in  relation  to  economic  matters, or the 
freedom  of trade  or occupation)  should  then  illustrate  by  way  of comparative  tech-
niques  the  level  of protection  of fundamental  rights  in  the nine  Member  States. 
Finally, it  will  have to  be  considered whether it  is  desirable, given the current degree 
of integration, to elaborate such a catalogue, and, if so, what procedure in terms of legal 
methodology  is  appropriate,' 
Due to the lack of time available, it  has not been possible to  carry  out an examination 
to  compare  the law  in  all  countries  to  the same degree.  Not only  in  details, but also 
in examples were differences unavoidable. In other respects individual shortcomings and 
occasional  mistakes  '!fe  unavoidable  in  the course  of an  attempt to  deal  with  a large 
number of different  legal  systems and  to  understand their basic  problems.  The  study 
was  terminated  in  the autumn of 1975. 22-23
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1.  The problem 
The  European  Communities  exercise  sovereign  authority 
through  their  institutions.  Making  regulations,  directing, 
intervening,  they  are  arrayed  against  the individual, and  set 
limits to his potential for development and achievement, espe-
cially in the economic field.  Although it is  the objective of the 
Communities and of the Treaties on which they are founded to 
extend the scope for  the economic activity of 'citizens of the 
Common Market' ('Marktbiirger')1 beyond the frontiers of the 
individual Member States, and thereby to create a greater free-
dom, none the less this freedom requires in many respects to be 
regulated and subjected to limitations. In many important fields 
and questions this is no longer-Qr no longer solely-effected by 
the state and its organs, but by virtue of Community authority 
(Gemeinschaftsgewalt). There is  no need here to consider how 
the European Communities may be classified within traditional 
categories, that is: whether they are to be viewed more as mem-
bers of the family of international organizations, or as suprana-
tional organizations sui generis,  or even as  having, to some ext~ 
ent, the configuration of a State itself; what however cannot be 
ignored or disputed is that powers to regulate and to intervene, 
hitherto exercised by the States alone, are now asserted by Com-
munity organs. 
The limiting of  State authority (Staatsgewalt) by the fundamental 
rights (Grundrechte) and human rights of the individual is one 
of the most outstanding achievements of the modern constitu-
tional State. The extent, form and means of protection of these 
fundamental rights vary from State to State and reflect the influ-
ences of history and different traditions; we shall revert to this 
below. However, in the States with which we are concerned the 
fact that there is this fundamental constraint upon State author-
ity is not in question. At national as well as international level, 
efforts are continually being made to make good deficiencies in 
the protection of human rights. Such deficiencies are currently 
being picked up and discussed with particular emphasis in the 
field  of Community law.  The Community Treaties contain no 
catalogue of fundamental rights (Grundrechtskatalog), but only 
certain disparate and incomplete reference points for fundamen-
tal rights and the corresponding constraints on Community au-
thority. This creates dangers both for the individual and for the 
Community itself: the protection of the individual seems insuf-
ficiently secured; in so far as it is-and that is the case to a not 
inconsiderable extent-considered to be inalienable, there is the 
danger that measures taken at the national level in the interest 
of fundamental  rights could  run contrary  to, and  take effect 
against,  Community  authority.  Protection  of the  individual 
could therefore operate in a manner inimical to integration. 
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To resolve this difficulty various means and measures are pro-
posed. Ranging from embodying a formal and detailed catalogue 
of fundamental  rights in  Community law,  to dispensing with 
any provisions in express terms-combined with confidence in 
a Community Court exercising its jurisdiction in a manner both 
constitutional and sympathetic to the Community-there are a 
variety of ideas and possible solutions. Only in  relation to the 
general aim does there seem to be at least a broad consensus. The 
individual  requires  protection  against  Community  authority, 
and this protection must be found within Community law, since 
recourse to purely national guarantees and procedural machinery 
must jeopardize the existence and further development of the 
Community. 
The present study is intended as a contribution to the discussion 
from the point of view of legal science. The question is how, in 
terms of  law, the aim, namely, to g"!Jarantee and develop the pro-
tection of fundamental  rights by  Community law, can best be 
achieved. In finding the answer, a comparative study of the var-
ious national catalogues of  fundamental rights, and provisions of 
law relating thereto, will be as valuable a contribution as a glance 
at general international developments and tendencies. It is for 
those having the power and the responsibility of political deci-
sion to draw the conclusions, both from previous experience and 
from the political requirements of  the present time. In this study 
our purpose is simply to survey and assess from the point of  view 
of legal  science, which itself cannot in  the nature of things be 
immune from personal assessment and political evaluation. 
At any given moment, fundamental rights have to be seen in the 
context of the legal  and constitutional systems in  which they 
subsist or are to be inserted. This affects the present study in the 
following  way:  the problem of the protection of fundamental 
rights will have to be considered in the context of the European 
Community as it now exists, and as it continues to develop on 
the basis already created. We are concerned with the subsistence 
or insertion of  fundamental rights in the existing structure of  the 
Community, which can of course be developed and modified, 
but which can be assumed for the foreseeable future to be likely 
to remain in essence the same. If a European federal  State or a 
European Union were to come into being, with a fundamentally 
different  'constitutional' basis, the protection of fundamental 
rights would also have to be viewed differently and thought out 
afresh.2It is hard to imagine that a new European 'constitution' 
could, contrary to the trends and demands of  the times, dispense 
with an explicit and detailed guarantee of fundamental rights; 
but this is  not our problem. We are solely concerned with the 
protection of  fundamental rights within the current legal system 
of  the European Communities which, although capable of  devel-
opment, will retain its basic structure. 
1  Expression or Ipsen; d. his Europliisches Gemeinschartsrecht, 1972,  p.  187 and 
fass1m.  . 
Cr.  the  comments  m the  Report  or the  Commission  on  European  Union  or 
25.6.1975,  Supplement  5175  - Bull.  EC,  point  82  et  seq. 
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Any consideration of the protection of  fundamental rights with-
in the European Communities cannot disregard the question of 
how far the classical fundamental rights, and the inherited con-
cepts of  such rights, are in process of  change and evolution. I The 
discussion of  fundamental rights within individual States as well 
as on the international level has recently undergone a change of 
emphasis; and no end to this search for new or modified appro-
aches and solutions can yet be discerned. 
The classical fundamental and human rights were and are in-
tended to protect the individual from undue interference by State 
authority in his personal and individual development. Belief and 
conscience, property, personal freedom, freedom of  opinion and 
assembly should be safeguarded against State intervention and 
statutory regulation. This was, and still is, the basic premise, and 
even nowadays remains an especially important concern of  fund-
amental rights. This view of  fundamental rights is closely related 
to a social order in which private initiative and individual free-
dom are accorded considerable scope, with a high degree of tol-
erance for the differing circumstances of actual cases. 
'Social fundamental rights' have little place in the classical cat-
alogue of  fundamental rights. It is true that the French catalogue 
of fundamental rights of 1793  did mention public welfare and 
stressed the duty of society to  protect citizens in need of help, 
and since then the right to work or to receive social protection 
from the State has found its way into the catalogue of  fundamen-
tal rights in many constitutions; but the legal systems prevailing 
in States of  the Western constitutional type have only made con-
stitutional provision for social fundamental rights in a sporadic 
and eclectic fashion. On the other hand, social security has, out-
side the catalogue of fundamental rights, found its way in many 
instances into the national or international legal system. Modern 
legislation relating to the protection given to employees and so-
cial security are, like other services provided by the State for so-
cially disadvantaged persons, characteristics of modem legal de-
velopment. At the international level, numerous agreements of 
the  International  Labour  Organization,  the  European  Social 
Charter of 1961 and the International Convention of  the United 
Nations of 1966 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights make 
provision for significant social guarantee. Some countries are dis-
cussing the adoption of  social fundamental rights into their con-
stitution.2 This development is probably still incomplete. It will 
have to be borne in mind in any consideration of the protection 
of fundamental rights within the European Communities. 
The same applies in the case of a further tendency in the current 
discussion on fundamental rights. There are indications and evi-
dence to suggest that the discussion of fundamental rights  is 
linked more strongly than before to overall democratic demands. 
Partly by stressing the principle of equality and the demand for 
citizens to enjoy equality in the real, and not merely in the legal 
sense, and partly by invoking the general principles of  democracy 
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there is a demand for more active participation and involvement 
(Teilhabe und Teilnahme) on the part of the citizen in establish-
ing what interests of  the community are to be.3 From various qu-
arters the democratization of the administration, the economy 
and other social areas is sought after, and set out as a require-
ment. It is  hard to judge how far this tendency will prove both 
lasting and justified; we do not intend to expresss any view on 
this aspect. 
In any discussion on the protection of  fundamental rights within 
the European Communities a decision has to be reached as  to 
whether the classical protective fundamental rights alone should 
be codified and strengthened or whether social and democratic 
fundamental rights-the word 'democratic' being used in the 
broad sense-should also be included within the strengthened 
protection. Contemporary social and intellectual trends speak in 
favour of such inclusion, but there are strong reasons to the con-
trary. Social and democratic fundamental rights and rights of  par-
ticipation are not only less capable of  being formulated in a clear 
and unequivocal manner than protective rights, but they are also 
less  susceptible  fo  direct  application  and enforcement by  the 
courts. The discussion on fundamental rights within the Euro-
pean Communities has hitherto been conducted from the point 
of view of the requirements of the rule of law (unter rechtssta-
atlichen Gesichtspunkten); predominantly, the search has been, 
and is, for rights on the part of the individual which can be pro-
tected by  the courts. If the protective rights against undue en-
croachment by State authority are supplemented by rights in re-
lation  to  the  performance  of statutory  duties  by  the  State 
(Leistungsanspriiche) and to democratic participation, the dis-
cussion will acquire new dimensions both in theory and in prac-
tice:  the  actual  conferring  and  guaranteeing  of fundamental 
rights by  the legislature, the executive and the judiciary must 
clearly differ in relation to protective rights from what it would 
be in relation to social fundamenal rights and democratic rights 
of participation.  This  is  merely  mentioned in  passing.  In my 
opinion, there is however a dilemma to consider here: the inser-
tion of social  and  democratic  basic  rights  into a catalogue of 
fundamental rights accords with a contemporary trend, but if it 
is to be followed, the price will probably be a surrender of some 
degree of judicial protection. 
t  Cf.  among  many  others Friesenhahn,  Der Wandel  des  Grundrechtsverstii.nd-
nisses,  Sitzungsberichte  des  50.  Deutschen  Juristentages  1974,  G  I  et  seq;  and 
Saladin,  Grundrechte im  Wandel  1970,  each  with  further  references. 
1  Cf. e.g. for Switzerland Jorg P. Muller,  Soziale Grundrechte in der Verfassung? 
Schweiz.  Juristenverein,  Referate  und Mitteilungen,  107  (1973)  No  4;  and  Benz. 
Die  Kodifikation  der Sozialrechte, ZUrcher  Beitriige  zur Rechtswissenschaft, 419 
(1973)  each  with  further  references. 
3  Cf.  discussions in  Germany e.g.  Martens-Hiiber/e,  Grundrechte im  Leistungs-
staat,  VerotTentlichungen  der  Vereinigung  der  Deutschen  Staatsrechtslehrer  30 
(1972). 
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in the field of fundamental rights 
Any consideration of the guaranteeing of fundamental rights at 
a European level must obviously and unavoidably have regard to 
the fundamental rights already entrenched in the legal systems 
of the Member States. In view of the fact that the catalogue of 
fundamenal rights and guarantees in respect thereof of  the Mem-
ber States of the European Communities differ so appreciably, 
one of  the most difficult questions is the extent to which national 
legal concepts and provisions should be incorporated into 'Euro-
pean' law.  Between two unacceptable extremes-incorporating 
the catalogue of fundamental rights of only one Member State 
into Community law, and aggregating all national guarantees in 
respect of fundamental rights with the consequence that Com-
munity authority would be closely hemmed in by a diversity of 
constraints-there lies a large number of possible structures, be-
tween which those bearing political responsibility  will  have to 
make their choice. This choice can, to a certain extent, be made 
easier by comparative legal survey. 
Comparative public law is not only a relatively young discipline 
but also gives rise to special difficulties and problems. I First, stu-
dies on comparative law  are more productive according to the 
extent to which the legal  systems compared are  in  accord  on 
questions of principle, or approximate to each other thereon; on 
the  other hand, comparisons  between constitutional  systems 
which are unalike, such as a constitutional system exemplifying 
the rule of law and separation of powers and the constitution of 
a people's democracy, are  particularly difficult.  This difficulty 
may be disregarded below, since in the case of  the Member States 
of the European Community we do find agreement as to basic 
questions on the organization of the State, despite all the differ-
ences on particular aspects. 
A mere comparison of the texts of the constitutions and of the 
ordinary statutes (einfache Gesetze) giving expression to funda-
mental rights under the national laws in question may be inter-
esting and valuable from a philological or semantic point of  view, 
but for exploration in the field of  comparative Jaw such mere tex-
tual comparison is  inadequate and  unproductive. The subsis-
tence, significance and scope of  provisions of  law can only be ac-
curately perceived if the actual exercise of  authority by the State, 
not least through the courts, is explored. In comparing legal sys-
tems it is not normally appropriate to consider first one particular 
system and its structure, and then to compare the provisions ob-
taining in other systems by reference to it. Rather, comparisons 
of law will normally proceed on a practical basis (zweckmassig), 
from the matter of  fact in question, from the issues of  actual fact 
to be resolved, and will then inquire as to what legal  solutions 
and provisions for dealing with these issues are available under 
the various national systems. Not infrequently it will be apparent 
that different legal systems pursue, and achieve, the same objec-
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tive in quite different ways. Herein lies one of the particular dif-
ficulties of comparative legal studies, and in this field of funda-
mental rights it is aggravated by the fact that the problems relat-
ing to fundamental rights are at the same time eminently 'pol-
itical' problems, because they are highly relevant to the structure 
of State and society. 
These difficulties require further clarification, and we shall revert 
to specific aspects in due course. As is well known, most, though 
not all, countries of the European Community have a written 
constitution. In so far as written constitutions exist, some con-
tain  no  provisions,  or  scarcely  any,  relating  to  fundamental 
rights; others contain detailed catalogues of fundamental rights 
which present notable differences of detail.  There are further-
more important differences between  the powers  vested in  the 
courts to review alleged violations of  these rights (Kontrollbefug-
nisse). Many constitutions provide for the courts of the legisla-
ture (by means of  a constitutional court orby the ordinary courts 
in the broader sense), while other constitutions such as the (un-
written) British one regard the legislature as omnipotent. Such 
important structural differences may well prove largely irrelevant 
for the purpose of practical questions of fundamental rights and 
for considering the policy of the law  on the establishment of a 
European catalogue of fundamental rights.  It may well be that 
some fundamental right, e.g. the freedom of conscience, or the 
protecion of  property, is more effectively and extensively secured 
within a constitutional system having only minimal guarantees 
for  fundamental  rights and· deficient provision  for judicial  re-
view, than in a State with an elaborate catalogue of  fundamental 
rights  and jurisdiction to  review  on the part of constitutional 
courts; in one State certain rights may as a rule be respected by 
reason of tradition and the prevailing social order without any 
formal constitutional guarantees, whereas in another State hav-
ing  a  catalogue  of fundamental  rights  statutory  reservations 
(Regelungsvorbehalt) attaching to the rights secured in the con-
stitution may deprive the fundamental  rights in  question of a 
large  measure of their efficacity. The structural differences be-
tween the constitutional systems can in other contexts become 
extremely important, that is, where we are concerned with read-
iness to accept basic changes: a national legislature which is con-
stitutionally omnipotent but which in  practice respects certain 
fundamental rights may be less willing to surrender its virtually 
absolute powers of regulation than a legislature whose acts are 
subject to review by  a constitutional court. These overlapping 
questions and considerations must be  identified and borne in 
mind  in  any  search  for  Europen  guarantees  of fundamental 
rights conducted on the basis of an exploration of comparative 
law. 
In  this  context  we  must take  into  account  yet  another fun-
damental difficulty, which is hitherto largely without historical 
1  Cf. e.g. the remarks on 'Vergleichung im  offentlichen Recht' by Kaiser,  Streb-
el,  Bernh~rdt and Zemanek,  ZaoRV, 24 (1964),  p.  391· et seq,  and the colloquia on 
comparative law of the Max-Planck-Institut on 'Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in  der 
Gegenwll!1'·  'Haftung  des  Staates  flir  rechtswidriges  Verhalten  seiner  Organe' 
and 'Genchtsschutz gegen die  Exekutive', Beitrage zum austandischen offentlich-
en Recht  und Villkerrecht, 36  (1962),  44  (1967)  and 52  (1969)  with  introductions 
by  Mosler. 
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erto always been intended to set limits to the sovereign and in-
herently boundless authority of the State. In principle, all fields 
of personal activity and life in society are potentially vulnerable 
to intrusion by State authority. The comprehensive powers for 
interference on the part of  the State are countered by the individ-
ual's  entitlement  to  protection  (Individualpositionen)  of his 
fundamental rights (such at least is the traditional constitutional 
concept of the Western democracies, as opposed to the meaning 
given to fundamental rights in the people's democracies).  The 
usual content of any catalogue of fundamental  rights now be-
comes entirely clear: protection is afforded above all in those ar-
eas of  individual activity wherein the dignity and freedom of the 
individual is particularly affected and protection from the omni-
potent State is seen as a matter of particular urgency. The cata-
logues of  fundamental rights which have been evolved on the le-
vel  of international  law  during  these last  three decades,  and 
which have in part become legally binding, have also pursued in 
essence the same objectives as the systems of  fundamental rights 
under national law:  they are intended to protect the individual 
against interference and undue intrusion by the State, and princ-
ipally in the particularly important field of  the individual's choice 
as to how he leads his life in relation to freedom of the person, 
of belief, of conscience, of home, etc.-as witness the freedoms 
contained in the European Convention of Human Rights ('the 
ECHR'). 
Within  the ambit  of the European  Communities, the initial 
question is different. At present, and for the foreseeable future, 
Community authority can only to a limited extent be compared 
to national authority. Freedom of  belief and conscience, protec-
tion from unjust arrest and prosecution, postal secrecy, freedom 
of the press and of artistic endeavour and many other freedoms 
are  scarcely, if at  all, affected  by  Community authority. This 
statement is not free from qualification, and occasional interfer-
ence by Community authority with certain of  these rights can by 
no means be ruled out; but this will be demonstrated at a later 
·stage. Nevertheless it is  not in doubt that the traditional fund-
amental rights appear to be jeopardized o~ly to a slight degree by 
the authority wielded by the European Communities. This con-
cerns perhaps chiefly the freedom to carry on a trade or occupa-
tion, the protection of  property, the right to equal treatment, and 
also those guarantees for the protection of the individual which 
can be described as essential features of the constitutional State 
or of'due process of law'. We shall revert to this. It does, how-
ever, given the current structure and current powers of  the Com-
munity, seem doubtful  whether the question of fundamental 
rights should be gone into in its entirety and to its traditional ext-
ent, or whether it is not preferable to restrict discussion to those 
fundamental rights which are more likely to be jeopardized and 
violated by the Community. 
This would have the followil.~ consequences for any relevant 
comparison oflaw. First, it must be considered which individual 
rights and possible fields for individual activity seem to be most 
endangered by the Community organs (and by national organs 
acting pursuant to Community law). These dangers will have to 
be set against the appropriate fundamental rights of the national 
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legal systems, and it must then be considered whether, and, if  so, 
to what extent, common rules of national legal systems should 
be incoporated into Community law, or whether an independent 
catalogue of  European guarantees of  fundamental rights could be 
evolved, perhaps loosely founded on existing national models, or 
whether we should, for the time being at least, refrain from seek-
ing to embody Community fundamental rights in legal rules at 
all. 
4.  The conduct and limits of this study 
The following study is chiefly concerned with making a survey 
and arriving at conclusions as to the extent to which fundamen-
tal rights are currently guaranteed and embodied in national legal 
systems, and in the legal system of  the Community. This can be 
no more than a cursory portrayal, since a complete discussion of 
fundamental rights and related problems in nine Member States 
and in Community law is manifestly impossible. We shall start 
by examining and describing in a general way the entrenchment 
(Verankerung) of  fundamental rights in the legal systems of the 
nine Member States; in doing this, it will scarcely be possible to 
discuss current trends in the direction of  a fresh interpretation of 
fundamental rights, and the emphasis will be on the traditional 
view of fundamental rights and their protection by the courts up 
to the present time. This will be  followed by conclusions as  to 
ho•v far fundamental rights are recognized within the present le-
gal system of the Community. These findings will include a dis-
cussion of the question how far Member States of the Commu-
nity have obligations under international treaty, in particular the 
ECHR, to respect fundamental rights, and how far these obliga-
tions have effect in relation to the Community and its organs. 
The contrast between the protection of  fundamental rights with-
in  the Member States on the one hand and safeguarding them 
within the legal system of the Community on the other hand, 
may indicate to what extent, if any, protection of fundamental 
rights in the Community is deficient. 
In a further section we shall discuss, by way of  example, one par-
ticular fundamental right-the right to freedom of economic ac-
tivity (Gewerbefreiheit)-and a constitutional duty having the 
characteristics of  a fundamental right-the duty to respect an in-
dividual's vested rights and interests (Gebot zur Respektierung 
erworbener Rechte  und Interessen des einzelnen).  These two 
fundamental rights, if they are in fact fundamental rights, have 
been selected since they can be of particular significance for  th 
European Community, and are  at the same time suitable for 
demonstrating the possibilities and.limitations of  regulating such 
matters at European level on the basis of  a comparison of  nation-
allegal concepts. In this context also, it will not  be possible to fol-
low all the ramifications of  nationa!.legal systems and to do com-
plete justice to all problems arising. To evolve a complete set of 
findings in full detail, omitting nothing and free from any inac-
curacy, would require considerably wider and more time-con-
suming preparatory work, and consultation with experts from 
the various Community countries. It should however be possi-
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and limitations of introducing a European catalogue of funda-
mental rights on the basis of studies in comparative law. 
This paper  will  conclude  with an attempt  to  summarize and 
assess, accompanied by  some reflections on questions of legal 
policy. 
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II  - The  general  pos1t1on 
in  relation  to  fundamental 
rights  in  the  legal  systems  of 
the  Community  and  its  Member 
States 
1.  Fundamental rights in the legal systems 
of the nine Member States : A survey 
As  has  already  been  said,  an exploration  in  comparative law 
should not in principle be restricted to a comparison of  individual 
provisions and their wording, but should rather consider how 
rules are entrenched in the legal systems in question, their most 
important characteristics, and the efficacy of the written rules. 
This applies especially in relation to the comparative survey of 
fundamental rights in the Member States of the European Com-
munities. We shall seek to outline below the extent to which, if 
at all, fundamental rights are entrenched in the legal systems of 
the Member States, whether and if so, to what extent, they are 
at the mercy of the legislative body having power to enact con-
stitutional amendments or ordinary statutes, and to what extent 
the national courts review and guarantee respect for fundamen-
tal  rights. 
Belgium 
The Belgian Constitution of 1831 contains in its Title II a series 
of fundamental rights. With the exception of  the particular pro-
hibition of discrimination incorporated into the Constitution in 
1970, these fundamentel rights are still valid in the form given 
to them by those enacting the Constitution in  1831. They bear 
the stamp of  the liberal thought of  that period. They are therefore 
almost exclusively rights of  freedom, intended to protect the hu-
man being as such, and they hardly consider him at all in his re-
lations with society. We therefore find the guarantee of  individ-
ual freedom (Article 7) combined with safeguards in the event of 
prosecution and arrest, and also the prohibition of  certain forms 
of punishment (Articles 12, 13); then there is the inviolability of 
the home (Article 10); equality before the law (Article 6); inviol-
ability of property (Article 11); and constitutional provision for 
cases of  expropriation 'pour cause d'utilite publique'; free use of 
languages (Article 23). Of no small importance, moreover, is the 
protection of the various aspects of freedom of opinion, which 
according to the Belgian Constitution embraces the protection of 
religion (Articles 14,  15), the freedom of assembly (Article 19), 
and the freedom of association (Article 20), and, moreover, ex-
tends to  the freedom  of education (Article 17),  press  freedom 
(Articles 18, 19), postal secrecy (Article 22), and the right of pet-
itioning (Article 21). These fundamental rights are in part subject 
to a general reservation that they may be amended by law. This 
29 applies especially to the guarantee of individual freedom, the in-
violability of the home, the freedom of education and the free-
dom of assembly.  But even in respect  of those  fundamental 
rights not subject to such reservation, limitation by enactment of 
Parliament is thought to be permissible, as for instance regarding 
postal secrecy  .1 
From this and from  the fact  that no clear limitations can be 
established on the restriction of  fundamental rights by the legis-
lature, one might infer that the idea in the minds of those enact-
ing  the fundamental  rights of the Belgian  Constitution, and 
which continues to make itself felt, is that the protection of the 
individual must primarily be secured against the executive, since 
it is most directly concerned with the individual and would be 
most likely to be in a position to infringe individual rights in the 
interests of effective administration. For this reason, the main-
tenance of  liberties was entrusted primarily to the legislature and 
the courts.  2 
Although fundamental rights are binding on all State authority 
and therefore in principle on the legislature as well, according to 
constitutional practice hitherto the legislature nevertheless has 
the power, in enacting statutes having constitutional implica-
tions, to interpret and apply, free from any kind of constraint or 
review, the fundamental rights thereby affected and therein to be 
answerable only to itself. 
Nor does the Belgian Constitution contain any limitations as to 
constitutional amendments in relation  to fundamental  rights. 
Any constitutional amendment is  however subject to a  rather 
complicated procedure. Pursuant to Article 131 of the Constitu-
tion, any constitutional amendment requires first of  all a declar-
ation by  the legislature showing cause that the constitutional 
provision should be amended. After such declaration both cham-
bers are dissolved by law. It is only the newly elected chambers 
which then have the power to amend the Constitution, together 
with the King and by a qualified majority. In this way it is  en-
sured that by means of the fresh elections the electorate is indi-
rectly  able  to  assert  its views on the proposed  constitutional 
amendment. 
Outside the Constitution, guarantees of fundamental rights are 
found principally in the ECHR which came into force in Belgium 
as part of  the law of  the land by virtue of  the Law of 13 May 1955. 
According to recent developments in Belgian case law, and espe-
cially  after the judgment of the Cour de Cassation of 27  May 
1971 ,3  the courts may review the compatibility of a statute re· 
solved by Parliament with international law embodied in treaties 
having directly applicable legal effect in Belgium, and can, if  they 
find such statute incompatible with such a provision of intema-
tionallaw, set it aside. In derogation therefore from the principle 
that the courts have no jurisdiction to review statutes as to their 
compatibility with the Constitution, the individual is, in this re-
gard, placed in a position where he can bring before the Belgian 
courts breaches of fundamental rights arising by virtue of ordi-
nary statutes, at least in so far as there is a breach of the ECHR 
or even of the EEC Treaty.4 
30 
Fundamental rights are only partly subject to the protection of 
the courts. For the review by the courts of the constitutionality 
of  statutes, the provision to be relied on, pursuant to the decided 
cases and the prevailing opinion of learned writers, has hitherto 
without exception been Article 107 of the Constitution, which 
reads: 'Les cours et tribunaux n'appliqueront les arretes et regle-
ments generaux, provinciaux et locaux, qu'autant qu'ils seront 
conformes aus lois'. From this provision the negative inference 
has hitherto always been drawn, particularly by the Cour de Cas-
sation, that it is no part of the courts' jurisdiction to review the 
constitutionality of  statutes.s According to the statute relating to 
the Conseil d'Etat of 23 December 1946, all that is possible is a 
preliminary review by  the Section de h~gislation of the Conseil 
d'Etat in proceedings for an opinion (Gutachtenverfahren). This 
review is  mandatory only where legislative proposals are intro-
duced by the executive, and then only in cases which are not 
matters of urgency-and the executive determines what is  ur-
gent. Moreover, this preliminary review does not derogate from 
the power of the legislature to interpret and apply the Constitu-
tion in sovereign manner. Certainly the principle of immunity 
from review applies only to the statute itself and not to subord-
inate instruments nor to royal decrees, which can of  course only 
be applied if they are compatible with the law, even the highest 
kind of law (the Constitution). A judgment of the Cour de Cas-
sation of 3 May 1974 and in particular the opinion ofProcureur 
general Ganshof van der Meersch in that case, have now given 
rise to doubt as to whether the courts are still disposed to main-
tain the principle whereby statutes are immune from review.6 A 
bill accepted by the Senate on 26 June 1975 and now transmitted 
to the House of Representatives is an attempt to counter this. 
The provision accepted by the Senate reads: 'Les cours et tribu-
naux ne sont pas juge de Ia constitutionnalite des lois et des dec-
rets'  _7  The outcome of the parliamentary process remains to be 
seen. 
Legal protection against undue intrusion by the executive in the 
field  of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights is  not 
restricted to that arising merely incidentally from an application 
of  Article I07 of  the Constitution, when the courts refuse to give 
effect to an unconstitutional provision of a subordinate instru-
ment; in so far as the claim for  legal  protection is  not directly 
aimed against the Crown, the courts and the Conseil d'Etat will 
also always grant judicial protection directly where the party af-
fected can show that his fundamental rights have been breached 
by the executive.s 
1  Cf.  Wigny,  Droit constitutionnel,  1952,  p.  320  et seq.; id.  Cours de droit con-
stitutionnel,  1973,  p.  154. 
z  Cf.  e.g.  Wigny,  Cour de  droit  constitutionnel, p.  138. 
3  Journal des tribunaux  1971,  pp.  471  to 474; p.lso  extracts in  ZaoRV 32  (1972), 
p.  529  et seq.  with  notes  by  8/eckmann,  op.  cit.,  p.  516  et seq. 
•  See  also  Wigny,  Cours  de  droit constitutionnel,  p.  140. 
'  See  Wigny,  Droit  constitutionnel,  p.  195,  with  further  references  to  decided 
cases.  See  also  the  report of de  Stexhe,  senat, 1974-1975,  Doc.  602,  No  2,  p.  2 
et seq. 
6  Cf.  Journal  des  tribunaux  1974,  p.  564;  and the  report  of de  Stexhe,  senat, 
1974-1975,  Doc.  602  No  2,  p.  4 et seq. 
7  Cf.  senat,  1974-1975,  Doc.  602,  Nos  I  and  2;  Chambre,  1975,  Doc.  637. 
'  Cf.  the detailed  report  of Velu,  Gerichtsschutz  gegen  die  Exekutive,  Vol.  I, 
1969,  Beitriige  zum auslandischen offentlichen  Recht  und  Volkerrecht  52  (1969), 
p.  60  et seq. 
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The Danish Constitution of 5 June 1953 contains a fairly large 
number of fundamental  rights, which can  be subdivided into 
three main groups: protective rights; rights of political freedom; 
and rights against the State to require performance of public ob-
ligations (Forderungsrechte).  Both the administration and the 
legislature  are bound to  observe these fundamental  rights or 
rights of freedom. If a citizen considers his fundamental rights 
to have been breached by the executive or the legislature, he can 
bring proceedings in the courts in respect thereof. 
In Chapter VII of  the Constitution, Articles 67, 68,70 guarantee 
freedom of religion; every citizen thus on the one hand has the 
right freely to practise his religion (Article 67) and on the other 
hand he may not be forced to perform specific religious obser-
vances (Article 68). Finally, his religious convictions or his origin 
may  not set him at any disadvantage (Article 70). 
Chapter VIII of  the Constitution grants a number of  fundamen-
tal rights; defines their actual content., and identifies in part the 
possible limitations thereto. Article 71(1) protects personal free-
dom, though not as a general freedom for personal activity, but 
only as opposed to  deprivation of freedom.2  The further para-
graphs of  the Article set out the circumstances under which-on 
the basis of statute or of  court order-personal freedom may be 
restricted, and what legal protection is available. Article 72 guar-
antees the inviolability of  the home, and the secrecy of  the postal 
and telephone services. These m:1y be curtailed by statute or by 
court order. According to Article 73  the right of property is in-
violable.  Under  certain  conditions-statutory  authority,  de-
mands of public interest, guarant,~.e of  compensation-expropri-
ation may take place; it can be challenged in the courts, as can 
the quantum of  any compensation. Article 74 enjoins the legis-
lature to abrogate any discriminatory statutes relating to the tak-
ing-up of  a trade or occupation and not justified in terms of pu-
blic interest. Article 75 contains in paragraph (I) a general right 
to work, and in paragraph (2) a right to social assistance from the 
State. Article 76 relates to compulsory education and the right to 
education. Article 77 guarantees freedom of  expression and pro-
hibits the reintroduction of  censorship or similar measures. The 
freedom of association is entrenched in Article 78; in addition, 
it states in what circumstances association may be  prohibited, 
and the preconditions therefor. According to Article 79 citizens 
have the right without prior notification  to assemble without 
arms. The police nevertheless retain a right of supervision over 
public assemblies; they may even disperse open-air assemblies. 
Article 80 contains rules of  conduct for the armed forces in case 
of  civil commotion. Article 81 obliges all men capable of  bearing 
arms to contribute to the defence of the country. Article 82 con-
tains the right of  social councils to administrative autonomy. Ar-
ticle 83 guarantees, so far as the legislative process is concerned, 
equality of  treatment, irrespective of  title or rank, whether inher-
ited or not. Article 84 prohibits the introduction of  feudalism and 
entails. Article 85 finally provides for a possible restriction of  per-
sonal freedom such as of the rights of association and assembly, 
in the case of members of the armed forces. 
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This conspectus shows that the Danish Constitution contains an 
impressive catalogue of fundamental  rights,  including  social 
fundamental rights (the right to work, the right to social assist-
ance, to education). 
In principle, these fundamental rights are available both for Dan-
ish nationals and for foreigners. It is only occasionally that for-
eigners are explicitly denied the protection of  fundamental rights 
(for instance Article 71(1X2)). 
The Danish legal system lacks amongst other things a codified 
general requirement of  equality of treatment or a prohibition on 
discrimination. Although some parts of the Constitution (Arti-
cles 70, 71(1), 83) do contain a prohibition against treating an in-
dividual by reference to specific personal circumstances on his 
part, it is doubtful whether any general principle can be deduced 
from  these provisions.  Some  commentators  leave  the  whole 
question open;3 others affirm the duty of the administration to 
observe a general principle of equality of treatment.4 
According to Article 88 of the Constitution every constitutional 
provision,  and  therefore  every  fundamental  right,  can  be 
changed or abrogated, and new provisions can likewise be incor-
porated into the Constitution. There is no inviolate core in the 
Danish Constitution, either as  a whole or in  individual provi-
sions thereof. 5 Nevertheless Article 88 sets out rather a ponder-
ous  procedure  for  constitutional  amendment.  Any  proposed 
amendment must first of all  be accepted by  Parliament. A new 
Parliament must then be elected, and it  must likewise approve 
the proposal. Finally a referendum is held, in which a majority 
of  all persons voting and at least 40 % of the electorate must ap-
prove the constitutional amendment. 
Although  Denmark  ratified  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights  in  1953,  the  provisions  thereof have  not  yet 
become the law of the land. 
In principle, fundamental rights in  Denmark are reinforced by 
judicial  protection.  There  is  one single jurisdiction  which  is 
competent in actions under both private and public law, and also 
in actions for constitutional review of statutory rules. 
Any person who has a legitimate interest in a statute or who is 
likely to be affected to his detriment can challenge a statute in the 
courts on the ground that it is in breach of one of the aforesaid 
fundamental rights. This independent power of review of statu-
tory rules, which is entrenched neither in  the Constitution nor 
in imy other statute, has been recognized generally since a judg-
ment of the Supreme Court in 1921. The introduction of  such a 
right to review was founded on the one hand on the considera-
1  The description of the legal  situation is based substantially on Andersen,  Dansk 
Forvaltningsret, 5th ed.  1966; it  is  not  possible to  deal  with  more  recent  trends 
in  the  interpretation of fundamental  rights. 
1  SfJrensen,  Statsforfatningsret,  1969,  p.  321. 
l  Sorensen,  op.  cit.,  p.  318. 
4  Andersen,  Dansk  Forvaltningsret, op.  cit., p.  426  et  seq. 
s  Andersen,  Dansk  Statsforfatningsret,  1954,  p.  439. 
31 tion of legal theory that higher-ranking constitutional law must 
. prevail over lower-ranking ordinary statutes , and on the other 
hand on the desire to protect the citizen from decisions of  the leg-
islature which were contrary to law .1 Procedure and judgment in 
an action for review of a statutory provision follow the rules ap-
plicable generally. There is however controversy as to whether 
the right of  judicial review of  statutory provisions deriving from 
the common law has the status of  constitutional law ,2 or whether 
it can be abrogated by an ordinary statute.3 In practice, there has 
not been any case in which a court has declared a statutory pro-
vision to be unconstitutional. This is particularly connected with 
the fact  that the legislature is allowed by  the courts extensive 
scope for the exercise of  political discretion.4 Only in a case of  un-
doubted violation of  the Constitution may the provision in ques-
tion be declared unconstitutional. Also, the principle of  interpre-
tation in conformity with the Constitution applies.5 
In addition to the independent power to review statutory provi-
sions, it is recognized that the courts also have the right to ex-
ercise such review in cases where constitutionality is not the sub-
stantive issue (Inzidentkontrolle). What is not entirely free from 
doubt is  whether the court in  this  respect  is  also  entitled to 
proceed to such review ofits own motion; in any event this does 
not happen as a matter of practice.6 
In respect both of  the independent power to review statutory pro-
visions and of the power to exercise such review in cases where 
constitutionality  is  not  the  substantive  issue,  any  judgment 
rendered will only have effect in the future and between the par-
ties involved. However, the administration and the courts gen-
erally follow judicial precedent, and it may be assumed that they 
will thereafter refrain from applying any provision declared un-
constitutional. 
A fundamental right expressed in the constitution in the form of 
a right to require the performance of  some public obligation (For-
derungsrecht), e.g. a right to work or to social assistance, cannot 
be asserted in the courts solely on the basis of the constitutional 
provision. The relevant constitutional provisions (Articles 74, 75, 
76) are of importance merely as a programme-as evidenced by 
the history of the development of the Constitution.? 
If an international treaty entered into by the State interferes with 
the rights of the individual, a similar action  may  be  brought 
against the statute concerning its relation to the treaty. 
Regulations promulgated by the administration may also be re-
viewed, both independently and in cases where constitutionality 
is not the substantive issue, as to their compatibility with statute 
or Constitution. 
According to Article 63 of the Danish Constitution, the courts 
have the right to determine all questions as to the extent of the 
powers of administrative authorities. While in principle any ex-
ecutive action, e.g. even an act of the Government (Regierung-
sakt), can be reviewed as to its legality, the legislature can exclude 
the right to bring an action in the courts by adding to the statute 
a provision whereby the terms of that statute are to be conclu-
sive. The power of  the courts to review is likewise removed if the 
administration was given scope for the exercise of discretion in 
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making its decision. Despite more recent trends-the courts do 
to a certain extent review  administrative acts  notwithstanding 
clauses declaring them conclusive or conferring discretion-this 
is still basically the position today. An action can be brought not 
only against provisions of general  application, e.g.  regulations, 
but also against individual administrative acts. If a citizen seeks 
specific action by the administration, and the administration re-
fuses, or fails to do anything, he may bring proceedings in respect 
of  such omission. In certain circumstances, the citizen is bound 
to respect a particular preliminary procedure; and this is normally 
done without the need for any statutory requirement to that ef-
fect, since this can usually bring about a satisfactory outcome 
more expeditiously and cheaply than recourse to the courts. 
The Danish administrative authorities are bound by the principle 
of  administration in accordance with the law ,8 that is, that their 
acts must be based on law, which in tum cannot be contrary to 
the Constitution. It also holds good that individual administra-
tive acts may  not be contrary to the Constitution. 
Danish administrative law contains some possibilities of extra-
judicial  legal  protection.  The citizen  has  in  some cases  the 
opportunity,  or,  in  other  cases,  the  obligation  to  challenge 
administrative acts and subordinate instruments which infringe 
his rights by referring the matter in the first place to the admin-
istrative authority immediately superior. The decision of  the ad-
ministration is then reviewed both as to its legality and as to its 
appropriateness  in  relation  to  the  purpose  it  is  intended  to 
achieve (Zweckmlissigkeit) and if necessary another decision is 
substituted therefor. If there is provisoin for appeal, the person 
affected may subsequently tum to the courts. For certain matters 
there are 'appellate committees', which review, to a certain ext-
ent independently of the other parts of the administration, the 
measures taken by  the authority in question; the decisions of 
such committees may as a rule be challenged in court.9 
In addition to those forms of appeal and appellate committees, 
the 'Ombudsman' is by far the most important of all the forms 
of  extra-judicial protection of rights. The institution of the Om-
budsman, who is appointed by Parliament and is completely in-
dependent, has its legal basis in Article 55 of the Constitution 
and in the statute of 1 December 1961. The creation of such an 
institution was intended on the one hand to give the citizen a 
quicker and cheaper form oflegal protection against the admin-
istration, and on the other hand to render subject to review such 
1  Castberg,  Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit  in  Norwegen  und  Diinemark  Beitriige 
zum ausliindischen  <;~ffentli~hen Recht'  und  Viilkerrecht,  36  (1962),  p. '420. 
2  Thus the predommant v1ew:  e.g.  Andersen,  Dansk Statsforfatningsret, p.  460; 
Serensen,  op.  cit., p.  302. 
l  Thus Ross,  Dansk Statsforfatningsret, 2nd ed.  1966, p.  195 et seq.,  with further 
references. 
•  Ross,  op.  cit., p.  194. 
5  Serensen,  op.  cit.,  p.  298. 
6  Cf.  Bent  Christensen,  Der gerichtliche  Rechtsschutz des einzelnen  gegeniiber 
der vollziehenden Gewalt in  Diinemark, Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen 
Recht  und  Volkerrecht  5 (I) (1969),  p.  122. 
7  Castberg,  op.  cit.,  p.  432;  Serensen,  op.  cit.,  p.  319; Ross,  op.  cit., p.  758. 
8  Krarup  and Mathiassen,  Forvaltningsret,  1967,  p.  118  et  seq. 
9  Serensen,  op.  cit.,  p.  289;  Christensen,  op.  cit., p.  124. 
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lenge in court. Of his own motion, or on the application of  an in-
dividual in that behalf, the Ombudsman investigates any admin-
istrative  act-simple administrative  measures,  administrative 
action, or even activities  having no  legal  significance whatso-
ever-as to its legality and reasonableness. There are doubts as 
to whether the institution of the Ombudsman-which was in-
itially intended as an experiment-may be abolished by ordinary 
statute, or only by constitutional amendment) Since the deci-
sions of the Ombudsman are not legally binding-he may refer 
the matter for investigation and legal proceedings to the author-
ities competent to take such action in the case in question, but 
cannot alter or annul the decision-the administrative authority 
concerned is free to decide whether it will look afresh at what it 
has done, and thereafter adopt a different attitude in the actual 
case in question. It should however be said that the administra-
tion as a rule follows the recommendations of the Ombudman.2 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23  May 
1949 has shaped the protection of the individual's fundamental 
rights in a manner which is without parallel in former German 
constitutions or in comparable foreign  constitutional systems. 
This is not so as regards the guaranteed rights themselves, but 
rather as  regards the way in which they are protected. The pre-
dominant guarantees are in respect of  the traditional rights of  the 
individual against undue intrusior.. by  State authority. Among 
the most significant of the guaranteed fundamental rights are: 
the protection of the dignity of  the individual human being (Ar-
ticle  1), the right of free  personal development (Article 2),  the 
pinciple  of equality (Article  3),  freedom  of religion  and  con-
science (Article 4), freedom of opinion and of the press, as well 
as  freedom of artistic and scientific endeavour (Article 5), free-
dom of assembly (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 9), 
secrecy in  relation to letters, mails and telephone communica-
tions (Article 10), freedom of  movement (Article 11), freedom of 
choice of trade or profession (Article  12), and the guarantee of 
property (Article 14). In addition there are provisions as to the ci-
vil  (staatsbtirgerlich) equality of all  German nationals (Article 
33), the constitutional entrenchment of the principle of liability 
on the part of the State for breaches of administrative duties (Ar-
ticle 34), provisions on the principles relating to electoral law (Ar-
ticle 38), and on the protection of the individual during civil or 
criminal proceedings (abolition of the death penalty, Article 102; 
the right to be heard; no punishment without legal justification; 
autrefois convect,  Article 103; and guarantees in relation to dep-
rivation of freedom, Article 104). 
Many of the fundamental rights are available to any person, re-
gardless of nationality, others only to  'Germans'. 
The Constitution contains a complicated system providing for 
possible derogations from these fundamental rights. Many fund-
amental rights are guaranteed without reservation (which does 
not however completely exclude any requisite delimitation and 
more specific elaboration by the courts and by  learned writers), 
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while other fundamental rights have been subjected by the Con-
stitution itself to a reservation permitting more detailed statutory 
provision; under no circumstances may the 'essential content' 
(' Wesensgehalt ')of  a fundamental right be altered (Article 19(2)). 
Social fundamental rights are largely absent from the Basic Law. 
In this context we cannot go into greater detail in relation to cer-
tain recent tendencies, in some areas oflearned writing, and also 
in decided cases, to declare social rights and democratic rights of 
participation  (Teilhaberechte)  to  be  parts  of the  Constitution 
pursuant to the general principle of the social State and the con-
stitutional requirement of  democracy (in some cases in conjunc-
tion with the principle of  equality), and to interpret them afresh 
accordingly. 
Apart from the guaranteed fundamental rights contained in the 
Basic Law there are a number of  other provisions for the protec-
tion of the individual.  Thus, some of the constitutions of the 
Lander of the Federation contain detailed catalogues of funda-
mental rights which subsist concurrently with  the Basic  Law 
(Article 142). The ECHR with its Additional Protocols has the 
force of  law in the Federal Republic, ranking according to the pre-
vailing view, on a par with an ordinary statute. In numerous 
other statutes, the social protection ofthe individual in particular 
is  more specifically established, and judicial protection will as a 
rule be available to reinforce such social protection. 
So far as the text of the Constitution is concerned (Articles 1(3), 
20(3)) it is beyond doubt and undisputed that the legislature also 
is bound by the Basic Law. While, as has been mentioned above, 
the legislature has the power within certain limits to evolve more 
specific elaborations of fundamental rights or derogations there-
from, none the less there is  no single fundamental right which 
is at the mercy of the legislature, and ultimately it  is always for 
the courts to draw the line between those derogations from fund-
amental rights which are lawful and those which are not. 
The manner in which the judicial protection of rights has been 
shaped by  the Basic Law  is  the really outstanding and perhaps 
unique feature  of West German constitutional law.  From the 
outset, the Constitution itself provides that there are rights of  ac-
tion in the courts against any breach by  public authority of the 
rights of the individual (Article 19(4)).  Thus, independently of 
any enabling provision in the ordinary statute in question, every 
act of the executive constituting an interference in the sphere of 
the individual can be challenged in court. The courts have the 
right and the duty to review the manner in which public author-
ity  has observed the Constitution, including the fundamental 
rights. It  follows that in judicial practice, especially that of  the ad-
ministrative courts, the fundamental rights and certain further 
constitutional maxims play an unusually important role.  Indi-
vidual  fundamental  rights, including the principle of equality, 
and  'unwritten' constitutional principles  such as  the require-
ments of  the rule of  law, the principle of  proportionality, etc., fre-
quently govern the manner in which the courts conduct their re-
1  As  to  the  latter:  Ross.  op.  cit.,  p.  774. 
'  On  this  point in  detail:  Ross,  op.  cit.,  p.  771  e/  seq.;  Christensen,  op.  cit., p. 
125,  and  bibliography,  p.  126. 
33 view.  Whenever the courts hold these rights and principles to 
have been breached they correct the executive act in question. 
They do so on their own  authority and  alone are  answerable 
therefor; they are only  subject to restrictions in so  far as  they 
deny the constitutionality of a formal statute. 
In principle, the compatibility of statutes with the Constitution, 
and thereby also with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution, can come before the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
three separate ways. First, other organs of State and a one-third 
minority of  the members of  the Bundestag may demand a review 
of the constitutionality of a statute by  the constitutional court 
(Article 93(1) (2)). 
Secondly, any court of the Federal Republic can submit to the 
constitutional court for  review  any  provision of law  which  it 
would have to apply but which it considers to be unconstitution-
al (Article 1  00(1)). Finally, any citizen can apply directly to the 
constitutional  court  by  way  of objection  on  constitutional 
grounds (normally after the exhaustion of other legal remedies) 
(Article 93(1) (4Xa)) in cases of alleged breaches of fundamental 
rights by any public authority including the legislature. 
This system for guaranteeing fundamental rights and legal pro-
tection, which clearly bears the marks of previous experience of 
the inhumanity of a totalitarian regime, demonstrates the im-
portance of fundamental rights within the West German legal 
system, and, at the same time, the problems for European Com-
munity law  thereby arising. By virtue of their jurisdiction out-
lined above, the courts of the Federal Republic, led by the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, have evolved a body of case law relating 
to all the important fundamental rights and fundamental consti-
tutional principles, which imposes constraints on all other parts 
of State authority and which must be respected by them. In this 
way judgments on, for instance, the freedom of trade or occupa-
tion, the right of  property, the principle of  equality or the require-
ments of  the rule oflaw, have led to extremely subtle distinctions. 
and differentiations, intended to protect the sphere of the indi-
vidual, without at the same time disregarding unduly the neces-
sary interests of the community as a whole. The central import-
ance of  the fundamental rights within the West German consti-
tutional system creates at the same time familiar problems for 
the European Communities. While the Basic Law enjoins (espe-
cially in Article 24) international cooperation and integration as 
well as comprehensive protection of fundamental rights, it does 
not deal in any explicit way with the possible tensions thereby 
created. This probably accounts for the fact that the problem of 
protection of fundamental rights within the framework of the 
European Communities is being, and will continue to be, can-
vassed in the Federal Republic with particular intensity, and that 
the legal view  which found  its authoritative expression in  the 
judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of  29 May 19741 and 
according to which national fundamental rights are to prevail, for 
the time being at least, over acts of the Community, is generally 
recognized as unsatisfactory  .2 
It must also be mentioned that a corpus of  constitutional provi-
sions embodying a core  of human rights  remains  unalterable 
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even by means of the procedure for constitutional amendment 
(Article 79 (3)); the difficult question of where the line is to be 
drawn between constitutional amendments which are lawful and 
those which are not, cannot be gone into here. 
France 
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 4 October 1958, like 
the Constitutions of 1875 and 19463 has no fixed catalogue of 
fundamental rights.4 As far as human rights are concerned, the 
Preamble refers instead to the Declaration of 1789 as well as to 
the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946:  'Le peuple  fran~ais 
proclame  solennellement  son  attachement  aux  droits  de 
l'homme et aux principes de Ia souverainete nationale tels qu'ils 
ont ete de finis par Ia Declaration de 1789, confirmee et completee 
par le preambule de Ia Constitution de 1946'. 
Beyond this, the text ofthe Constitution of 1958 mentions only 
a few of the classical fundamental rights, such as the equality of 
all citizens before the law without regard to origin, race or religion 
(Article 2 (1)), the freedom ofbelief(Article 2 (1)), the freedom of 
the person from arbitrary arrest and the right to judicial control 
of any deprivation of personal liberty (Article 66). 
For the protection of fundamental  rights the reference to  the 
Preamble of 1946 is of special importance. This Preamble refers 
in turn to the human rights of the Declaration of 1789 and the 
'principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de Ia republique'. 
In addition the Constitution ofl946 acknowledges the 'principes 
politiques, economiques· et sociaux particulierement necessaires 
a notre  temps'.  We  can  therefore  distinguish  the following 
I  BVerfGE 37,  p.  271  et.  seq. 
1  There are  already  a  large  number of comments on this judgment, from  the 
point of view  of Community law  as  well  as  from  that of German constitutional 
law; cf.  inter alia,  Feige,  Bundesverfassungsgericht- Grundrechte -Europa, JZ 
1975,  p.  476  et seq.; Hal/stein,  Europapolitik  durch  Rechtsprechung, Wirtschaft-
sordnung und Staatsverfassung, Festschrift ftlr Franz BOhm  zum 80.  Geburtstag, 
1975, p.  205  et seq.; Hi/f.  Klein,  Bleckmann,  Sekundiires Gemeinschaftsrecht und 
deutsche  Grundrechte,  Zum  BeschluB  des  Bundesverfassungsgerichts  vom  29. 
Mai  1974, ZaoRV 35  (1975), p.  51  et seq.; Ipsen,  BVerfG versus EuGH re 'Grun-
drechte', Europarecht,  10  (1975),  p.  I  et seq.; Pestalozza,  Sekundiires  Gemeins-
chaftsrecht und nationale Grundrechte, DVBI.  1974,  p.  716  et seq.; Scheuner  .. Der 
Grundrechtsschutz  in  der Europiiischen  Gemeinschaft  und  in  der  Verfassungs-
rechtsprechung, AoR 100 (1975), p.  30  et seq.; Zuleeg,  Das Bundesverfass)Jngsger-
icht als  Hilter der Grundrechte gegentiber der Gemeinschaftsgewalt, OOV  1975, 
p,  44  et seq. 
l  The  draft  Constitution of 1946,  which  set out  in  detail  the traditional  fund-
amental rights and social  rights, was  rejected by  the French  people  in  a referen-
dum. A  partial  reason  for  this, as  well  as  the excessive power conferred  on  the 
National  Assembly, was  the fear of a whittling down of the classic  fundamental 
liberties of the Declaration of 1789 by  legal  implementing rules and 'intervention-
ist' and 'socialist' conceptions of fundamental rights.  On this, cf.  Burdeau,  Droit 
constitutionnel et institutions politiques,  1959,  p.  330;  Vedel,  Cour de droit  con-
stitutionnel, 1950-51,  p.  570  et seq.; Prelot,  Institutions politiques et droit consti-
tutionnel, 1961,  p.  510  et seq.; Laferrierre,  Manuel de droit constitutionnel, 1947, 
pp.  904,  910  et seq. 
~  Cf. on the fundamental position of basic rights within the French legal  system 
esp. Rivero,  Les liberte  publiques, Vol.  I, Les droit de l'homme, 1973; Burdeau, 
Les  libertes  publiques, 4th ed.  1972;  Co/liard.  Libertes  publiques, 4th  Ed.  1972; 
Stahl,  Die Sicherung der Grundfreiheiten im iiffentlichen Recht der FUnften Fran-
zosischen Republik, Veroffentlichungen des lnstituts ftlr  lntemationales Recht an 
der  Universitlit  KOin  61  (1970);  Duverger-Sfez,  Die  staatsbUrgerlichen  Freiheits-
rechte  in  Frankreich  und  in  der  Union  Fran~"tise,  in:  Bettermann-Nipperdey-
Scheuner,  Die  Grundrechte, 1967,  Vol.  I, Part  2,  p.  543  et seq. 
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bertes publiques'): 
(i)  the classical freedoms contained in the Declaration of 1789 
such as the freedom of the person, the principle of equality, of 
private property, and freedom of opinion and of the press; 
(ii)  the political, economic and social  principles of 1946.  The 
courts and legal writers are predominantly of the view that the 
reference in the Preamble of 1958 embraces these rights as well, 
although, strictly speaking, this does not amount to an extension 
of the 'droits de l'homme' listed in  the Declaration of 1789 .I 
Amongst these additional rights are the right to strike, to work, 
and to industrial participation, the principle of  social security for 
all, as well as the guarantee of equal educational opportunity; 
(iii)  the'  principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de Ia rep-
ublique'. By virtue of the reference to these principles, the fund-
amental freedoms provided for  by  ordinary statute during the 
Third Republic are raised to the constitutional level. 2 Some of  the 
fundamental  rights which  are  the most important  in  practice 
come within the 'principes fondamentaux', as, for instance, the 
freedom of  assembly (liberte de reunion-protected by statute of 
30 June 1881), the freedom of  commerce and industry (liberte de 
commerce et de l'industrie-statute of 21  March 1819). 
It  was for a long time disputed whether the Preamble had the sta-
tus of  a directly applicable legal rule or represented a mere guide-
line for construction.3 The prevailing view, both in the decided 
cases and in learned writing, was that the Preamble, as part of  the 
Constitution resolved upon by the French nation, had the same 
legal status as the text of the Constitution itself, in so far as di-
rectly binding provisions could be deduced therefrom. This· was 
affirmed as regards the rights to freedom, but denied as regards 
the social rights laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution 
of 1946 which require the performance of a positive act on the 
part of  the State.4 The question of  the legal status of  the Preamble 
can today essentially be regarded as resolved, since the Conseil 
Constitutionnel in its judgment of 16 July 1971 declared uncon-
stitutional a bill for the reform of the French law relating to as-
sociation, in reliance on the Preamble.5 
The  'libertes  publiques'  constitutionally  entrenched  in  the 
Preamble cannot be assimilated to the individual fundamental 
rights of the German Basic Law, for instance. The constitutional 
securing of  a precisely defined corpus of  individual rights against 
the State is a concept alien to French legal thought.6 The trad-
itional rights of the citizen are defined in ordinary statutes and 
are, in the French view, thereby secured. The respect for  the 
achievement of the French revolution renders it scarcely con-
ceivable that a statute could be in breach of human rights. The 
possibility of a contradiction between the acknowledgement of 
fundamental rights in the Preamble and an ordinary statute has 
only been discussed since  the said judgement of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.7 This understanding of the role of the legisla-
ture explains  moreover why  the attempt  to  set  fundamental 
rights out in detail in the draft 1946 Constitution was rejected by 
the French nation in a referendum. 
The French courts have furthermore never conceived of the 'li-
bertes publiques' as subjective public rights in the sense of the 
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German doctrine. The established rights are to be understood ra-
ther as a guarantee of a general principle. This view is manifest 
externally in that the Conseil d'Etat does not as a rule speak of 
rights, but rather speaks for example of  the 'principe de Ia liberte 
de reunion'  _8  This makes possible a more flexible approach by 
the courts in relation to fundamental freedoms. 
According to Article 89 of the Constitution, Parliament, or on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the President of the 
Republic  may initiate the procedure for constitutional amend-
ment. The proposed amendment requires the approval of  the Na-
tional Assembly and the Senate, and must be endorsed by  ref-
erendum. A referendum may be dispensed with only if the Pres-
ident of the Republic decides to submit the amendment to the 
entire Parliament.  In this case the amendment is  accepted, if 
three-fifths of  the votes cast are in favour of  it. Only the principle 
of the republican form of government is excluded from consti-
tutional amendment. 
Since the decision of  the Conseil d'Etat in Aramu9 fundamental 
freedoms may, even if not covered by the twofold reference in 
the Preamble to the Constitution, none the less subsist as general 
principles oflaw inherent in the French legal system. Such fund-
amental freedoms  will  apply 'meme en !'absence de textes' if 
they  are  in conformity  with  French legal  tradition.IO  We are 
therefore concerned in essence with judge-made law. It covers, 
in  addition to certain fundamental freedoms, such as the free-
dom of  movement, the inviolability of the home, freedom of  ed-
ucation and the right to be heard, also administrative principles, 
such as recourse to the administrative courts, the prohibition on 
retrospective administrative decisions, and many other princi-
ples of proper administration (impartiality of investigating com-
missions, legal force of  administrative decisions). II The distinc-
tion between the general legal principles and the constitutionally 
entrenched principles is made more difficult by the fact that the 
Conseil d'Etat increasingly considers the fundamental freedoms 
as general principles 'resultant notamment du preambule de Ia 
Constitution'.  The  constitutional  entrenchment  is  therefore 
only one of the possible sources of general legal principles.12 
1  Stahl,  op . .cit.,  p.  23  with  further  references;  for  a  different  opinion  Vedel, 
fours de  drmt,constitutionnel et  des  institutions  politiques,  1961,  p.  790. 
R1vero.  Les  pnnc1pes  fondamentaux  reconnus par Ies  lois  de  Ia  Republique': 
~ne nouvelle  categorie. con~titutionnelle? D.  Sir.  1972,  Chron.  265. 
Pelloux,  Quelques  reflexmns  sur le  preambule de  Ia  Constitution  fran~ise de 
1958, Hommage d'une generation de juristes au  President Basdevant, 1960, p.  389 
et seq.; Morange.  Valeur juridique des principes contenus dans Ies declarations des 
droits, RDP  1945,  p.  229  et seq.;  George/,  Aspects du  Preambule de  Ia  Constitu-
tion  du 4 octobre  1958,  RDP  1960,  p.  85  et seq. 
'  Georgd, ?P·  cit., P·. 91; Rivero-Vedel,  Les  principes economiques et sociaux de 
I~ Constltutmn: Le  preambule, Collection Droit Social  31  (1947),  p.  20;  Stahl,  op. 
ell  .•  p.  32 et seq. 
5  JORF 1971, p.  7114; seeRess. Der Conseil Constitutionnel und der Schutz der 
frundfreiheiten  in  Frankreich, JoRNF  23  (1974),  p.  123  et seq. 
See  Stahl.  op.  cit.,  p.  53  et seq. 
;  Ress,  op.  cit., p.  125;  Rivero,  note  to  CC  of 16.7.1971,  AJDA,  p.  537  et seq. 
9  References  from  JUdgments  of the  CE  in  Stahl.  op.  cit.,  p.  57  et seq. 
CE  of 26.10.1945,  ..ynmu, '?·  1946,  J.,  p.  158  with  notes  by  Morange.  10  Morange,  Les  pnnc1pes generaux du droit sous Ia  ye Republique, RDP  1960 
p.  1188 et seq.; Letot;rneur,  Les 'principes generaux du droit' dans Ia  jurispruden~ 
du Conseil  ~'Etat, Etude  s .et  Documents (pub.  by  CE)  1951,  p.  19  et seq.; Krech. 
D1e  Theone  der  allgememen  Rechtsgrundsiitze  im  franzosischen  oiTentlichen 
Recht,  Studien  zum  intemationalen  Wirtschaftsrecht  und  Atomenergierecht  49 
(1973),  p.  II et seq. 
11  Review  in  Krech,  op.  cit.,  p.  179  et seq. 
12  Cf CE  of 26.6.1959,  Syndical  general  des  ingenieurs-conseils,  Rec.  p.  394. 
35 There is considerable controversy amongst learned writers as to 
the status of  such of those general principles as are not embraced 
within the reference in the Preamble. From the decisions of the 
Conseil d'Etat the prevailing inference is  that all  general legal 
principles enjoy constitutional status.1 There will be no need to 
answer this question so long as it is only executive acts which are 
being  reviewed  as  to  their compatibility with the 'liberte pu-
bliques'. The Conseil Constitutionel has hitherto had no occa-
sion to decide on the question whether these general legal princ-
iples are also binding on the legislature. 
It has already been said that by  virtue of the reference in  the 
Preamble the fundamental human rights provided for in the sta-
tutes of  the Third Republic are constituti  ~nally safeguarded. The 
legislature is thus prohibited from proceeding to amend the law 
in such a way  as  to contravene the 'principes fondamentaux' 
therein contained. A question therefore arises as to whether this 
will  lead to what can be termed the petrification of the content 
of these statutes, that is, which part of a statute partakes of the 
fundamental substance of the principle.2 It would furthermore 
seem possible as a result of  the decisions of the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel since the judgment of 16 July 1971, to draw, to some 
extent, the conclusion that not only are the freedoms entrenched 
in the statutes of the Third Republic to be numbered amongst 
the 'principes fondamentaux', but also further basic  freedoms 
which have been enacted in subsequent ordinary statutes.3 
The reference to the 'principes fondamentaux' and the legal de-
cisions in relation to the general legal  principles greatly compli-
cate the answer to the question whether any given right against 
the State on the part of  a citizen is protected by ordinary statute 
only or by the Constitution itself. As in practice this problem has 
only recently become of importance, as a consequence of the re-
cent decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel, the discussion on 
this point is still very much in its early stages. The necessity to 
identify  those fundamental  rights which are  protected by  the 
Constitution against encroachment by the legislature could alter 
the entire scheme of things existing hitherto. It is  now  for the 
courts to give shape to  the vague concept of 'principes fonda-
mentaux ', in order to evolve a secured corpus of fundamental 
freedoms. 
France has in the meantime ratified the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), and four of the five Additional Pro-
tocols, by a decree of 3 May 1974.4 The Second Additional Pro-
tocol was not ratified: it confers on the European Court of Hu-
man Rights the power to render opinions on legal questions re-
lating to the construction of the Convention, upon the applica-
tion of the Committee of Ministers. Moreover, France has only 
accepted the right of appeal on the part of the State, and not on 
the part of  individuals under Article 25. As with any other inter-
national treaty gazetted in France in the appropriate manner, the 
ECHR applies directly as part of the French legal system. Under 
Article 55 of the Constitution properly ratified or approved trea-
ties or conventions shall prevail, as from the date of their gazet-
ting, over the statutes of the country, subject to the proviso that 
the treaty or convention in question is also applied by the other 
party thereto. The true meaning of precedence in this way  is  a 
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matter of controversy in learned writing and in decided cases.s 
The Conseil Constitutionnel, in its decision of 15 January 1975 
in relation to the termination of pregnancy, made clear that, as 
far as  the ECHR is concerned, the incompatibility of a statute 
with the treaty in question cannot be assimilated to unconstitu-
tionality  .6  For this reason the Conseil Constitutionnel declined 
to incorporate the ECHR into the constitutional criteria for re-
view for the purposes of the procedure under Article 61. 
French  legal  tradition,  moulded  by  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau's 
doctrine oflaws as the expression of  the 'volonte generale', can-
not conceive of  the judicial review of  legislative acts by reference 
to fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.? It  is only 
by establishing fundamental rights in statutory form that, in the 
French view, the acknowledgement of  fundamental freedoms of 
the Declaration of 1789 and Preamble of  1946 can be secured. Ac-
cordingly, protection of freedoms against the executive is the fo-
cus of the protection of fundamental  rights.  Article 61  of the 
Constitution nevertheless confers  upon the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel a right to review statutes as to constitutionality. Statutes 
are subject to such review when they have been passed by Par-
liament but not yet gazetted. There is thus no constitutional re-
view of  statutes after their publication. The decisions of  the Con-
seil Constitutionnel have legal force. A provision which has been 
declared unconstitutional may not be published or applied. The 
decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel are binding upon public 
authority,  and  all  authorities  or  courts  (Article 62 (2)).  This 
procedure has only  become of practical  importance since the 
Conseil Constitutionnel in its judgment of 16 July 1971 has dec-
lared the Preamble to be among the criteria for review .s  In this 
case a Government bill was for the first time declared unconsti-
tutional for breach of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by 
the Preamble. Additional importance was acquired by this deci-
sion  by  the  constitutional  amendment of 29  October  1974.9 
1  Vedel.  Droit administratif, 4th  Ed.  1964,  p.  252  et seq.; Auby-Drago,  Traite de 
contentieux administratif, Vol.  3,  1962,  p.  23;  Batailler,  Le  Conseil  d'Etat, juge 
constitutionnel,  1966,  p.  132  et  seq. 
2  See  Ress,  qp.  cit.,  p.  156  et seq. 
3  Cf.  Rivero,  Les  'principes  fondamentaux  reconnus  par  les  lois  de  Ia  Repu-
blique',  une  nouvelle  categorie  constitutionnelle?  D.  Sir.  1972,  Chron.  265. 
•  JORF of 4.5.1974,  p.  4750;  see  also  Madiot,  Du  Conseil  Constitutionnel a Ia 
Convention  euriopeenne:  vers  un  renforcement  des  libertes  publiques?  D.  Sir. 
1975,  Chron.  I  p.  3 et  seq. 
5  See  Ress,. Der  Rang  volkerrechtlicher  Vertriige  nach  franzosischem  Verfas-
sungsrecht, Oberlegungen zur Entscheidung des Conseil  Constitutionnel vom  15. 
Januar  1975  tiber  den  Rang  der  Europaischen  Konvention  zum  Schutz  der 
Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten nach Art.  55  der franzosischen  Verfassung, 
ZaoRV  35  (1975),  p.  445  et seq. 
6  JORF of 16.1.1975, 671; JCP  1975  II,  18030 note Bey; AJDA  1975  II, 134 note 
Rivero;  EuGRZ  1975,  p.  54  et seq. 
7  See  in  detail  Stahl,  op.  cit., p.  72  et seq.  In  general  on the judicial  protection 
of fundamental  rights:  Dran,  Le  controle juridictionnel et Ia  garantie des libertes 
publiques, 1968; Rivero,  Le systeme  fran~ais de protection des droits de I'homme, 
Les  droits de  l'homme, Revue de  Droit  International et Compare  I (1968),  p.  70 
et seq.; Franck,  Les  fonctions juridictionnelles du Conseil Constitutionnel et du 
Conseil  d'Etat  dans  l'ordre  constitutionnel,  1974;  Goose,  Die  Norrnenkontrolle 
durch  den  franzosischen  Conseil  Constitutionnel,  Schriften  zum  Offentlichen 
Recht,  212  (1973).  • 
'  Cf.  for  the most recent decisions of the CC: Hamon, Controle de constitution-
alite et  protection des droits individuels:  A propos de  trois decisions recentes du 
Conseil Constitutionnel, D. Sir.  1974, Chron. 83; Favoreu-Philip,  La jurisprudence 
du Conseil Constitutionnel, RDP  1975, p.  165 et seq.; see also Favoreu-Philip,  Les 
fandes decisions  du  Conseil  Constitutionnel,  1975. 
Loi constitutionnelle No 74-904 of 29.10.1974, JORF of 30.10.1974; see  Franck, 
Le  nouveau regime des saisines du Conseil Constitutionnel, JCP 1975  I, p.  2678; 
Philip,  L'elargissement de Ia saisine du Conseil Constitutionnel, AJDA 1975, p.  15 
et seq. 
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could only  be  invoked  by  the President of the Republic,  the 
Prime Minister, or the Presidents of  both Chambers, the right is 
now conferred upon 60 deputies for the time being of  the Nation-
al Assembly or the Senate to invoke the jurisdiction of the Con-
seil Constitutionnel by seeking a review of the constitutionality 
of a statute which has not yet been published. The extension of 
this right to apply to the Conseil Constitutionnel is of  great im-
portance, since now a parliamentary minority may also use the 
procedure under Article 61  as a political instrument against the 
Government. It  has already been so used on three occasions, and 
on one of these occasions the Conseil Constitutionnel rendered 
its decision (on the question of termination of pregnancy, deci-
sion of 15 January 1975).1 
Recent decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel have provoked 
lively discussion in  France as  to  whether parliamentary sover-
eignty was being replaced  by  government by  the courts.2  The 
problem of judicial review of legislative action is  posed all  the 
more acutely since the twofold reference in the Preamble to the 
Constitution of 1958 rarely permits of any precise and unequiv-
ocal definition of the substance and extent of protected funda-
mental rights. 
Furthermore, recently decided cases have imposed on the legis-
lature substantive limitations within  the field  of fundamental 
rights when enacting provisions in relation to matters reserved 
to  it  under Article 34.3  Article 34 states: 'La loi  fixe  les  regles 
concernant: -les  droits civiques et les garanties fondamentales 
accordees aux citoyens pour l'exercice des libertes publiques ... '. 
The development in  France could lead  to a weakening of the 
traditional aversion to any catalogue of fundamental rights. The 
development of a jurisdiction to review on the part of a consti-
tutional court, which would be effective and at the same time ac-
ceptable to Parliament, would only be possible in the long term 
if the court can proceed on the basis of sufficiently concrete cri-
teria for review. 
The French administrative courts determine the legality of any 
act of an  administrative authority.4  They  review  the compat-
ibility of  executive measures with the law. The Conseil d'Etat re-
views indirectly administrative decisions as to their compatibility 
with the Constitution, in so far as contitutional provisions are 
embodied or given concrete form in ordinary statutes. Moreover, 
since the judgment of the Conseil d'Etat of 28  June ~918,5 the 
constraint has been removed whereby the Conseil d'Etat could 
neither apply  nor interpret the Constitution.  In this way, the 
Conseil d'Etat secured the means of taking into account, when 
construing statutes, the constitutional guarantees relating to the 
protection of fundamental  rights  in  cases  of undue encroach-
ment by the executive. This will however not be possible where 
the wording of the statute is unequivocal. In such case, the sta-
tute in question must be applied, in spite of its being unconsti-
tutional, and  any  administrative act  founded  thereon will  be 
binding.6 
The Conseil d'Etat however applies the Constitution as  the di-
rect criterion in  cases of government regulations which are  is-
sued independently of any statute(gesetzesunabhiingige Verord-
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nungen). By Article 37 of the Constitution of 1958 the govern-
ment is  empowered to  issue regulations independently of any 
statute, in so far as the matter is not reserved to the legislature 
under Article 34 of the Constitution. On 7 July  19507  in  De-
haene the Conseil d'Etat had  regard  for  the  first  time to the 
Preamble and deduced therefrom that, pursuant to paragraph 7 
of  the Preamble of 1946, the right to strike was recognized in law 
even for civil servants. In the following period, the principle of 
equality in the Preamble was used several times in the review of 
provisions governing the civil service (dienstrechtliche Vorsch-
riften). In its judgment in Societe d'Eky of 12 February 19608 the 
Conseil d'Etat conclusively settled that the Declaration of 1789 
imposes, as directly applicable constitutional law, constraints on 
the authority of  the Government to issue regulations. Neverthe-
less, the review  of government regulations and administrative 
acts on the basis of the Preamble has not acquired any great im-
portance within the case-law of the Conseil d'Etat. In fact, the 
application of the Preamble will  in  most cases be  unnecessary 
since the fundamental freedoms are normally regarded as 'prin-
cipes  generaux  du  droit  applicables  meme  en !'absence  des 
textes', quite independently of the fact that they may be statu-
torily  or constitutionally  secured.  It is  true  that  the Conseil 
d'Etat in its more recent judgments refers to the connection be-
tween the 'principes generaux' and the Preamble to the Consti-
tution.  The Preamble  however  plays  only  a supporting  role. 
What is  decisive  is  the creation of law  by  the administrative 
courts, which has brought into being an extensive catalogue of 
freedoms.9 The general principles oflaw bind the'  autorite regle-
mentaire', which means that they assert themselves directly in 
relation to regulations issued independently of statutes, and in 
relation to administrative acts. The bounds of this doctrine are 
reached where the adminstrative decision can be  founded on a 
statutory provision. The unconstitutionality of the administra-
tive act will in this case not lead to its being set aside. The fact 
that the act is in accordance with th statute will prevail. But since 
even within the field of  administration independent of  statutory 
provision the administration usually enjoys a broad measure of 
discretion, there are numerous cases in which the Conseil d'Etat 
1  JORF of 16.1.1975, p.  671;  seeRess, Der Rang vii1kerrechtlicher Vertriige  nach 
franziisischem  Verfassungsrecht,  Ober1egungen  zur  Entscheidung  des  Conseil 
Constitutionne1  vom  15.  Januar  1975  tiber den Rang  der Europiiischen  Konven-
tion  zum Schulze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten nach  Artikel  55  der 
franziisischen  Verfassung, ZaiiRV  35 (1975),  p.  445  et seq.; Ruzie,  La Constitution 
fran~ise et  1e  droit  international  (a  propos  de  Ia  decision  du Conseil  Constitu-
tionnel  du  15  janvier  1975),  Clunet  1975,  p.  249  et seq. 
2  Cf.  Rivero,  Les  'principes  fondamentaux  reconnus  par  les  lois  de  Ia  Repu-
blique': une nouvelle categoric constitutionnelle? D.  Sir.  1972, Chron. 265; Ham-
on,  Joe.  cit.;  further  references  in  Ress,  Der  Conseil  Constitutionnel  und  der 
Schutz der Grundfreiheiten  in  Frankreich, JiiRNF  23  (1974),  p.  123  et  seq. 
3  Cf. the decision of the CC of 28.11.1973, JORF of 6.12.1973, p.  12949; see also 
de  Soto,  La  decision  du Conseil  Constitutionnel en date du  28  novembre  1973, 
RDP 1974, p.  889; Rivero, Peines de prison et pouvoir n!glementaire, AJDA 1974, 
p.  229. 
~  See  Fromont,  La protection juridictionnelle du particulier contre le  pouvoir ex-
ecutif en France, Gerichtsschutz gegen  die  Exekutive, Beitriige zum ausliindisch-
en iiffentlichen Recht und Viilkerrecht 52(1) (1970), p.  221  et seq.; Stahl,  Die Sich-
erung der Grundfreiheiten im iiffentlichen Recht der FUnften Franztisischen Rep-
ublik,  Vertiffentlichungen des Instituts flir  Intemationales Recht an der  Univer-
sitiit  Ktiln  61  (1970),  p.  133  et seq. 
5  Heyries,  Sir.  1922,  3,  49  note Hauriou. 
•  Stahl,  op.  cit., p.  59  et  seq. 
7  Dehaene,  RDP  1950,  p.  691  et  seq. 
8  Societe  d'Eky, D.  1960,  J.,  p.  263,  note  Huillier;  JCP  1960,  II,  No  11629  bis 
with  note  by  Vedel. 
9  Stahl,  op.  cit.,  p.  72  et seq. 
37 has reviewed administrative action directly as to its compatibility 
with the freedoms recognized as 'principes generaux'. 
General statements as to the circumstances in which fundamen-
tal rights may be curtailed by the administration are more diffi-
cult to make than for example is the case with the judgments of 
the German courts. The fundamental considerations which have 
influenced the decision in the specific case are generally not dis-
closed. Learned writers in France appear to consider the setting-
ofT of  opposing interests according to the principle of  proportion-
ality as constituting something of a guideline in the case-law of 
the Conseil d'Etat.1 The interest of  the State in exercising its au-
thority to intervene is weighed against the value of the freedom 
thereby affected and the extent of the damage inflicted.  The 
severity of the intervention must bear some reasonable relation 
to the interest of  the State which is thereby to be secured. No in-
tervention may therefore affect the substance of the freedom in 
question. This covers 'absolute, general' prohibitions (e.g.  the 
prohibition upon persons suffering from tuberculosis from enter-
ing areas oftourism).2 Moreover, any interference with freedoms 
must be based on a careful weighing-up of the actual circum-
stances of the case. In this weighing-up an important consider-
ation is the value of the freedom in questions. The extension of 
powers of control will thus depend on the value of the freedom 
opposing such extension. The Conseil d'Etat in this respect is 
guided  by  the  intentions  of  the  legislature.  The  possible 
limitations will  vary depending on whether the legislature has 
employed a greater or lesser degree of  care in order to guarantee 
the various fundamental rights. Particularly stressed is the value 
of the 'liberte fondamentale', which chiefly comprises the rights 
attaching to the individual's personal sphere, such as the free-
dom of the person, the inviolability of the home, and property. 
In addition, the'  principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de 
Ia n!publique' usually carry particular weight. These include, in-
ter alia,  the freedoms of the press, of assembly, of association, 
and of religion. It is true that no systematic approach in relation 
to the content of, and the limitations upon, the 'liberte fonda-
mental' has been evolved. Whether the protection of  freedom or 
the interests of  the State should prevail is decided by the Conseil 
d'Etat by weighing-up in each individual case the basic freedoms 
against the 'interets de l'ordre et de Ia securite'. 
No  formal  appellate  procedure  within  the  administration  is 
known to French law. There is the'  recours a  gracieux', whereby 
a citizen may address himself to the authority which has taken 
the administrative action  in  question, or has declined  to take 
such action when requested. In addition there is  the possibility 
of the 'recours hierarchique' whereby an appeal is  made to su-
perior authority. Both these forms of  appeal are referred to as' re-
cours administratif, as opposed to 'recours contentieux', that is, 
actions brought in the courts.3 These are not appeals having par-
ticular requirements as to form or to time-limits. The authority 
to which they are addressed is under no duty to take any decision 
thereon. The absence of  any formal procedure for legal protection 
by  the administration is  to be explained in terms of the history 
of the development of the French administrative jurisdiction. 
This jurisdiction has evolved from the system for legal protection 
operated by  the administration itself.  Until  1953  it  was for  the 
Prefectoral Councils to determine complaints wherein adminis-
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trative action was challenged, and against their decisions an ap-
peal iay to the Conseil d'Etat. In the reforms of 1953 these Pre-
fectoral  Councils were  replaced  by  'tribunaux administratifs' 
which thenceforth had jurisdiction at first instance in all admin-
istrative disputes. Procedurally, the principles applying in the ad-
ministrative courts are very much akin to those of the Conseil 
d'Etat. The prerequisite for any action is first of  all that there be 
a decision of  the administrative authrority in question, dismiss-
ing an objection raised by a citizen. Against the decision contain-
ing  such dismissal  appeal can be  made to the administrative 
court within two months. Silence on the part of the authority in 
question will, after four months, be construed as a refusal. The 
administrative courts deal with a wide variety of  actions, each of 
which has its own peculiarities,4 The most important form of  ac-
tion is the'  recours pour exces de pouvoir'. In this action the set-
ting aside of administrative acts violating statutory law can be 
sought. For the citizen seeking redress there is also the 'recours 
de pleine juridiction ', which is a species of action in the admin-
istrative courts for the fulfilment of  an obligation. It is concerned 
with subjective rights against the adminstration arising under 
statute or contract. According to French legal opinion, the ad-
ministration can only be adjudged liable for the payment of  mo-
ney, but not to perform an administrative act. For all practical 
purposes this action can therefore be regarded as an action for da-
mages. 
Ireland 
The Irish Constitution of 1937 contains a comprehensive inven-
tory of  fundamental rights. In the section on fundamental rights 
(Article 40  et seq.) there are guaranteed, in  particular, general 
equality, the 'personal rights of the citizen' (a general freedom), 
the right to personal freedom, the inviolability of  the home, free-
dom of opinion, freedom of assembly, freedom of association 
and combination, family rights, parental rights, private property, 
freedom of religion and conscience. There are moreover funda-
mental rights in relation to criminal procedure (Article 38) and a 
prohibition on giving retrospective effect  to criminal statutes 
(Article 15 (5)), as well as the guarantee of  judicial independence 
(Article 35 (2)).  Any constitutional amendment is  subject to a 
referendum  (Article 46 (2)).  Constitutional  amendments  are 
therefore extremely  difficuJt.5  The Constitution also  contains 
certain social fundamental rights. In the provisions on 'funda-
mental rights' the right to free primary education should above 
all  be  mentioned (Article 42 (4)).  Reference  should  further be 
made to Article 41 (2'/': 
1  For this  point  and  the  following, see  Burdeau,  Les  libertes  publiques,  p.  43  et 
seq.;  Co/liard,  Libertes publiques,  1972,  p.  158  et seq.;  Vedel,  Droit  administratif, 
5th  ed.  1973,  p.  794  et seq. 
2  References  in  Burdeau,  op.  cit.,  p.  48. 
3  De Laubadere, Traite de droit administratif, 6th ed.  1973, p.  257  et seq.; Luck-
ing,  Die  Grundlagen der franziisischen  Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit,  1955,  p.  56  et 
seq. 
•  Cf.  Debbasch,  Droit  administratif,  2nd  ed.  1971,  p.  435  et seq.; de Laubadere, 
op.  cit., p.  478  et seq.; Bourjo/,  Droit administratif, Vol.  2,  Le controle de !'action 
administrative,  1973,  p.  163  et seq. 
5  Kelly,  Fundamental  rights  and  the  Irish  Law  and  Constitution,  2nd  ed.  1967,  r·  9 et seq. 
Kelly,  op.  cit.,  p.  305  et seq. 
S.  5/76 'The State shall... endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect 
of their duties in the home'. 
The Constitution also contains principles in relation to social pol-
icy  ('directive  principles  of social  policy')  the observance  of 
which cannot, unlike that of  the fundamental rights, be reviewed 
by the courts (Article 45). 
A whole series of fundamental rights, which are not contained 
in the Irish Constitution, are guaranteed elsewhere in the legal 
system, such as the right to be heard, the right to an early trial. I 
The ECHR is not however part of the domestic law.2 
The fundamental rights of the Irish Constitution bind the ad-
ministration and the legislature} Various forms of  judicial pro-
tecion are available to ensure that they do so. 
Article 26 of the Irish Constitution provides initially for a pre-
liminary procedure for  obtaining an opinion in  relation to  the 
constitutionality of  any statute. The President may, before sign-
ing any statute, submit it to the Supreme Court for an opinion 
as to its constitutionality. 
Apart from statutes which have already been the subject of  a pro-
nouncement by the Supreme Court pursuant to the abovemen-
tioned procedure, the High Court and the Supreme Court can 
also  pronounce  on  the  constitutionality  of statutes  in  cases 
where  constitutionality  is  not  the  substantive  issue  (Arti-
cle 34 (3X2)).4  Moreover, in  a judgment in  1970,  the Irish  Su-
preme Court has recognized the possibility of an objection on 
constitutional grounds to statutes in so far as the objectors are di-
rectly affected by the statutory provision in question.s 
Though no general right to legal protection against illegal acts of 
public authority is formulated explicitly in the Constitution, the 
courts have deduced such a right from Article 34 (3XI), and Ar-
ticle 40 (3).6  There exists therefore comprehensive judicial pro-
tection against illegal executive action.? It should be noted, how-
ever, that under Article 37 of  the Constitution 'limited functions 
and powers of a judicial nature' may be conferred on persons or 
bodies other than judges or courts.  Even when this has  been 
done by statute, the ordinary courts have still exercised a control 
over the constitutionality of the procedure.8 
Italy 
The Italian Constitution of 1947 contains a very comprehensive 
catalogue of  fundamental rights, consisting of the general princ-
iples  prefacing  the Constitution and  the entire Part I thereof; 
there are in all 54 articles, which are subdivided as follows:  Ti-
tle I: civil liberties; Title II: socio-ethical relations; Title III: ec-
onomic relations; Title IV: political relations. Provision for der-
ogation by  statute is  reserved in  the case of numerous funda-
mental rights. 
The major part of  the Constitution can be amended by the proce-
dure for  constitutional amendment. Only  the principle of the 
republican form of  government is expressly excluded from such 
amendment, pursuant to Article 139. However, according to the 
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prevailing view, in  addition to the republican form of govern-
ment, Article 2 of the Constitution contains a further limitation 
on constitutional amendment. Since Article 2 speaks of inviol-
able human rights, any setting aside of  these rights is not lawful; 
what alone is  lawful is  to amend and adjust them to new situ-
ations, without affecting their essence.  9 None the less an amend-
ment to the Constitution can only be achieved by a cumbersome 
procedure prescribed under Article 138 of the Constitution: any 
law to amend the Constitution must be accepted by both cham-
bers  in  two  separate readings  at  an  interval of at  least  three 
months, and with an absolute majority. It is subjected to a ref-
erendum, if  one-fifth of  the members of  one chamber or 500 000 
voters or five regional councils so demand. A law which has been 
subjected to a referendum will  not be published if it  is  not ap-
proved by a majority of the valid votes cast. A referendum will 
not however take place if the law has been approved during the 
second division by each chamber by a two-thirds majority of the 
members.IO 
A further guarantee of  fundamental rights has been achieved by 
the ratification by Italy of  the ECHR and the Additional Protocol 
of 20  March  1952, by  statute No 848  of 4 August 1955.11  The 
ECHR is Italian domestic law with the status of  an ordinary sta-
tute. 
The observance of the Constitution is ensured primarily by the 
Corte Costituzionale. The tasks of the Court are set out in Ar-
ticle 134  of the Constitution.  The  protection  of fundamental 
rights is not secured by the direct appeal by way of  objection on 
the grounds of  constitutionality, as in Germany, but only incid-
entally, or by a procedure 'in via principale' whereby the State 
may request a review of  the constitutionality of  tht~ legislation of 
a Region, or a Region may apply to the Corte Costituzionale for 
a review of the constitutionality of a national statute or the le-
gislation of another Region. 
The procedure whereby constitutionality is reviewed when it is 
not the substantive issue in the dispute in question is set out in 
greater detail by Article I of the Constitutional Act No 1 (Iegge 
costituzionale) of 9 February 1948 and Articles 23-30 of  ordinary 
1  Kelly.  op.  cit.,  p.  305  et seq. 
2  Siisterhenn,  La  protection  intemationale des  droits  de  l'homme dans le  cadre 
europeen,  1961,  pp.  303  et seq.,  308,  with  further  references. 
3  Boldt,  Grundrechte  und  Normenkontrolle  im  Verfassungsrecht  der  Republik 
lrland, JOR,  19  (1970),  p.  229  et seq. 
'  See  Boldt,  op.  cit.,  p.  244  et seq. 
>  East Donegal  Cooperative  v Attorney-General, 1970,  IR 335,  esp.  at  p.  338  et 
seq.;  cf.  also  Boldt,  op.  cit.,  p.  247. 
6  Kelly,  op.  cit., p.  291  et seq.; Kelly,  Judicial  Protection of the Individual against 
the  Executive  in  the  Republic  of Ireland,  Gerichtsschutz  gegen  die  Executive, 
Vol.  I, 1969,  pp.  426  et seq.,  435;  cf.  also  Barrington,  Private Property under the 
Irish Constitution, The Irish Jurist 8 (1973),  p.l6 et seq.; Kelly,  Judical Review  of 
Administrative Action:  New  Irish Trends, The Irish  Jurist 6 (1971),  p.  40  et seq. 
7  The opinion of Boldt,  op.  cit., p.  242,  that the control of the executive by  the 
courts is  rarely effective, cannot be accepted. The references cited by  Boldt rather 
indicate  the  contrary. 
'  Foley  v  Irish  Land  Commission  and  Attorney-General,  Irish  Law  Times  86 
(1952),  p.  55  et seq.,  (1952)  IR  118.  Cf.  however Fisher v Irish Land Commission 
(1968)  IR  3, and  the criticism of this decision  in Barrington.  loc.  cit.  See  also  on 
these  problems  Grogan,  Administrative  Tribunals,  in  King (ed.),  Public  Admin-
istration  in  Ireland,  Vol.  3 (1954),  who,  however,  relies  for  his  restrictive  inter-
pretation of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts  on  decisions  given before the 
Constitution  of 1937,  which  thus  have  only  a  limited  value  as  precedents  on 
question  of constitutional  law. 
'  Cf.  Monati,  lnstituzioni di  diritto  pubblico,  8th  ed.  1969,  p.  1126. 
10  On the problem of constitutional amendment Mortati.  op.  cit., p.  ll05, et seq. 
"  References  to  learned  authors  in  Mortati,  op.  cit.,  p.  1128. 
39 statue No 87 of 11  March  1953. Some details of importance for 
the protection of  rights deserve special mention. Article 23 of  the 
ordinary statute of 1953 provides that constitutionality may be 
reviewed  incidentally in any  'giudizio dinanzi and un'autorita 
giurisdizionale '.  These words  have always  been broadly inter-
preted by the Corte Costituzionale,l thus bringing within their 
ambit not only the ordinary courts as 'giurisdizione volontaria' 
but also the various 'giurisdizioni speciali' (e.g. Commissari per 
Ia liquidazione degli usi civici, Commissione dei ricorsi in mater-
ia di brevetti, etc.). There is uncertainty as to arbitration tribunals 
and  the Giunta per le elezioni  nell'ambito delle Camere parla-
mentari.  The  Corte  costituzionale  has  confirmed  (Ordinanza 
2211960 and 5711961) that it may  in the course of proceedings, 
e.g. in conflitti di attribuzioni or in sede penale, itself raise the 
question of constitutionality, and refer it to itself. According to 
a judgment of the Corte costituzionale, no such right of referral 
is granted to the investigating judge in civil proceedings (senten-
za 10911962); and while the public prosecutor in criminal cases 
may  raise the question of constitutionality, he has no power to 
refer the papers to the Corte Costituzionale (sentenza 40/1963). 
In  sentenza  5311968  the  Corte  Costituzionale  recognizes  the 
power to refer on the part of the giudice di sorveglianza in cases 
relatng to the application of  security measures, and with senten-
za  7211968 in cases relating to the execution of sentence. 
There are special time-limits prescribed for the course of  the pro-
ceedings, with the effect that they are completed relatively quick-
ly.2  What  merits  mention  is  that  the  proceedings  before  the 
Corte Costituzionale are independent of the proceedings in the 
course of  which the referral has occurred. If the latter for any rea-
son come to an end, the proceedings before the Corte Costituzi-
onale  will  continue; moreover,  the  proceedings  in  the  Corte 
Costituzionale are removed from the control of the parties there-
to. 
A judgment of  the Corte Costituzionale has the following effect: 
any  provision declared  unconstitutional  will  cease  to  apply  as 
from  the day  following  the publication of the judgment. The 
question whether unconstitutionality has an ex tunc or ex nunc 
effect is thus avoided and a practical solution is what is contem-
plated (cf. Article 30 (2) of the Act of  1953). The dismissal of  a ref-
erral will only be effective for the particular case in question, or 
for the actual proceedings between the parties in provision. The 
dismissal does not exclude a referral in a different case, even on 
the same grounds and by  the same parties. 
The legal protection for the citizen alleging undue encroachment 
by the executive is based on Articles 24 (1) and 113 of the Con-
stitution. According to these provisions every  person may, for 
the protection of his own rights or legitimate interests, seek the 
assistance of the courts. For the protection of rights and legiti-
mate interests against acts of the public administration there is 
always the right to sue in the ordinary and in the administrative 
courts. This protection may not be excluded or restricted in fa-
vour of special forms  of appeal or in respect of particular kinds 
of acts.  The law defines which courts may set aside acts of the 
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public administration in the cases prescribed by statute and with 
the effects so prescribed. Title IV of the Constitution, which re-
lates  to courts (Article 101  et seq.), contains further important 
provision on the judicial protection of the rights of the individ-
ual. No exceptions are permitted from the absolute jurisdiction 
of the courts.3 
Luxembourg 
The Luxembourg Constitution of 1868 with its significant sub-
sequent amendments contains in  its Chapter II  ('Des Luxem-
bourgeois et de leurs droits ') a catalogue of fundamental rights. 
For the best part, these fundamental rights subsist in their ori-
ginal form, bearing the stamp of a bourgeois-liberal concept of 
the State. Only by the constitutional amendment of  12 May 1948 
were some social fundamental rights brought into the catalogue, 
such as the right to work, but also the protection of freedom of 
economic acitivity. 
Following  a  proclamatory  basic  statement  in  Article 11 (3) 
(' L'Etat garantit les droits naturels de Ia personne humaine et de 
Ia  famille '), the Luxembourg catalogue of fundamental  rights 
provides, inter alia, for the following fundamental rights: equal-
ity before the law (Article 11 (2)), general freedom of the person 
(Article 12 (1)), inviolability of the home (Article 15), guarantee 
of property (Article 16), freedom of opinion (Article 24 (1), free-
dom of the press (also Article 24 (1), postal secrecy (Article 28), 
right of petition (Article 27), freedom of  religion (Article 19), free-
dom of assembly (Article 25), freedom of  association (Article 26), 
the  right  to  public  primary  education (Article 23)  the right  to 
work and to social security (Article 11 (4)), the guarantee of  trade 
union rights (Article 11  (5)), freedom to carry on an independent 
trade or profession (Article 11 (6)), the right to trial by the lawful 
judge (Article 12). Some of these fundamental rights are subject 
to a  reservation permitting statutory restriction, and others, such 
as the freedom of economic activity, can only be given shape by 
statute. But even where the legislature is entrusted with the task 
of giving shape to certain rights, the Constitution has  in some 
cases  attached  a  further  reservation  permitting  statutory 
restriction. 
According to prevailing legal opinion, fundamental rights take 
precedence over ordinary statutes by virtue of their embodiment 
in  the Constitution. This precedence derives  from  Article 113 
(' Aucune disposition de Ia Constitution peut etre suspendue').4 
Although the Constitution entrusts the courts with the review 
1  Biscaretti di  Ruff/a,  Diritto  costituzionale,  lOth  ed.  1974,  p.  567. 
1  Biscaretti di Ruff/a,  op.  cit., p.  568  et seq. 
l  Bachelet,  La protection juridictionnelle du  particulier contre le pouvoir executif 
en  ltalie,  Gerichtsschutz  gegen  die  Exekutive,  1972,  p.  469  et seq.; Mortati,  op. 
cit.,  p.  1125  et seq.;  Landi-Potenza,  Manuale  di  diritto  amministrativo,  4th  ed. 
1971,  p.  57  et seq.,  esp.  pp.  585,  659,  et seq. 
•  Cf.  re  constitutional  precedence  Bonn,  Le  controle  de  Ia  constitutionalite  des 
lois, Pas.  Lux.,  1973, p.  5  et seq.; Majerus,  L'Etat Luxembourgeois, 2nd ed.  1959, 
p.  42  et seq.;  Pescatore,  Introduction  a Ia  science  du  droit,  1960,  No  92. 
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contain any provision for the review of the constitutionality of 
statutes. The courts have accordingly declined to review ordinary 
statutes.2 This en be explained by the liberal concept of  the Con-
stitution of the previous century which considered the legisla-
ture to be the most appropriate guarantor of the protection of ci-
vil  rights and freedoms.  Further support was derived from  the 
principle of the separation ofpowers.3 However, this is not a ne-
cessary inference from  the Constitution.4 The aforementioned 
principle is however also applied by the courts to grand-ducal re-
gulations issued in lieu of  statutes.5 Whether the courts can con-
tinue with this line of  authority seems doubtful, given the influ-
ence of the Belgian courts, and  in  particular of a more recent 
judgment of the Belgian Cour de Cassation.6 But the legislature 
in enacting ordinary statutes has followed the view of  the courts, 
and has in section 237 of  the Penal Code made it a punishable of-
fence for a judge to fail  to give effect to a statute.? These deci-
sions of the courts have recently been criticized by learned au-
thors, especially in comparison with the review of  statutes on the 
basis of international treaties.8 
The provisions on fundamental rights are, like all constitutional 
provisions, liable to constitutional amendment. The procedure 
for constitutional amendment has several stages. First, the legis-
lature  must satisfy  itself of the necessity  for  a constitutional 
amendment, by reference to the provisions to be amended (Ar-
ticle 114). Thereafter, the Chamber is dissolved by operation of 
law. Only a re-elected Chamber may resolve to amend the con-
stitution and in so doing it is bound by the decision of its prede-
cessor as  regards the subject-matter. With not less than three-
quarters  of its  members  present,  the Chamber  votes  on  the 
amendment by a two-thirds majority of  all votes cast. The legis-
lature is not bound as to the actual contents of the amendment. 
There is  no limit to  possible constitutional amendments. Only 
during a regency are constitutional amendments without excep-
tion inadmissible under Article 115. 
Apart from  the Constitution the ECHR is  of importance. Pre-
viously the courts had, just as  in  relation to the constitutional 
guarantees, declined to review  national law  by  reference to in-
ternational treaties.9  They  have  nevertheless developed a pre-
sumption  of interpretation  that  until  the  contrary  is  proved 
the legislature is  not to  be  taken to  have intended to  put itself 
in  breach of an international obligation; and therefore the law 
of Luxembourg  should  as  far  as  possible  be  interpreted  in 
accordance  with  treaty  previsions.JO  Since  1950  a  change  is 
discernible in  the approach  of the courts.  Provisions of inter-
national treaties which are  'directly applicable'  are now  given 
precedence  over  national  statutes,  irrespective  of the date  of 
their coming into force;ll  the international treaty  is  a source 
of law  of higher status.l2  The courts  of Luxembourg  have 
nevertheless declined to  accord such precedence in  relation to 
the  application  of the  ECHR,  on  the  footing  that  it  is  not 
directly  applicable  under national  law  but that it  merely  pro-
vides for obligations on the part of the States.13  The approach 
of the courts of Luxembourg therefore contrasts with  that of 
the other Benelux States,  which  give  the ECHR direct  appli-
cability  and  precedence  over  national  law. 
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There is  no  judicial  control  directed  to  compliance  with  the 
Constitution in  Luxembourg.14  The ordinary  law  (Article 237 
of the  Penal  Code)  denies  the courts  any  powers  in  relation 
to  review  of legislation.  The power  of the  Conseil  d'Etat  to 
advance constitutional  objections  under the legislative  proce-
dure (pursuant to Article 76) cannot be considered as  a judicial 
procedure.  No  binding  force  attaches  to  the  opinion  of the 
Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat can only withold its assent 
to dispensing with a second reading of a statute in the Cham-
ber.  Since  this  could  only  take  place,  at  the  earliest,  three 
months after  the first  reading,  the Conseil  d'Etat  is  in  a po-
sition  to  exercise  a temporary  veto;  it  has  no  further  means 
of blocking  the statute in  question  (Article 59  of the Consti-
tution). 
For  the  legal  protection  of citizens  alleging  undue encroach-
ment  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  proceedings  may  be 
brought either in  the ordinary courts or in  the administrative 
courts, depending on the matter in  issue.l5  Before the Conseil 
d'Etat,  Comite  Contentieux,  two  kinds  of  proceedings  are 
possible:  the 'contentieux de pleine juridiction' as  proceedings 
at  second  instance  against  decisions  of  the  administrative 
courts, or  as  appellate proceedings, but only  in  so  far  as  pro-
vided  by  statute.  In  addition, the Conseil d'Etat has jurisdic-
tion in the 'contentieux d'annulation', as  a court of cassation, 
having  power  to  determine  all  objections  to  administrative 
decisions  where  there are  no  other means of legal  protection 
'  Article 95:  'Les cours et  tribunaux  n'appliquent  les  arretes  et  reglements  gen· 
eraux et locaux qu'autant qu'ils sont conformes aux lois'. The Conseil d'Etat con-
siders  this  provision  directly  applicab,le  to  itself,  though  it  is  neither a 'cour'  nor 
'tribunal'.  Cf.  Loesch,  Le Conseil  d'Etat du  Grand-Duche de  Luxembourg,  Livre 
Jubilaire,  1956,  pp.  507,  515. 
2  Cour  de  Cassation,  judgment  of  14.8.1.877,  Pas.  Lux.  I,  p.  370;  judgment  of 
24.4.1879,  Pas.  Lux.  I  p.  534;  Conseil  d'Etat, Comite  du  Contentieux, judgment 
of 3.1.1883,  Pas.  Lux.  II  p.  174;  Cour de  Cassation, judgment of 21.11.1919,  Pas. 
Lux.  XI,  p.  72;  judgment  of  26.5.1920,  Pas.  Lux.  XI,  p.  72. 
3  ...  ils  [les  tribunaux] n'ont  pas  r~u Ia  mission  de  controler  les  dispositions  le-
gislatives  et  de  les  ecarter  pour  cause  d'inconstitutionalite  ...  S'il  en  etait  autre-
men!  il  y pourraient aneantir les actes du corps legislatif...  le juge doit se  rappeler 
sans  cesse  que  sa  mission  se  borne a juger suivant  Ia  loi,  et  non  a juger  Ia  loi' 
(Cour  de  Cassation,  judgment  of  14.8.1877,  Pas.  Lux.  I,  p.  370). 
'  Cf.  Bonn,  op.  cit.,  p.  18. 
'Cour de Cassation, judgment of 29.7.1948,  Pas.  Lux.  XIV,  p.  422; judgment of 
13.5.1954,  Pas.  Lux.  XVI,  p.  99; Cour d'Appel,  judgment of 25.1.1958,  Pas.  Lux. 
XVII,  p.  248. 
•  Journal des Tribunaux  1974 p.  564, Cf.  re the  influence of Belgian cases,  Bonn. 
op.  cit.,  p.  12;  see  also  latest  developments  in  Belgium,  above  II  I. 
7  'Seront pun is  ...  les juges ...  qui se seront immisces dans l'exercice du  pouvoir 
legislatif, soit par des reglements contenant des  disp~sitions legislatives soit en ar-
retant  ou  suspendant  !'execution  d'une  ou  plusieurs  lois,  soit  en  deliberant  sur 
le  point  de  savoir,  si  ces  lois  seront  executees  .. .' 
s  Cf.  Bonn,  loc.  cit. 
'  Cour  Superieure  de  Justice,  judgment  of  21.11.1919,  Pas.  Lux.  XI,  p.  74. 
1o  Cour  Superieure  de  Justice, judgment  of  13.6.1890,  Pas.  Lux.  II,  p.  621.  Cf. 
on  this  question  Pescatore,  Conclusion  et  eiTet  des  Traites  internationaux  selon 
le  droit constitutionnel,  les  usages  et  Ia  jurisprudence  du  Grand-Duche  de  Lux-
embourg,  1964. 
11  Cour Superieure de Justice, judgment of 8.6.1950, Pas.  Lux.  XV,  p.  41; more 
detailed judgment of 14.7.1954 Pas.  Lux.  XVI, p.  150; judgment of 21.7.1951, Pas. 
Lux.  XV,  p.  235. 
12  Cour  Superieure  de  Justice, judgment  of  14.7.1954,  loc.  cit.;  doubtful  as  to 
the  reasoning,  but  in  agreement  with  the  outcome:  Pescatore,  op.  cit.,  p.  106,  et 
seq. 
13  Tribunal  Correctionnel  Luxembourg,  judgment  of  24.10.1960;  unpublished, 
mentioned (with dissenting comment) by  Bonn,  op. cit.,  p.  16, and  Pescatore,  Pas. 
Lux.  XVIII,  pp.  97,  107. 
"  Cf.  Welter,  La  protection  du  particulier contre  1e  pouvoir executif au  Luxem-
bourg,  Gerichtsschutz  gegen  die  Exekutive,  1969,  Vol.  2,  pp.  679,  et seq. 
"  Welter,  loc.  cit. 
41 available. I  What is  exceptional  is that no judicial protection is 
available  against  'actes  de  Gouvernement'.2 
The Netherlands 
The  'Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der  Nederlanden', regulat· 
ing  the legal  relationship  between  the  European  dominions, 
the  former  colonies,  and  the  now  autonomous  dominion  of 
the Netherlands Antilles contains in  Articles  43  to 45  general 
provisions  relating  to  fundamental  rights.  By  virtue  thereof, 
each  domination  is  bound  to  give  effect  to  fundamental  hu-
man  rights  and  liberties.  Amendments  to  the  provisions  on 
fundamental rights in the Constitution of the European Neth-
erlands  or in  the local  legislation  of the  Antilles  require  the 
assent  of the  Imperial  Government) 
The Constitution of the European Netherlands, the Grondwet 
(GW), of 1815 (with numerous amendments) contains anum-
ber  of fundamental  rights  without,  however,  establishing  a 
uniform  and  consistent  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights. 
Essentially the GW contains the classical  fundamental  rights. 
It is  however thought there also exist further unwritten social 
fundamental  rights, such  as  the  right  to  be  cared  for  by  the 
State and the right to  provision  for  ill-health and old  age.4  At 
present,  the GW contains  the  following  fundamental  rights: 
the  right  to  equal  protection  of person  and  property  for  all 
who  are  within  the  imperial  dominions  (which  is  the  equiv-
alent of the principle of equality of treatment, Article 4):  equal 
opportunity  for  all  Dutch  citizefls  to  enter  the  government 
service (Article 5);  the prohibition of censorship and  freedom 
of the press (Article 7); right of petition (Article 8); freedom of 
association and assembly (Article 9); expropriation only for the 
benefit of the public, and only  subject  to  prior compensation, 
or  compensation  guaranteed  prior  to  expropriation  (Arti-
cle 165);  the  right  to  trial  by  the  lawful  judge  (Article 170); 
protection  from  arbitrary  arrest (Article 171);  protection of the 
home  (Article 172);  postal  secrecy  (Article 173);  freedom  of 
religious  observance  and  the  liberties  relating  to  religious 
communities (Articles 181  to  187);  freedom  of education (Ar-
ticle 208(2)).  It is  worth  observing  that  the  right  of property 
is  not  protected  generally  but  only  against  certain  forms  of 
interference.s  No  fundamental  right  to  choose  one's  own 
trade or occupation can be deduced from  the Constitution. As 
part  of the current  moves  to  amend  the Constitution of the 
Netherlands,  it  is  intended  to  preface  the  GW  with  a  cata-
logue of classical  fundamental  rights (as  Chapter 1).  In Chap-
ter IV  some social  fundamental  rights  are  to  be  incorporated 
in  the Constitution, including  a right  to  work,  which  would 
also  cover work on one's own  account, the promotion of pu-
blic  welfare  and the safeguarding of the nation's health, etc.6 
The  fundamental  rights  currently  guaranteed  in  the  Nether-
lands are considered as  general  principles  requiring  more spe-
cific  elaboration  by  the  legislature.?  There are  no  real  restric-
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tions  on  the  legislature  enacting  ordinary  statutes; in  elabo-
rating  further  statutory  provisions  including  provisions  res-
tricting  fundamental  rights,  they  may  go  a considerable  way 
without  infringement  of the letter of the Constitution.8  The 
extent of most fundamental  rights  therefore  depends  on  this 
further elaboration, which is  reserved to the legislature alone. 
The real  protection of fundamental rights  lies  in the fact  that 
any restrictions must be based on a formal  statute.9 It is  con-
sonant  with  this  understanding  of fundamental  rights  that 
they  are  not considered  to  be  law  having  any  higher status. 
They  may  be  amended  at  will,  like  other  provisions  of the 
GW, by  any  legislature  effecting  constitutional  amendments. 
Any form of constraint on such a legislature is  alien to Dutch 
law.JO There are no restrictions as  to subject-matter in relation 
to  constitutional  amendments.  A  complicated  procedure  is 
however  provided  for  in  the  case  of constitutional  amend-
ment.  First, Article 210 of the GW req.uires  a statement as  to 
the necessity  for  constitutional amendment, in  the form  of a 
statute  providing  for  amending  provisions.  Thereupon  both 
Chambers  are  dissolved  (Article 211  of the  GW).  The  new 
Chambers  then  resolve  upon  the  constitutional  amendment, 
which requires in  both Chambers a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast.  Since constitutional amendments relating to  fund-
amental  human  rights  and  liberties  are,  pursuant  to  Arti-
cle 45(a)  of the  Statute of the  Kingdom  of the  Netherlands, 
'empire matters', the provisions relating to imperial legislation 
must also  be  applied  (Articles 15  to  20  of that Statute).  The 
extent  of the  participation  of the  other  dominions  in  the 
amendment  of the  provisions  relating  to  fundamental  rights 
in  the GW  is  however  a disputed  question)! 
Of the extra-constitutional  guarantees  of fundamental  rights 
the  ECHR  is  of  particular  importance.  The  constitutional 
amendment  of  1953  has  provided,  under  Article 65  of the 
GW,  for  the  direct  application  of  international  treaty  law; 
pursuant to  Article 66 of the GW  the Dutch courts must dis-
1  Re administrative jurisdiction Bonn,  Le contentieux administratif en droit  lux-
embourgeois,  1966;  Welter,  loc.  cit.;  Majerus,  op.  cit.,  p.  155  et  seq. 
2  Welter,  op.  cit.,  p.  686. 
3  This consists of the Government of the  European  Netherlands, supplemented 
by  a Minister  from  the  Government  of the  Netherlands  Antilles. 
•  Be/infante,  Beginselen  van  Nederlands  Staatsrecht,  1964,  p.  162  et  seq. 
s  Be/infante,  op.  cit.,  p.  178. 
•  Draft  Constitution  by  the  State  Commission  (Cals-Donner-Commission): 
Tweede  rapport,  Eindrapport  van  de  Staatscommissie  van  advies  inzake  de 
Grondwet  en  de  Kieswet,  1969,  p.  25  et seq.;  1971,  p.  212  et  seq. 
7  Be/infante,  op.  cit.,  p.  162. 
a  Kranenburg,  Het  Nederlands  Staatsrecht,  1958,  p.  501;  Van  der  Pot-Donner, 
Handboek  van  het  Nederlandse  Staatsrecht,  9th  ed.  1972,  p.  462. 
9  Oud,  Het Constitutioneel  Recht  van  het  Koninkrijk  der  Nederlanden,  Vol.  2, 
2nd  ed.  1970,  p.  698. 
1°  Oud,  loc.  Cit. 
11  Thus Kranenburg,  De Nieuwe Structuur van ons Koninkrijk,  1955, p.  56;  Van 
Helsdingen,  Het Statuut voor het  Koninkrijk der  Nederlanden,  1957,  Note to  Ar-
ticle  45,  p.  497,  et  seq.;  Oud,  Het Constitutioneel  Recht  van  het  Koninkrijk  der 
Nederlanden,  Vol.  1,  2nd  ed.  1967,  p.  57;  Van  der  Pot-Donner,  op.  cit.,  p.  635 
(somewhat  hesitantly,  wishing  to emphasize  the  particular circumstances of indi-
vidual  cases). 
S.  5176 regard  any  Dutch  law  to  the  contrary.!  Directly  applicable 
international  treaty  law  therefore  has  acquired  precedence 
over national law,  including constitutional law.  In contrast to 
the Luxembourg courts, which regard the ECHR merely as an 
obligation  undertaken by  the States without any  direct appli-
cability  in  national  law,  the Dutch Hoge  Raad  has  acknowl-
edged  that  the  ECHR  is  so  applicable.2  Accordingly,  the 
Dutch courts  must review  provisions of national  law  by  ref-
erence  to  the ECHR.3  This duty  to  review  is  of heightened 
importance, since review  of ordinary statutes  by  reference  to 
the Cons!itution is  prohibited  under Article 131  of the GW.4 
In order to overcome this  inconsistency in  the jurisdiction to 
review,  the State Commission  for  Constitutional  Reform  has 
proposed  the adoption  into the Constitution of a jurisdiction 
to  review  by  reference  to  the  classical  fundamental  rights. 
Other  constitutional  provisions,  including  those  relating  to 
social  fundamental  rights, should  not  be  available  as  a yard-
stick for  such review.5  At  present, the introduction of this ju-
risdiction  to  review  seems  unlikely, since the  Government  is 
not considering the incorporation of such a provision into  its 
draft constitutional amendment.6 There has  not yet  been  any 
parliamentary  initiative  in  this  matter. 
In  the  Netherlands  the  courts  do  not  have  the  power  to 
review  the constitutionality  of legislation.  The  procedure  be-
fore  the Raad van State to obtain an opinion, which  must be 
observed  in  any  legislative  process  pursuant  to  Article 64  of 
the GW, cannot  be  regarded  as  judicial  review.  This  proce-
dure  is  merely  an  internal  matter within  the government;  it 
is  of no  consequence if the opinion is  disregarded.? The opin-
ions are also  not published.  The vesting of any jurisdiction in 
the courts to enforce compliance with the Constitution seems 
unlikely.  The  Government  has,  during  the  discussion  on  a 
constitutional amendment, declared its opposition to any such 
jurisdiction in  the courts,s as  proposed  by  the State Commis-
sion.9 
In  the Netherlands there are a large  number of forms of legal 
protection  against  excessive  encroachment  by  the executive. 
That hitherto encountered most  frequently  is  a quasi-judicial 
protection  available  within  the  administration  itself,  for 
instance, under the 'Wet Beroep administratieve Beschikking-
en' which  grants  legal  protection  against  measures  taken  by 
State authorities. The jurisdiction of the civil  courts is  also of 
some importance, as  they  may  issue orders  against  adminis-
trative  authorities  in  interlocutory  proceedings,  and  these 
courts also  give  a wide  interpretation  to  the  concept of civil 
law.JO 
In  the spring  of 1975  the  Estates  General  passed  a  statute 
relating  to  general  administrative  jurisdiction,  although  the 
date of its  coming  into  force  is  not yet  settled.  Originally  it 
was  to  have been  1 January  1976.  This  statute 'Wet admin-
istratieve  rechtspraak  overheidsbeschikkingen ')11  provides  in 
principle for a general administrative jurisdiction in relation to 
acts  of all  administrative  authorities,  including  those of the 
provinces and the districts.  For this purpose a judicial section 
with  judicial  functions  and  guarantees  is  to  be  established 
within the Raad van State. Articles 5 and 6 of the statute pro-
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vide  for  the  setting-up  a  negative  list  of  matters  to  be 
excluded  from  the administrative jurisdiction.  Some  parts  of 
this negative list will  remain in force for only a limited period; 
but there is  at  any  rate  the possibility of amendments or ex-
tension. The area of application of this general statute on ad-
ministrative jurisdiction will  furthermore be  restricted for  the 
time being because the jurisdiction it  confers  is  only available 
in  a subsidiary way.  in so  far  as  other means of protection of 
rights exist, including those existing purely within the admin-
istration,  the  jurisdiction  of the  administrative  court  (Raad 
van  State,  afdeling  rechtspraak)  will  be  excluded.  The ambit 
of the statute can  be  broadened in  two  ways:  by  a curtailing 
of the 'negative list' of Articles 5 and 6 and  by  setting aside 
the  provisions  relating  to  special  legal  protection,  since  this 
would  bring  into  force  the  subsidiary  effect  of the  general 
statute on  administrative jurisdiction. 
United Kingdom 
As is well  known, the United Kingdom has no written con-
stitution, that is, no constitution in  the formal  sense. Accord-
ingly  there  can  be  no  question  of fundamental  rights  being 
entrenched by  means of any formal constitutional instrument. 
On  the other hand,  there  is  of course  a constitution  in  the 
practical  sense  as  the sum of all  the  rules  which govern  the 
conduct of the highest  organs  of State  and  the fundamental 
relationship between the individual and the State.  It is  in  this 
context  that  fundamental  rights, or fundamental  liberties,  or 
civil  rights  and  freedoms,  can  be  spoken  of in  the  United 
Kingdom. 
The guarantee of fundamental  rights  in  the British  Constitu-
tion  amounts in  the final  analysis  to  freedom  generally, sub-
ject  to  general  reservations  permitting  statutory  restrictions. 
What  is  guaranteed-this  is  one  of  the  most  important 
aspects of the 'rule of Jaw'-is the freedom of each individual 
to  do,  and  not  to  do,  whatever  he wishes,  so  long  as  what 
he  does  is  not  contrary  to  the  rights  of third  parties  or  the 
1  Article  65:  'Bepalingen  van  overeenkomsten,  welke  naar  inhoud  een  ieder 
kunnen  verbinden,  hebben  deze  verbindende  kracht  nadat  zij  zijn  bekend  ge-
macht'.  Article  66:  'Binnen  het  Koninkrijk  geldende  wettelijke  voorschriften 
vinden  geen  toepassing  wanneer deze  toepassing  niet  verenigbaar  zou  zijn  met 
een ieder verbindende bepalingen  van overeenkomsten, die hetzij  voor, hetzij  na 
de  totstandkoming  der  voorschriften  zijn  aangegaan'. 
2  Hoge  Raad,  judgment of 13.3.1960,  NJ  1960,  No  436. 
3  Hoge  Raad,judgment of 24.2.1960,  NJ  1960,  No  483;  judgment of 18.4.1961, 
NJ  1961,  No  273;  judgment  of  19.1.1962,  NJ  1962,  No  107;  judgment  of 
25.6.1963,  NJ  1964,  No  239. 
•  Article  131(2):  'De wetten  zijn  onschendbar'. 
5  Tweede rapport van de  Staatscommissie van advies inzake de Grondwet en de 
Kieswet,  1969,  p.  34  er  seq.  (Cals-Donner-Commission). 
6  Nota  inzake  het  Grondwetherzieningsbeleid,  2.  Kamer,  Zitting  1973-1974, 
Kamerstuk  No  12  944  No  2,  p.  12. 
7  Cf.  Oud,  op.  cit., Vol.  I, p.  455  et seq.;  Van  der Pot-Donner,  op. cit., p.  286  et 
seq. 
•  Staatscommissie,  op.  cit.,  1969,  p.  34,  re  the classical  fundamental  rights. 
9  Nota  inzake  het  Grondwetherzieningsbeleid, op.  cit.,  p.  12. 
10  Re this still valid legal position cf.: Langemeijer,  Der gerichtliche Rechtsschutz 
des  einzelnen  gegenilber  der  vollziehenden  Gewalt  in  den  Niederlanden,  in 
Rechtsschutz gegen  die  Exekutive,  1969,  p.  793  et  seq. 
11  For the text of the statute: Eerste  Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Zitting  1974-
1975,  Kamerstuk  No  47. 
43 law.  From.  this  starting  point,  certain  fundamental  rights 
have, in  legislation, case law  and learned writing, been shaped 
in particular ways, such as  the right of personal  freedom,  the 
freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom 
of property)  In  recent  years  there  have  however  been  occa-
sional  demands for  a formal  constitution  to  be  made  for  the 
United  Kingdom, which  could  in  certain circumstances even 
include a catalogue of fundamental  rights.  It cannot however 
be said that demand for  this in the United Kingdom is so wi-
despread  that such a project would  have any  prospect of suc-
cess  in  the  near future.2 
In  view  of what  has  been  said  above,  the  guaranteeing  and 
the  circumscribing  of the  rights  of individuals  are  primarily 
the  task  of the  legislature  and  also  of the  courts.  There  is 
however  no  comprehensive  catalogue  of fundamental  rights 
prescribed  by  legislation,  in  the  manner,  for  instance, of the 
Canadian Bill  of Rights.  Also the ECHR is  not binding under 
the domestic  law  of the  United  kingdom.  It can  nevertheless 
be  said  that,  taken  as  a  whole,  the  English  legal  system  is 
fashioned  in such a way  that the rights contained for  instance 
in  the United Nations Treaty  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights or 
in  the ECHR, are  generally speaking, secured  within  the  ter-
ritory of the United Kingdom. However, any rights so secured 
are  entirely at  the mercy  of the legislature.  The only  guaran-
tee that the legislature will not unduly restrict these rights lies 
in the mechanisms of political control which characterize Brit-
ish  constitutional life,  and  in  the libertarian  traditions of Bri-
tain.3 
Since  fundamental  rights  are  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the 
legislature, there can be  no question of any judicial  review  of 
statutes for  their compatibility  with  these fundamental  rights. 
In dealing with legislation, the courts can of course effect cer-
tain  marginal  emendations (Randkorrekturen)  for  the protec-
tion  of fundamental  rights.  For this  purpose judicial  practice 
has  evolved  a  number  of presumptions.4  Thus, statutes  are 
construed so  that, for  instance,  the  levying  of taxes  requires 
clear  and  explicit  words.  Criminal  statutes  are  strictly  con-
strued.  In the absence of clear  and  unequivocal  provisions  to 
the contrary, the legislature  is  not taken to  have  intended  to 
oust  the jurisdiction  of the courts, or  to  give  statutes  retro-
spective  effect.  Similarly,  the  Court  of Appeal  has  recently 
held  that the ECHR must be  taken  into  account in  interpret-
ing  statutes:  There  is  a  presumption  that  the  legislature  did 
not  intend  to  infringe  the ECHR, and  statutes are  to  be  in-
terpreted  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  compatible  with  that 
Convention.5  The legislature is  thus obliged  to  enact in  clear 
and  unequivocal terms  any  intervention  in  the sphere of the 
individual, but is  not prevented  from  intervening  in  this  way 
by  any  constitutional  constraint. 
Against  this  legal  background,  what  in  other  legal  systems 
might be  considered under the heading of 'protection against 
infringement of fundamental  rights by  the excutive' amounts 
in  the United  Kingdom  to  a control  of the  legality  of exec-
utive  action.  To  this  extent,  legal  protection  in  the  United 
Kingdom  is  comprehensive.  But  the legislature in  turn is  free 
to  exclude  the protection of the courts.  This  has  occurred  in 
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a  number of cases,6  though  it  is  usual  for  quasi-judicial  re-
view  bodies  to  be  created  for  the  legal  protection  of  the 
individual. The ordinary courts have (although not invariably) 
interpreted such ousters of jurisdiction restrictively, and  have 
thus  preserved  a  certain  power  of review.?  Some  statutes, 
moreover, provide for  limited rights of appeal  to  the ordinary 
courts.&  Moreover,  the  executive  has  no  immunity  from 
judicial proceedings, with the exception of actions against the 
sovereign  in  person.9 
Recently  there  have  been  reports  of various  suggestions  and 
proposals for  the enactment of a 'Bill  of Rights'  for  the Uni-
ted Kingdom (or even for Northern Ireland alone) without the 
introduction of a formal  constitution.IO It remains  to  be  seen 
how  far  such  projects  will  succeed  and  lead  to  clear  results, 
and  this cannot be judged by  an outsider.  What merits com-
ment  is  that the proposals  clearly  are  intended  to  limit  only 
partially  the sovereignty of Parliament, in  that the legislature, 
if it  wishes  to  derogate  from  the  Bill  of Rights,  will  have  to 
make  this  clear  in  the statute  in  question.  Such  a provision 
comes very close to the abovementioned presumption evolved 
by  the courts, that, in  a case of doubt, the  legislature  is  not 
to  be  taken  to  have  intended  to  infringe  particular  rights  of 
the  individual. 
All  in  all,  the  position  of fundamental  rights  in  the United 
Kingdom  presents  unique features  which  in  some degree  are 
alien  to  continental  constitutional  thought.  With  the Magna 
Carta of 1215  and  in  the constitutional struggles  of the  17th 
century  England  produced  statements  of  fundamental  im-
portance for  the development of fundamental rights. Even to-
day,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  protection  of fundamental 
rights  in  the United Kingdom does  in  fact  lag  behind that in 
continental  European  States.  However,  the formal  position  is 
that fundamental rights are  at  the mercy  of the legislature to 
a far greater extent than in  most other Members States of the 
European  Community. 
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This  cursory  survey  of the protection  of fundamental  rights 
within the Member States of the European Communities per-
mits certain initial inferences to be drawn, and findings made. 
By  way  of simplification  it  can  be  said  that  many  common 
features  of principle contrast  with  deep-rooted  differences  in 
the  manner  in  which  these  fundamental  rights  have  been 
elaborated  amongst  the  Member States. 
The thinking on fundamental rights in  all  Member States has 
been  largely  shaped  by  the historical  development of funda-
mental rights and by  an  understanding of them as  rights  pro-
tecting  the  individual  against  undue  encroachment  by  the 
State,  and  notably  by  the executive.  In  the  unwritten  law  of 
the British constitution, the experience of centuries of British 
constitutional struggles has a continuing effect in  the field  of 
fundamental  rights.  The present-day  guarantee of fundamen-
tal  rights in French constitutional law  is  formally  linked with 
the French Revolution, by  the references  in the current Con-
stitution  to  the Constitution of 1946  and  the  Declaration  of 
human  and  Civil  Rights  of 1789.  The  constitutional  provi-
sions  of other European  States,  such  as  the  Belgian  Consti-
tution, also  date back to a considerable extent to the first  half 
of the  last  century.  Constitutional  re-formulations  of funda-
mental rights, as  in  the Federal  Republic of Germany, in  Italy 
and  Luxembourg,  as  a  rule  contain,  in  so  far  as  protected 
fundamental rights are concerned, no  fundamental changes in 
relation  to  the past.  Overall, it  could be  said that in  terms of 
constitutional  history  and  of the history  of thought the pro-
tection of fundamental rights within the Member States of the 
European  Community  manifests  similar  concepts  and  basic 
structures.  They  continue  to  have  effect  with  undiminished 
vigour,  and  are  at  the same  time  reinforced  by  the  interna-
tional  declarations  and  conventions relating  to  human rights. 
It  is  also  worth  mentioning that various  currents of thought 
and movements can be discerned at  national level, which tend 
further to develop the protection of fundamental rights. In the 
United  Kingdom  a  formal  Bill  of Rights  is  being  discussed. 
In  France  there  are  some  signs  that,  contrary  to  traditional 
views,  the activity  of the legislature  itself may  be  subject  to 
some control as  to  its  compatibility  with  fundamental  rights, 
although  only  to  a  limited  extent. 
In  the  States  under  consideration,  the  protection  of funda-
mental  rights  has been judicially  secured  to  varying  degrees. 
All  the States of the European Community seem to be at one 
on  the principle of judicial control  as  to  the legality  of exec-
utive  action.  While  some States  favour  the principle of enu-
meration, that is  the proposition  that administrative acts  can 
only  be challenged in court in  the cases  provided  for  by  law, 
other States make possible the judicial review  of all  executive 
action  by  means of a general  provision. The need for judicial 
control  of the executive, taken with the requirement of legal-
ity  in  all  administrative action, is  undisputed in  principle and 
a  common  element  in  legal  thinking  in  the  States  of the 
European  Community. 
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The  same  cannot be  said  in  relation  to  control  over the le-
gislature as  regards  respect  for  fundamental  rights.  The the-
oretically  comprehensive and  absolute  power  to review  legis-
lation  vested  in  the Bundesverfassungsgericht of the Federal 
Republic  of Germany  is  in contrast to  the approach  in other 
States,  where  the  courts  are  always  bound  by  the  law  and 
have  no  right  to  test  its  constitutionality.  This  view  is  axi-
omatic under British constitutional law, and it also prevails to 
some extent  in  France  and  the Benelux  States, even  though 
certain  moves to  restrict  this  principle can be  detected.  Italy, 
on the other hand, possesses in its Corte Costituzionale a trib-
unal of final  instance which  also controls in  effective manner 
what  the  parliament  does. 
Closer consideration and assessment of the substance of guar-
antees in  relation to  fundamental  rights and catalogues there-
of  reveal  considerable  differences  between  the  States,  and 
thereby  disclose  appreciable  difficulties.  In  the  United  King-
dom, apart  from  the ECHR, there  is  no  catalogue of funda-
mental rights whatsoever; guarantees of particular rights must 
be  drawn  from  various  instruments, from  numerous statutes 
and  recognized  principles  of law.  In  France,  alongside  rudi-
mentary  constitutional  provisions,  the Declaration of Funda-
mental  Human  and  Civil  Rights,  the fundamental  laws  and 
the general  principles  of law  evolved  mainly  by  the Conseil 
d'Etat  must  be  considered  for  the  purposes  of any  survey. 
The  other  European  States  herein  considered  have  more  or 
less  comprehensive catalogues  of fundamental  rights  in  their 
constitutions.  The  task  of a  complete  survey  of the  funda-
mental  rights  in  all  these  catalogues  and  of those  of such 
rights  which  are  only  guaranteed  by  express  provision  in  the 
constitution of certain of the States  is  no  doubt  an  attractive 
one but cannot be  undertaken here.  Two guarantees are  to  be 
studied  below,  by  way  of example.  More  detailed  considera-
tion could be  show  that certain rights which  have a particular 
bearing on the  personal  responsibility  and  dignity  of the  hu-
man being-as for  instance the freedom from  arbitrary arrest, 
the  freedom  of belief  and  conscience,  postal  secrecy-are as 
a  rule  guaranteed.  The  more  the rights of the individual  are 
likely to conflict with the interests of the community, without 
any  unequivocal  provision  for  the former to  prevail, the grea-
ter  the  discretior.  to  elaborate  entrusted  to  the  legislature, 
whether on  the  basis  of express  reservation  provided  for  in 
the catalogue of fundamental  rights or under a general  power 
of the legislature  to  draw  the line  in  a  manner exempt  from 
judicial control  between the personal sphere of the individual 
and the interests of the community. This is  for  instance true 
of the protection of property, where no  legal  system can dis-
pense with some provision  for expropriation, and the freedom 
of trade or occupation, which  cannot  have  the same purport 
for  every occupation, and which is  closely linked to the econ-
omy  in  the  State  in  question. 
45 2.  Protection of human rights 
in international law, 
in particular in the ECHR 
For  our purposes  the  ECHR  is  of particular  significance  in 
two ways; first, since the accession thereto of France in  1974, 
all  Member States  of the European  Communities have been 
bound by  the ECHR, so  that its content reflects the common 
'minimum standard' which the States with which we are con-
cerned have undertaken to respect.  To  this extent the ECHR 
permits of definite conclusions as  to  what  all  Member States 
are  unquestionably  willing  to  grant by  way  of protection  for 
fundamental  rights.  Secondly, there  is  the question whether, 
and, if so, to what extent, the European Community is  bound 
directly  by  the  ECHR. 
No  more than is  the case with most of the national catalogues 
of fundamental  rights  can  the  guarantees  of the  ECHR  be 
regarded as a system complete in itself and comprehending all 
the important rights of the individual organized  convincingly 
and  coherently.  The position  is  rather  that  any  catalogue of 
fundamental rights is  as  a rule, as  in  this case, simply a con-
solidation  of various  rights  which  historical  experience  and 
common  belief have  caused  to  be  considered  as  particularly 
deserving  of protection,  and which  are  secured  by  means  of 
differing  formulations,  limitations  and  reservations.  Thus, in 
the  ECHR  are  found  predominantly  the  clz..ssical  protective 
rights  against  particularly  grave  encroactments  by  State 
authority.  The ECHR catalogue begins  with  the right  to  life 
in  Article 2,  followed  by  the  prohibition  on  torture,  slavery 
and  forced  labour, and the right  to  freedom  from  unjustified 
arrest  and incarceration.  These deal  primarily  with  protection 
from  the totalitarian and  arbitrary  measures of a police  State; 
much  the same is  true of the rights  protected by  Article 6 of 
the  ECHR  in  respect  of legal  proceedings,  and  of Article 7 
(nulla poena sine lege).  Then there is  the guarantee of the right 
to  respect  for  the privacy  of the  individual,  including  postal 
secrecy  (Article 8),  freedom  of thought, conscience,  and  reli-
gion  (Article 9),  the right to  free  expression of opinion (Arti-
cle 10),  freedom  of assembly  and  association  (Article 11),  the 
right to marry and found a family  (Article 12).  Article 14 con-
tains prohibitions on discrimination. The First Additional Pro-
tocol  has added to  these rights of the Convention the protec-
tion  of property, a right  to  eduacation, and  the guarantee of 
free  and  secret  elections.  The  Fourth  Additional  Protocol 
guarantees,  inter  alia,  the freedom  of establishment  and  the 
freedom of movement. Most guarantees of fundamental rights 
in the ECHR and the additional Protocols are accompanied by 
possible  and  more  narrowly  circumscribed  derogations  there-
from;  in  this  regard  the  respective  paragraph  (2)  of Articles 8 
to  10  of the ECHR are  of special  importance. 
At  this stage it  is  appropriate  to  make some  remarks on the: 
substantive  importance  of  the  ECHR  guarantees  for  the 
European  Communities.  Some  of the  fundamental  rights  of 
the  ECHR  clearly  predicate  the  existence  of governmental 
machine having all-embracing and potentially boundless pow-
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'  er, and would  therefore  have little bearing on the Jaw  of the 
European  Communities, given  their  legal  and  actual  limita-
tions.  The right to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, 
the  rights  of the defendant  or  the  accused  in  criminal  pro-
ceedings, are, at the current stage of development, matters for 
the State alone, and  not  the Community.  Most  of the other 
rights of the ECHR could only come into conflict with Com-
munity  measures  in  exceptional  and  borderline  cases,  as  for 
instance the freedom of consicience and the freedom of opin-
ion;  the  fact  that in this  respect  conflicts  cannot be  entirely 
ruled  out will  be gone into below;  but here one can  scarcely 
speak  of far-reaching  threats  to  the individual  from  acts  of 
Community  authority.  For  the  Community  the  following 
rights of the ECHR are  more likely  to  be  of importance:  the 
right  to  form  trade unions (Article 11),  the protection of pro-
perty (Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol), and the free-
dom of movement and freedom of establishment (Fourth Ad-
ditional  Protocol).  On  these  points  the  protection  of funda-
mental  rights by  the ECHR can acquire  relevance in relation 
to  the acts  of Community organs  in  circumstances and  situ-
ations  likely  to  occur  more  frequently. 
We shall  consider below  to  what extent Community law  and 
the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities  impose  upon  the Community  institutions the obli-
gation of compliance with  the ECHR.  For the time being we 
shall continue with this conspectus of the position of human 
rights  in  international  law. 
The proposition that State authority  is  in  principle subject  to 
no  constraint  under  international  law  in  relation  to  its  do-
mestic acts and its exercise of power in  relation to its own na-
tionals  is  now  a thing of the past, and  not only  by  reason of 
the ECHR. The protection of the individual against pressures 
and  undue encroachment on the part of the State has  found 
expression  in  a  large  number  of provisions  of international 
law. 
It is  not entirely free  from  doubt to what extent international 
customary Jaw  and the fundamental principles of the interna-
~ional 1egal system protect fundamental rights and the human 
rights  of  the  individual.  It  does  however  seem  to  be 
increasingly accepted that unwritten international law  guaran-
tees  a  modicum of human rights  and places  upon  States  an 
obligation to respect  them. The Declaration of Human Rights 
of the United Nations of 1948, even though lacking any bind-
ing  character, is,  at  least  to  some extent and  in  conjunction 
with  a  large  number of other international  instruments, evi-
dence  that  the exercise  of State  authority  is  subject  to  con-
straints of international  Jaw  for  the benefit  of the individual. 
In  any  case  this  can  be  deduced  from  the  United  Nations 
Charter. 
Although  the Conventions on  Human Rights  of the United 
nations  of 1966  are  not  yet  in  force,  it  is  probable  that they 
will  come  into  force  in  the near  future.1 A  number of other 
'  The  International  Agreement on Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  came 
into force  on 3 January  1976; the International  Agreement on Civil and  Political 
Rights  came into  force  on  23  March  1976.  [Editor's  Note) 
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prohibition  of racial  discrimination,  has  become  binding  in 
certain of the Member States of the European  Communities 
as  international treaty  J.aw.  Then there are the Agreements of 
the  International  Labour  Organization,  the  European  Social 
Charter and other bilateral and multilateral agreements which 
cannot  be  individually  listed  and  evaluated  here.  it  should 
however be borne in mind that, apart from the ECHR, a con-
siderable  number  of obligations  arising  under  international 
law  bind States to respect  fundamental  rights  and place upon 
them a duty  to  uphold  the  rights  of the individual. 
3.  Recognition of fundamental rights 
in the Treaties of the Communities 
and by the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities 
The Treaties  relating  to  the European  Communities  contain 
no  catalogue  of fundamental  rights.  It  would  however  be 
wrong  to  infer  that  the  Treaties  ascribe  no  importance  to 
fundamental  rights  and  the rights  of the individual, or even 
take no cognisance of them. The text of the Treaty certainly 
affords considerable scope  for  the rights of the individual and 
objective  rules  relating  to  his  protection, notably,  having  re-
gard  to  the chief objects  of the Treaties, in  relation  to  econ-
omic endeavour. Thus, the prohibition  on discrimination  be-
tween citizens of the Common tJarket for  reasons of nation-
ality  forms  part  of the basis  principles  of the  Treaties;  it  is 
emphasized as a principle  in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty and 
thereafter explicitly  in  Articles  40,  45,  79  or  95  thereof;  the 
provisions of Articles 85  et seq.  on competition are concerned, 
inter  alia,  with  prohibitions  on  discrimination  and  thus  bear 
upon certain aspects  of the principle of equality.  The Treaty 
provisions  on freedom  of movement  for  workers  (Article  48 
et seq.) and  the freedom  of establishment (Article 52  et seq.) 
or even on the free  provision of services within the Commu-
nity  (Article  59  et seq.)  are  closely  related  to  the freedom  to 
practise  a  trade  or occupation  and  thereby  to  a  fundamental 
right  embodied  in  many  national  constitutions.  The part  of 
the EEC Treaty  which  relates  to  social  policy  (Article  117  et 
seq.) contains  provisions  on  social  aims,  which  can  be  con-
sidered together with the problem of social  rights; Article  119 
enjoins equal  pay  for  men and  women  and  thus deals  with 
an  aspect  of the principle of equality  which  is  extremely im-
portant  in  practice  and  which  moreover  touches  upon  the 
problem  of the  relevance  of fundamental  rights  in  relations 
between  individuals  (Drittwirkung).  In  this  context  it  is 
neither  possible  nor  necessary  to  consider  the  abovemen-
tioned  provisions  in greater detail.  The fact  is  that the Trea-
ties  do  contain scope  and rules  for  fundamental  rights of ec-
onomic relevance, and  in  my opinion  it  is  an  important task 
for  legal  science  and  for  practitioners  to  consolidate  all  the 
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rights  and  entitlements  of  the  individual  which  are  gua-
ranteed explicitly or implicitly by  the Treaties, and to examine 
in  greater  detail  their ambit  as  well  as  the existing  deficien-
cies.  Apart  from  the  provisions  already  mentioned,  regard 
would  need  to  be  had to  Article 220,  which  provides for  ne-
gotiations to secure for  Community citizens equality of treat-
ment  in  further  areas,  but  also  to  Article  222,  whereby  the 
Treaty shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the rules  in  Member States 
governing  the system  of property  ownership. 
On  the  question  of how  far  fundamental  rights  are  already 
protected  under the  law  of the  European  Communities, the 
judgments of the. Court of Justice  of the Communities  nat-
urally  play  a prominent part.  The Court has the obligation to 
ensure that in  the interpretation and application of the Treaty, 
the law  is  observed (Article 164);  in  so doing, it  reviews, inter 
alia,  the legality of the acts of the Council and the Commis-
sion (Article  173),  Accordingly  it  is  primarily  from  the judg-
ments of the Court that we can establish how  far  fundamen-
tal  rights and the protection of the rights and interests of the 
individual are currently available  under Community law.  The 
Court  has  on several  occasions  during  recent  years  explicitly 
dealt  with this question and  the judgments in question  have 
rightly  attracted  great  attention.  It should  however  not  be 
overlooked  that  general  legal  principles  play  a  major  role  in 
the practice of the Court even where  fundamental  rights  are 
not specifically  relied  upon, and  these general  legal  principles 
are  seen, on closer examination, to  contain  much that corre-
sponds or approximates  to  fundamental  rights under national 
law. 
In  the  meantime  there  are  a  number of publications  in  the 
field  of legal  science  which deal  with the importance of gen-
eral legal  principles in the law  of the European Communities, 
and which find  ample material in  the judgments of the Court 
at  Luxembourg.  To  name  but  a  few  from  German  learned 
writing:  Feige  has  dealt  in  a monograph 1  with  the  principle 
of equality in EEC law.  Lecheler has made a special  study of 
general  legal  principles  in  the  judgments  of the  European 
Court,2 dealing, inter alia,  with the principle of the legality of 
administrative action, with its implications for the revocability 
of administrative acts  which  are  illegal  but which  have  con-
ferred  a benefit, in the judgments of the Court of Justice, and 
has made full  use of the impressive dicta on the principles of 
legal certainty, of good  faith, the prohibition of discrimination 
and  the duty to grant a fair  hearing. Finally, Gottfried Zieger 
has  also  thoroughly  analysed  the judgments of the Court of 
Justice in relation to general legal  princples.3 He considers the 
case-law  under the following  headings: 
'The principle  of equality 
in  legislation  relating  to  pricing 
prohibition  of special  charges 
1  Feige,  Der Gleichheitssatz im  Recht  der EWG,  1973. 
1  Lecheler,  Der Europiiische Gerichtshof und die allgemeinen  Rechtsgrundsatze, 
1971. 
3  Zieger,  Die  Rechtsprechung  des  Europiiischen  Gerichtshofs,  eine  Untersu-
chung der Allgemeinen  Rechtsgrundsatze,  JoRNF  22,  p.  299  et  seq. 
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equality  in  the  European  law  governing  officials 
The  right  to  a  hearing 
Ne bis in  idem 
Economic  freedom 
The  principle of proportionality 
Other fundamental  rights 
Other principles  based  on  the rule  of law 
Principle  of legal  certainty 
Principle  of administrative  legality.' 
This  is  not the place  to  discuss  in  detail  the various compo-
nents  of this  list.  What  is  important  is  simply  that  it  gives 
a  picture of the general  legal  principles  which  play  a  part  in 
the judgments of the  Court of the  European  Communities, 
without encountering fundamental objections and difficulties. 
According  to  these judgments, which  in  this  respect  are  un-
challenged, the law  of the European Communities which the 
Court of Justice has to apply includes not only the provisions 
expressly  contained  in  the  Treaty  but  also  the  unwrittten 
principles  widely  acknowledged  in  systems based  on the  rule 
of law. In evolving general principles of law the Court has fol-
lowed  the  example  of national  courts.  The  case-law  of the 
French Conseil  d'Etat mentioned above  has, over the course 
of its  long development, fashioned the most important princ-
iples  to be observed by  an administration which  is  subject to 
statutes and the law.  In a similar way, although in a different 
context  and  in  relation  to  a  Community  authority  holding 
considerably  lesser  powers  than a State,  the  European  Court 
of Justice has developed appropriate legal  principles; it can  be 
assumed  that the exprience of the individual judges, derived 
from  their  own  legal  systems,  has  played  an  important  part 
in  this.  The proximity  of these decided cases  to  the problem 
of fundamental  rights  is  brought out by  another comparison. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, relying  loosely  on a small  number of references  in  the 
text of the Constitution, has developed a whole series of con-
stitutional  requirements-such  as  the  requirement  of legal 
certainty, the principles  of the protection of legitimate expec-
tation  (Vertrauensschutz)  and  of  proportionality-and  has 
brought them within the protection of the constitutional court 
under  the  procedure  for  objections  on  grounds  of constitu-
tionality.  The relevant  judgments of the Court of the Euro-
pean  Communities do  not refer expressly, or only do so  very 
occasionally, to  the requirement, imposed  by  the rule  of law, 
of  upholding  the  rights  of the  individual  or  fundamental 
rights; but in fact  these are limitations laid upon Community 
authority primarily in the interests of the citizens of the Com-
mon  Market. 
Amongst  the  decided  cases  of the  Court  of the  European 
Communities, there are  four  principal judgments which con-
tain  important  fundamental  statements  as  to  the  protection 
and  the  position  of fundamental  rights  within  the  Commu-
nity. I  They  have attracted a corresponding  measure of atten-
tion.  We must once again indicate their most salient features. 
In  Stauder v Sozialamt  der  Stadt  Ulm2  the Court, in  a  pre!-
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iminary  ruling  under Article  177  of the  EEC  Treaty, had  to 
make  its  decision  upon a relatively  simple set of facts.  They 
were  that  a  person  in  receipt  of war  victim  welfare  benefits 
thought it  wrong that, in order to receive butter at  a reduced 
price  as  provided  under Community law,  he  was  obliged  to 
state  his  name  to  third  parties.  The German  administrative 
court to  which  appeal  was  made  itself had doubts  as  to  the 
legality of the provision in question. The very short judgment 
of the Court of Justice appears  to acknowledge  fundamental 
rights as part of the general principles of Community law, but 
holds that in  that particular case, on a certain construction of 
the  provision  in  question,  no  illegality  was  disclosed.  The 
essential  part  of the judgment reads: 
'The provision  at  issue  contains  nothing  capable  of prejudi-
cing  the  fundamental  human rights enshrined in  the general 
principles  of Community  Law  and  protected  by  the Court'. 
This  was  the earliest  indication  that  fundamental  rights  are 
entrenched in  Community law  by  means of the general  prin-
ciples of law.  It must also  be  mentioned that in  Stauder var-
ious fundamental rights and legal  principles were canvassed as 
having  possibly  been  infringed,  namely  the  requirement  of 
respect  for  human dignity  as  well  as  the principle of equality 
and the requirement  to  observe the principle of proportional-
ity between the gravity of the interference in question and the 
needs  of the  Community.  The  Court  did  not  elaborate  on 
these  points. 
In  a further fundamental  judgment of 17  December  1970  in 
lnternationale  Handelsgesellschaft  v  Einfuhr  und  Vorrats-
stelle3  the  European  Court of Justice, again  in  a  preliminary 
ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, made some state-
ments  of principle  on  the  position  of fundamental  rights  in 
Community  law.  The  case  concerned  a  Community  regula-
tion  which  provided  for  the forfeiture  of deposits  where ex-
port  licences  were  not  used, and  which  the exporter thereby 
affected, and  the national  court considered  to  be  contrary  to 
fundamental rights.  The Court of Justice of the Communities 
stated: 
'Recourse to  legal  rules  or concepts of national  law  to  judge 
the validity of instruments promulgated by  Community insti-
tutions  would  have  the  effect  of  harming  the  unity  and 
efficacity  of Community  law.  The  validity  of such  instru-
ments can  only be judged in  the light  of Community law.  In 
fact,  the  law  born  from  the  Treaty,  the  issue  of an  auton-
omous source, could  not, by  its  very  nature, have the courts 
opposing  to  it  rules  of national  law  of any  nature whatever 
without losing its Community character and without the legal 
basis  of the Community  itself being  put  in  question.  There-
fore  the  validity  of a  Community  instrument  or  its  effect 
within a Member State cannot be  affected  by  allegations  that 
it  strikes  at  either  the  fundamental  rights  as  formulated  in 
1  See  especially  the  report of Pescatore  for  the Seventh Congress  of the  Inter-
national  Federation  for  European  Law,  Brussels,  2 to  4n October  1975. 
1  [1969]  ECR  419  et  seq. 
1  [1970] ECR  1125  el seq.  (but English text of quotation from  the judgment tak-
en from  (1972)  CMLR  283,  the official  English  version  not yet  being  published). 
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tutional  structure. 
An  examination  should,  however,  be  made  as  to  whether 
some analogous  guarantee, inherent in  Community law,  has 
not been infringed. For respect for  fundamental  rights has an 
integral  part  in  the  general  principles  of law  of which  the 
Court  of  Justice  ensures  respect.  The  protection  of  such 
rights, while inspired by the constitutional principles common 
to  the Member States must be ensured within the framework 
of  the  Community's  structure  and  objectives.  We  should 
therefore examine in  the light of the doubts expressed by  the 
Administrative Court whether the deposit system did  infringe 
fundamental  rights respect  for  which  must be ensured in  the 
Community  legal  order.' 
The Court of Justice  finally  decided  that  there  had  been  no 
violation  by  the  provision  in  question.  What  is  of interest 
here, apart from the basic  position taken by  the Court of Jus-
tice  as  quoted  above,  are  the  fundamental  rights  alleged  to 
have  been  infringed.  These  were  primarily  the  principle  of 
proportionality, then the right of the individual  freely  to carry 
on economic  activity,  and  finally  the  fundamental  rights  of 
property  and  respect  therefor.  Everi  if we  concur  with  the 
Court  that  on the  facts  of this  particular  case,  these  rights 
were  not  infringed,  we  must  nevertheless  appreciate  that 
these  rights  by  their  very  nature  are  particularly  apt  to  be 
affected  by  Community  authority. 
The next judgment of the Court of Justice  of particular  im-
portance,  namely  that of 14  May  1974,  in  Nold  v  Commis-
sion,!  concerned  the  legality  of regulations  which  precluded 
the applicant  because of his  modest  turnover from  receiving 
deliveries as a wholesale coal merchant. The Court once again 
laid  down  principles relating  to  the protection of basic  rights. 
'As the Court has already stated, fundamental  rights form  an 
integral  part  of the general  principles  of law,  the observance 
of which  it  ensures.  In  safeguarding  these  rights,  the  Court 
is  bound  to  draw  inspiration  from  constitutional  traditions 
common to  the Member  States,  and  it  cannot  therefore  up-
hold  measures  which  are  incompatible  with  fundamental 
rights recognized  and protected by  the Constitutions of those 
States.  Similarly,  international  treaties  for  the  protection  of 
human rights on which  the Member States have collaborated 
or of which they are  signatories, can supply guidelines which 
should be followed within the framework of Community law. 
The submissions of the applicant  must  be  examined  in  the 
light  of these principles. 
If  rights of ownership are  protected by  the constitutional laws 
of all  the Member States  and  if similar guarantees are  given 
in respect of the right freely to choose and practise their trade 
or. profession, the rights  thereby guaranteed, far  from consti-
tuting unfettered prerogatives, must be  viewed in  the light of 
the  social  function  of the  property  and  activities  protected 
thereunder. For this reason, rights of this nature are protected 
by  law  subject always  to  limitations laid  down  in  accordance 
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with  the  public  interest.  Within  the Community  legal  order 
it  likewise seems legitimate that these rights should, if neces-
sary,  be  subject  to  certain  limits justified  by  the overall  ob-
jectives  pursued  by  the  Community, on  condition  that  the 
substance  of these  rights  is  left  untouched.  As  regards  the 
guarantees  accorded  to  a  particular  undertaking,  they  can  in 
no  respect  be  extended  to  protect  mere commercial  interests 
or  opportunities,  the  uncertainties  of which  are  part  of the 
very  essence of economic activity.  The disadvantages claimed 
by  the applicant are in  fact  the result of economic change and 
not  of the  contested  Decision.' 
The  regulations  under challenge  were  finally  upheld  in  this 
case  also.  However,  it  is  important  in  this  context  that  the 
Court  once  again,  and  more  strongly,  emphasized  the  fact 
that the Community organs are  in  principle bound to respect 
fundamental  rights;  these are  a component  part  of Commu-
nity  law,  the  substance  of which  can  be  deduced  from  the 
guarantees  relating  to  fundamental  rights  available  in  the 
Member States, and also-and this is  novel-from the ECHR. 
What  was  in  question  here  were,  again,  the  protection  of 
property, the prohibition of discrimination, the right  freely  to 
practise  a  trade  or  occupation  and  to  carry  on  economic 
activity,  and  the  principle  of proportionality. 
Meanwhile,  a  new  decision  of the  Court  dated  28  October 
1975-case 36/75, Roland  Rutili  v  The Minister for  the In-
terior2-has  developed  the  previous  case-law  and  evaluated 
and restricted the limitations on the freedom of movement for 
workers  guaranteed  by  Article  48  of the  EEC  Treaty  in  the 
light  of the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 
4.  General legal principles and the 
fundamental rights common to all 
Member States as necessary components 
of the law of the European Communities 
As  already  pointed  out,  the  basic  Treaties  of the  European 
Communities do  contain certain reference  points  for  the pro-
tection  of the  rights  and  interests  of the  individual,  but  no 
catalogue of fundamental  rights.  The Court of Justice has  in 
its judgments, despite this absence of explicit rules in the text 
of the Treaties, gradually  developed and  accepted  a consider-
able number of general  legal  principles; and has, in  the judg-
ments  cited  above,  expressed  its  attitude  in  a  fundamental 
way  on the significance of fundamental  rights in Community 
law.  Its position can be summarized thus: although in no case 
can  national  law,  including  fundamental  rights  arising  under 
national  constitutional  law,  claim  priority  over  Community 
I  [19741  ECR 491,  507. 
1  [19751  ECR  1219. 
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gal  principles  the fundamental  rights  generally  recognized  in 
the Member States do form  part  of Community law, and, ac-
cording  to  the Nold  judgment  in  1974,  in  establishing  such 
rights  the  ECHR  must  also  be  considered.  If despite  these 
statements of the Court of Justice, the present state of affairs 
is  regarded  in  various quarters  as  unsatisfactory, this  may  be 
attributable to  more than one reason.  For one thing, there  is 
the apprehension, expressed by  the constitutional court of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, that fundamental rights under-
lying  national constitutional law  are  unprotected under Com-
munity  law.  Moreover,  there  is  a  danger  that,  given  the 
increasing  activity of the Community and  its  organs  and the 
inadequate  provision  for  fundamental  rights  in  the  Treaties, 
important interests of the individual will  remain without pro-
tection.  This in turn  is  bound up with  doubts as  to whether 
the Court of Justice  has the jurisdiction and  the capacity  to 
develop its own appropriate form of protection of fundamental 
rights.  These  questions  must  be  considered  briefly  at  this 
stage. 
There can be  no  doubt that from  the point of view  of Com-
munity law, there can be no question of national fundamental 
rights  having validity  and applicability.  Even less  would  it  be 
possible  merely  to  add  together  the  corpus  of fundamental 
rights  of the  nine  Member  States  and  to  have  the  entire 
scheme  of provisions  thus  assembled  made  binding  on  the 
Community and  its  organs.  Such  an  approach  must contend 
with  the fact  that virtually  all  the catalogues of fundamental 
rights  contain  unique  features  and  are  subject  to  limitations 
formulated  in  different  ways  by  reason  of national  and  his-
torical phenomena, and that these cannot be transferred in  toto 
and cumulatively  into Community law,  if the Community  is 
not  thereby  to  become  paralysed.  Tile  independent  character 
of Community  law  precludes  any  direct  recourse  to  national 
fundamental  rights. 
Furthermore, every  international and  supranational legal  sys-
tem Gust  like  any  national  legal  system) will  require its  writ-
ten law  to  be  supplemented by  general legal  principles and le-
gal  concepts  shared  by  the Member States.  In  international 
law  this  necessity  has  found  expression  in  Article  38(1Xc)  of 
the  Statute of the  International  Court  of Justice.  I  have,  in 
another context, already pointed out that international admin-
istrative  courts,  particularly  the  administrative  courts  of the 
United  Nations  and  the  International  Labour  Organization, 
have of necessity evolved and applied appropriate general legal 
principles.l  'The judgments of the international administrative 
courts contain ample support for  the view  that the general le-
gal  principles  of national  legal  systems  must  be  observed  in 
the elaboration and  application of the internal  law  of the or-
ganization in question.  General  principles  of national  admin-
istrative procedure and of judicial control of State acts are cor-
rectly  considered  by  the courts  as  also  being  necessary  parts 
of the  international  legal  system.  The  requirement  of 'due 
process of law', the duty to grant a hearing, the maxim  audi 
et alteram partem, the inherent constraints upon administrative 
discretion and the judicial review  thereof, the principle of pro-
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portionality,  and  further  basic  legal  principles  are  also  appli-
cable  to  the  internal  law  of international  organizations;  and 
the administrative courts rightly assume it to  be their duty to 
ensure that  these  principles  are  respected.'2 
If the matter is  looked at  in  this  way, it  is  not only not un-
usual but is  perfectly  natural that the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  also  derives  general  legal  principles, 
including  the  underlying  guarantees  of fundamental  rights, 
from  the  legal  systems  of the  Member  States,  and  applies 
them, and  that  all  Community organs  are  bound  to  respect 
these  legal  principles. 
In order to serve any practical purpose this fundamental state-
ment needs more specific elaboration, and in this considerable 
difficulties  will  have to  be  overcome.  Whenever there  is  the 
possibility  that  any  fundamental  rights  have  been  affected, 
careful scrutiny  is  requisite to establish how  far  a fundamen-
tal  right  is  directly  recognized  within  the  treaty  law  of the 
Communities,  to  what  extent and  in  what  form  it  is  to  be 
encountered in  the  legal  systems of the Member States, and 
how  far  it is possible to speak of any fundamental significance 
of the right  in  question and its  implications.  Such  investiga-
tion, however, can  hardly be avoided if a correct idea of legal 
concepts in the Member States is  to be conveyed. In this con-
text  the ECHR ought also to be considered, since it contains 
a minimum of rights recognized by  all Member States. At the 
same  time,  we  agree  with  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  in  Nold,  in  that the mention of the ECHR is  only  a 
supplementary one, sine'!  the contents of the  ECHR are  not 
identical  with  the  legai  principles  recognized  by  Member 
States  of the  EEC. 
Finally,  we  shall  briefly  discuss  the  question  of the  direct 
applicability  of the ECHR to  Community organs.  The Court 
of Justice of the  European  Communities  in  its  judgment of 
12  December 1972  re  International Fruit Company3 has, as  is 
known, declared that the Community is  bound directly by  the 
provisions of GATT; and it has been discussed on various oc-
casions whether and to  what extent the view  of the Court of 
Justice  as  expressed  in  that judgment can  be  applied  to  the 
ECHR. In my opinion, there are strong arguments against the 
ECHR  having  direct  effect  against  Community  organs.  The 
ECHR contemplates only States as  parties thereto, and the or-
ganizational  structure  (Commission,  Court  of  Justice  and 
Committee of Ministers) provided  for  therein  is  designed  for 
States  as  parties  to  the  Convention.  Even  under  the law  of 
the EEC itself (cf.  particularly Article 234 of the EEC Treaty) 
thereis no requirement that the Community need be assumed 
to  be  bound directly  by  the Convention.  The appropriate so-
lution, and that conforming to  international, can be  achieved 
by other means. The ECHR, as treaty law  recognized as  bind-
ing  upon  them by  all  Member  States  of the EEC,  contains 
I  cr.  Bernhardt (-Miehsler),  Qualifikation  und Anwendungsbereich des internen 
Rechts  intemationa1er  Organisationen,  Heft  12  der  Berichte  der  Deutschen  Ge-
sellschaft  fUr  Vii1kerrecht,  1973,  pp.  7 et seq ..  29  et seq. 
2  Ibid,  with  further references. 
3  [1972]  ECR  1219  et seq. 
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necessary  protection of the individual; and  by  virtue of this 
the  prerequisites  for  the  existence of general  legal  principles 
under EEC law  are  met. This does not, however, preclude the 
possibility that more extensive fundamental rights are  present 
in  the Jaw  of the nine Member States, which  are  to  be  con-
sidered as  general  legal  principles of these States, and in such 
case  the protection of fundamental  rights  under  Community 
law  goes  beyond that of the ECHR.  There are further reasons 
in favour of the proposition that the ECHR is  relevant to  the 
EEC  only  in  an  indirect  manner;  for  instance,  only  in  this 
way  will  the  individuality  in  actual  and  in  organizational 
terms  of both legal  orders  be  preserved.  We  cannot go  into 
this more deeply  here, and a few  observations will  suffice.  As 
already  mentioned,  the  human  rights  guaranteed  by  the 
ECHR, by  reason of their substantive nature, primarily  affect 
the signatory States. An infringement by  the Community or-
gans  of most of the fundamental  rights  of the individual  as 
contained in the ECHR is  improbable or impossible.  In so far 
as  the  rights  under the ECHR can  have  relevance  in  Com-
munity  law,  the Court  of Justice of the  European  Commu-
nities  can  cite  them  as  principles  common  to  the  Member 
States, and in this connection it  can and should take into ac-
count the decisions and  the practice  of the ECHR organs. If 
the  Community  were,  however,  to  be  bound  directly,  this 
would  be  incompatible  with  the organizational  provisions  of 
the ECHR, and provoke conflicts of jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, any  divergencies  between  the judgments of the  Court 
of Justice of the European Communities on the one hand and 
the decisions of the  ECHR organs  on  the  other would  then 
become  less  important. 
Considerations similar to  those in  relation  to  the ECHR will 
obtain  in  relation  to  other  rules  and  agreements  of inter-
national law.  Treaties to which Member States of the EEC are 
parties,  for  instance  the  agreements  of  the  International 
Labour  Organization,  or-after  its  coming  into  force-the 
Human Rights Charter of the United Nations, have to be tak-
en into  account  when considering  whether individual  funda-
mental  rights  are  part  of general  legal  principles.  Here,  it  is 
not always  necessary  that all  the EEC Member States should 
be  bound by  the individual conventions. In so  far  as  national 
law  accords with the convention in question without the State 
in  question  being  bound  thereby, then there can  be  deduced 
from  the  combination  of treaty  and  national  law  a  general 
principle which will  have  to be  respected  in  Community Jaw. 
A  certain  flexibility  is  inevitable  here,  and  is  in  any  case 
appropriate,  since  in  any  individual  case  it  willJ  have  to  be 
established from  a large  number of relevant  aspects  how  far 
a  rule  can  be  regarded  as  a general  legal  principle. 
In  such  an  assessment  of written  Community  Jaw,  tof the 
principles  of the national  law  of the Member States, and  of 
the  binding  provisions  of international  law,  it  seems  likely 
that all  the fundamental  rights which  are deemed  inalienable 
will  be considered as  part  of Community Jaw  to  be  respected 
and  applied  by  the  Community organs.  It is  hard  to  believe 
that any  grave deficiencies  continue to  subsist  in  the protec-
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tion of fundamental right.  In  any  event, contrary to the view 
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, any  lack of protec-
tion of fundamental  rights  within Community  law  is  not ap-
parent, or is, to say  the least, unlikely, in  the light of our un-
derstanding  of the  current  position. 
51 Ill  - Comparative  legal  study  of 
certain  fundamental  rights 
Preliminary 
We  shall  now  explore in  greater depth  the question whether 
an  assessment from  the  point of view  of comparative law  of 
national  provisions  on fundamental  rights  can  furnish  assis-
tance  or advice  for  evolving  'European'  fundamental  rights, 
and  we  shall  proceed  by  considering  individual  fundamental 
rights. For this purpose we can discuss only two fundamental 
rights, or, as  the case  may  be, legally  protected  rights of the 
individual.  It would  be  wrong  to  select  such  rights  on  the 
basis of ease of comparison between States, and it seems more 
appropriate to select fundamental rights which would be  likely 
to  play  a  greater  role  in  the  context  of the  European  Com-
munities.  Some  of the classical  fundamental  rights,  such  as 
protection  from  arbitrary  arrest  or even  the freedom  of reli-
gion, are more readily  comparable, but largely  unimportant in 
the EEC context. Those fundamental rights which are of spe-
cial  importance  for  the  European  Communities  are  on  the 
other hand harder to identify and compare; but an attempt to 
review  them must be  made. 
The freedom  to exercise one's trade or occupation is of prime 
importance  in  a Community  whose object  is  economic  inte-
gration  transcending  national  frontiers.  In  what  follows  we 
shall  therefore explore a major aspect of the general freedom 
to  exercise  a  trade  or  occupation,  namely  the  freedom  of 
economic activity (Gewerbefreiheit), and the manner in  which 
it  is  regulated  by  law  within  the Member States  of the EEC. 
This right is, however, inseparably  linked to  the whole econ-
omic  system of the State in  question; and  this  creates  addi-
tional difficulties in  a comparative survey. Once again it  must 
be  stressed  that  the  time  at  our  disposal  permits  only  of a 
very cursory glance at the relevant legal provisions of the nine 
Member States  of the  EEC,  and  no  doubt  experts  from  the 
relevant  countries  could  suggest  improvements  in  many 
respects. 
In  addition  to  the  fundamental  rights  expressly  formulated 
and  reasonably clearly  defined, general  precepts  or legal  prin-
ciples  play  an important part  in  most legal  systems. This  has 
already  been  demonstrated  more  than  once  in  the course  of 
tnis study, notably  in  connection  with  the discussion  of the 
development  of fundamental  rights  in  France,  as  well  as  in 
the  reference  to  the judgments of the  Bundesverfassungsge-
richt on the requirements of the rule of law, and finally  in  the 
survey of the legal  principles which  have been evolved in the 
judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities for  the purposes of these Communities. It seems appro-
priate  to  bring  into  the  following  survey  a  legal  principle 
which  can be  of special  importance  for  the position and  pro-
tection of the individual and which has on various occasions 
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had  a  part  to  play  in  the judgments of the Court of Justice 
at  Luxembourg. It is  the problem of how  far  public authority 
may  interfere  with  the rights  of the individual  which are  al-
~eady established.  This  question  is  extremely  important, and 
JUSt  as  hard  to  answer unequivocally.  On  this  subject too, it 
should be  said  that in  what follows  allowance will  need to  be 
made  for  shortcomings  and  deficiencies. 
1.  Freedom of economic activity 
In  the wide  variety  of possible  activities  by  way  of trade  or 
occupation, freedom of economic activity occupies an import-
ant position. By  this right we mean the freedom  to pursue on 
one's own account  the business of manufacturing, supplying 
services, or of buying  and  selling  with  the object  of partici-
pating  in  economic  life  and  achieving  profits.  The essential 
features  of the relevant  legal  rules  of the Member States  of 
the  European  Communities can  be  described  as  follows. 
Belgium 
Freedom to  carry on economic activity as  part of the freedom 
to practise a trade or occupation is  not expressly provided for 
in the Belgian  Constitution. Earlier writers  sometimes sought 
to  deduce  it  from  Article 7  of the  Constitution  ('La liberte 
individuelle  est  garantie ').1  This  view  has  now  been  aban-
doned. Prevailing opinion sees in Article 7 a guarantee merely 
of the 'liberte d'aller et  venir', corresponding  to  the English 
habeas  corpus.2  This  restrictive  interpretation  of Article 7 of 
the  Constitution  is  confirmed  by  the  various  attempts  to 
amend  the  Constitution  as  regards  fundamental  economic 
rights.  As  late as  1954 Parliament saw  no necessity for a con-
stitutional amendment to this end. Within the relevant Com-
mittee of the Chamber it  had  been pointed out that the then 
current  text  of the  Constitution  contained  no  guarantee  of 
freedom of economic activity, but that had been no bar to ap-
propriate  legislative  development.  To  incorporate  economic 
fundamental  rights  into  the Constitution was  deemed  to  be 
superfluous3  and  ineffectual,  since  provision  for  such  econ-
omic fundamental  rights  would  still  have  to  leave  to  the le-
gislature extensive powers of regulation.4  Although a Declar· 
ation  of 1968  acknowledged  the  necessity  of amending  the 
Constitution 'par !'insertion de dispositions relative aux droits 
economiques et sociaux',  no  such constitutional  amendment 
1  References  in Dor  and Braas,  Les  novelles, corpus  itiris belgici,  Vol.  2,  1935, 
faragraph  143;  further  Perin.  Cours  de  Droit Public,  Vol.  3,  1967,  pp.  59,  73. 
Refe;ences  in Buchmann  and Buttgenbach,  Revue  de  droit international et de 
droit compare, 27 (1950), p.  154; De  Visscher,  Annales de droit et des sciences pol· 
itiques,  12 (1952),  pp.  310 et seq.  315;  Wigny,  Droit constitutionnel, p.  389 et seq.; 
id.,  Cour de  Droit  Constitutionnel,  p.  177;  Vlaeminck,  Le  Droit  constitutionnel 
beige,  5th  ed.  1966,  p.  70. 
1  Cf.  the de  Schryver  Committee Report, Chambre  1952-1953,  Doc.  693,  p.  33. 
•  Chiefly  De  Visscher,  Annales de  droit et des sciences politiques,  12 (1952),  p. 
315  et  seq. 
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business on the legislature in its constitution-amending capac-
ity.1 
In the absence of such a constitutional basis, the courts found 
the  right  to  freedom  of economic  activity  upon  Article 7 of 
the French Decree of 2 March 1791  and  Article 2 of the Law 
of 21  March  1819.2  Article 7 of the  Decree of 2 March  1791 
reads,  'II sera  libre  a  toute  personne  de  faire  tel  negoce  ou 
d'exercer telle  profession, art  ou  metier qu'elle  trouvera  bon; 
mais elle sera tenue de se conformer aux reglements de police 
qui  pourront  etre  fait'. 
Reglements de police in  the implementation of this  provision 
are therefore capable of restricting freedom of economic activ-
ity, but could not abolish it completely, as  they would  thereby 
go  beyond  mere  implementation.  This  could,  however,  be 
achieved  by  statute,  as  the legislature  is  not  subject  to  any 
restriction if it wishes to disregard some other ordinary statute 
(here  that of 1791).  Belgian learned  writing contains no  com-
prehensive portrayal  of the current exceptions  from  the right 
to freedom  of economic  activity.  None the less  a brief glance 
at  Belgian  ordinary  statute law  makes  it  clear  that there  are, 
for  instance, State monopolies, as  in  the field  of broadcasting 
and  telephone  communications  (Law  of 14  May  1930).  The 
Constitution furthermore contains no restrictions as to the est-
ablishment of State economic enterprises, so that here also,  as 
a pure matter of fact,  freedom of economic activity  could  be 
undermined.3 Finally, entry to certian occupations is  in  many 
cases  regulated,  whether  to  ensure  professional  quajfication 
(as  for  instance with  doctors and  pharmacists), or to  preserve 
economic balance (as with trade and crafts), or to protxt third 
parties  (as  with banks, insurance  undertakings).4  The lengths 
to  which  statutory  regulation  can  go  here  is  perhaps  shown 
by  a law  of 22 April  1948,5  which prescribed a set-off of prof-
its  and  losses  amongst  the  different  coalmining  enterprises 
and  provided at  the same time that any  coalmine which  was 
closing  down  would  continue to  be  worked  by  the State on 
its  own  account. 
Judicial  protection  to  ensure  the  legality  of administrative 
action  within  the  field  of freedom  of economic  activity  is 
guaranteed  in  principle.  We can  refer  to  what  is  said  above. 
There is, in  addition, legal  protection available  within the ad-
ministration: first  the informal application  for  legal  redress  in 
the shape of the submission of grievances (Gegenvorstellung) 
or  appeals  to  higher  authority  (Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde); 
then  there are  the  formal  appeals  also  to  be  brought  within 
the administration.  These are  individually  prescribed  by  sta-
tute.  An  appeal  to  the  courts,  in  particular  to  the  Conseil 
d'Etat, is  possible  only  in cases  where  the  prescribed  formal 
appeals  within  the  administration  have  been  made  without 
success.6 
Denmark 
Denmark has no  fundamental  right  to  freedom  of economic 
activity entrenched in the Constitution. Neither from the con-
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stitutional  duty  upon  the  legislature  to  abrogate  any  discri-
minatory statute governing occupations (Article 74),  nor from 
the  right  to  work  entrenched  in  Article 75 (l),  can  such  a 
fundamental  right  be  inferred.  Only indirectly  is  a person ex-
ercising economic activity protected by  Article 73  of the Basic 
Law (right of property). Thus the withdrawal from  such a per-
son of his  trade licence can amount in certain circumstances 
to  an  interference  with  his  rights  of property. 
Each individual has a right to obtain a trade licence, if he ful-
fills  all  criteria prescribed  in  the statute relating  to  trading.  If 
he  is  refused  such  a licence  in  spite of his  fulfilling  all  the 
criteria,  he may  sue in  court  for  the issue  thereof.  This  will 
not be  the  case, if-as is  provided  in  specific  cases-the au-
thorities in  question have been  given a measure of discretion 
in  the  issue  of a  licence. 
There are  in  principle no  general  restrictions on commencing 
and carrying on economic activity.  The specific criteria for the 
issue of a trade licence are set out in  the Trade Law  of 8 June 
1966.  There  are  particular  areas  (private  Bereiche)  which  are 
almost completely  under State control  and  supervision.  7  The 
State  also  participates  to  a  modest  degree  in  economic  life 
directly; chiefly, however, in  the field  of public services, such 
as  railway  and  local  transport  undertakings,  and  postal  and 
telegraph  services.  The  organizations  in  question  are  either 
directly  incorporated into the administration or the undertak-
ings are carried on as joint stock companies under private law 
in  which  the  State  holds  a  majority  of  the  shares  and  to 
which it has granted the appropriate concessions. Finally there 
are  various  statutes relating  to  unfair competition  and  mon-
opolies which curtail to some extent the autonomy of the pri-
vate sector.  Actual  nationalizations  have not  yet  taken  place. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The Basic  Law  of the Federal  Republic of Germany contains, 
in the part dealing  with fundamental  rights, varius  provisions 
which  are  of importance  for  the  individual's economic  activ-
ity. Thus the freedom  for personal development guaranteed in 
Article 2 extends, according to prevailing learned opinion, also 
to  certain areas of economic activity, inter alia,  to  freedom  of 
contract.  Article 9 protects the formation of economic associa-
tions.  Article 14  contains  a  guarantee  of property;  Article 15 
allows, under certain circumstances, nationalization (Oberfiih-
1  On the so far unsuccessful attempt to amend the Constitution as regards fund-
amental economic rights, see especially-with funher references in each case-de 
Stexhe, La revision de Ia constitution beige, 1968·1971, 1972, p.  349 et seq.;  Wigny, 
La  troisieme  revision  de  Ia  constitution,  1972,  p.  406  et seq. 
1  Cour de Cassation, 18 June 1906, Pasicrisie beige 1906, I, 311; cf.  Wigny,  Cours 
de Droit Constitutionnel, p.  177;  Vlaeminck,  op.  cit., p.  70. 
3  See Buchmann,  Buttgenbach,  Revue de droit  international et de droit compare, 
27  (1950),  p.  160  et  seq. 
'  Cf.  Wigny,  Cours de Droit Constitutionnel, p.  177;  id.,  Droit Constitutionnel, 
p, 389  et seq.; Buchmann  and  Buugenbach,  op.  cit., p.  161  et seq. 
!  Pasimonie I  1948,  Collection  complete  des  lois,  Arretes  et reglements gener-
aux. 
6  Cf.  the  repon of Velu,  loc.  cit.  and  Mast,  Precis de  droit administratif beige, 
1966,  p.  306  et seq. 
7  Cf.  Andersen,  Oansk Forvaltningsret, 5th ed.  1966,  p.  79. 
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purposes  is  Article 12 (1)  of the  Basic  Law: 
'Aile  Deutschen  haben  das  Recht,  Beruf,  Arbeitsplatz  und 
Ausbildungsstiitte frei  zu  wahlen.  Die  Berufsausiibung  kann 
durch Gesetz oder aufgrund eines  Gesetzes geregelt  werden.' 
This constitutional provision has led to copious case-law  from 
the  Bundesverfassungsgericht.  Of particular  importance  was 
and  still  is  a judgment of 11  June 1958,1  in  which  the con-
stitutional court described in greater detail the extent to which 
freedom  of trade or occupation could lawfully  be  regulated by 
statute.  Since  then,  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  has  con-
tinued to follow  the views evolved in this judgment, while at 
the same time it  has  in  a large  number of further judgments 
defined  more closely  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn  between 
lawful  and unlawful  interference  with the freedom  to  choose 
one's  trade or occupation.2  The 'philosophy' of the constitu-
tional court can be described as  follows:  interference with the 
freedom  of trade or occupation  is  lawful  for  the  purpose  Of 
safeguarding important public interests, but only  by  a process 
of weighing  up the public  interests at  stake against the indi-
vidual's freedom of personal development. Here, the court has 
evolved a 'graduated levels approach' (' Stufentheorie '), which 
distinguishes  between three main levels  where interference is 
permissible under conditions which become increasingly strin-
gent  from  one level  to the next.  The first  level  relates to  the 
exercise  of occupations,  that is,  to  the specific  circumstances 
under  which  any  activity,  which  is  lawful  in  principle  and 
open  to  any  person,  may  be  regulated  by  statute.  Here  we 
have the provisions relating to industrial safety, working con-
ditions, requirements of hygiene or measure for  the protection 
of the environment. In the case of such  provisions  the indi-
vidual  may  therefore carry on a specific activity, but must, so 
far  as  the practical aspects are concerned, comply with certain 
requirements.  Here  the  legislature  is  given  a  considerable 
measure  of discretion.  The second  level  relates  to  what  are 
termed  the subjective qualifying  conditions (sogenannte  sub-
jektive  Zulassungsbedingungen).  These are  conditions  which 
the individual must personally satisfy in order to  take up and 
practice  a  trade  or  occupation.  Examples  of this  are  passing 
the  requisite  examinations  for  the  practice  of medicine  or 
pharmacy and the personal  requirements imposed on a driver 
or  a  hotel-keeper.  At  the  level  of the  subjective  qualifying 
conditions interference is  only permissible in  so far  as  import-
ant public interests are at stake and in  need of protection. The 
third level  relates  to what are  termed the objective qualifying 
conditions. Here, decisions as to whether any person may em-
bark  on any  particular  activity  are  made  by  reference  to  ob-
jective criteria which the individual cannot influence.  For ex-
ample, only a limited number of persons are permitted to  be-
come  chimney-sweeps, taxi-drivers  or surveyors.  Such  inter-
ventions restrict the individual's right  to  free  development  in 
a particularly serious  way  and  in  the judgments of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht  they  are  only  permitted  in  terms  of 
constitutional  law  for  the  purposes  of  safeguarding  pre--
eminent community  interests. 
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The  constitutional  court  has  applied  these  principles  to 
numerous  occupations  in  a  manner which  has  attracted  not 
only  approval  but  also  considerable  oppositon.  We  cannot 
here  go  into detail;  and  the exceptions  in  the case of certain 
professions  linked  in  a  particular  way  to  the  State (such  as 
notaries)  cannot  be  considered  here.  The State  organs  must 
however take  into consideration a large  number of points of 
view  and criteria when regulating professional activity, and in 
the final  analysis the Bundesverfassungsgericht will determine 
in binding manner the intervention which the legislature may 
undertake.  It follows  from  what  is  said  above  that each  in-
dividual  case  is  subject  to  judicial  control. 
These  comments  on  the  law  of the  Federal  Republic  must 
suffice.  The constitutional formulations  of the Basic  Law  are 
particularly apt  to  demonstrate the possibilities  and the  limi-
tations  of  incorporating  the  right  to  freedom  of trade  or 
occupation  in  a catalogue of fundamental  rights.  The funda-
mental right  itself can be  relatively  easily and clearly defined. 
Given  that economic  life  can take  so  many  different  shapes 
and that society  makes a variety of demands, the freedom  of 
trade or occupation can hardly  be constitutionally guaranteed 
without allowing to the legislature by  means of explicit or im-
plicit  reservations  a measure  of discretion  in  the elaboration 
by  statute of these rights-going as  far  as  the power to  pro-
hibit  individual  activities  or  to  set up  State  monopolies  and 
to nationalize parts of the economy. The conditions for lawful 
intervention  can  hardly  be  particu~arized in  the catalogue  of 
fundamental  rights, and certain  generalized  provisions  would 
be unavoidable. It seems all  the more important therefore that 
some judicial  athority  should  have  the power  to  review  the 
acts of the legislature, and of the executive, and, if necessary, 
to  correct  them,  if the  fundamental  right  is  not  to  be  left 
entirely  at  the  mercy  of the  legislature. 
France 
Although the Preamble to  the Constitution of 1946  does  not 
list  the right  to  free  economic  activity  among  the 'principes 
sociaux', the judgments of the Conseil d'Etat proceed on the 
footing  that  the  'liberte  de  commerce  et  de  l'industrie'  and 
the  'Iiberte  de  l'activite  professionnelle'  are  fundamental 
principles) The Council d'Etat relies on the one hand on the 
constitutional  assurance  in  the  Constitution of 1848  and  on 
the other hand on a decree of I 791  on freedom  of economic 
activity:  'II sera  Iibre a toute personne de  faire  tel  negoce  ou 
•  BVerfGE  7,  377. 
2  Cf.  BVerfGE  39,  210  (225  et seq.). 
3  Cf.  Schmid,  Die Handels· und Gewerberreiheit in der franzosischen Rechtspre· 
chung, Diss.  Tilbingen 1%5; Burdeau,  Libertes pub/iques,  p.  425  et seq.; Morange, 
Reflexions sur Ia protection accordee par le juge administratif ii Ia  liberte du com· 
merce et de l'industrie, D.  1956, Chron. 117 et seq.; Mallen,  Laliberte du commerce 
et de /'industrie,  en droitfranrais,  in: Laliberte du commerce et de /'industrie en droit 
public suisse et compare,  1954,  p.  199 et seq.; Stahl,  Die Sicherung der Grundfrei-
heiten  im  offentlichen  Recht  der  Filnften  Franziisischen  Republik,  Veriiffentli-
chungen des  lnstituts flir  International  Recht  an  der Universitat  Kii1n  61  (1970) 
p.  268  et seq. 
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mais elle sera tenue de se conformer aux reglements de police 
qui pourront etre faits'.!  The freedom of economic activity  is 
nevertheless  subject  to  extensive  restriction.  In  the  case  of 
many  undertakings  there  is  no  longer  any  freedom  of eco-
nomic  activity,  and  they  are  carried  on exclusively  by  State 
monopolies (for instance, PTT, tobacco, matches, gunpowder). 
Against the establishment of monopolies by the legislature no 
appeal will  lie on the principle of the right to freedom of eco-
nomic activity. The power of the legislature to establish such 
monopolies  for  police  or  fiscal  reasons  has  never  been 
doubted  by  French  learned  writers.2  The  Preamble  to  the 
Constitution of 1946  does  only  envisage  nationalization  for 
'services publics  nationaux'; these are  predominantly  banks, 
insurance  undertaings,  motor car  manufacturers  and  the in-
dustries concerned with raw  materials. Some of these nation-
alized public undertakings compete with the private sector (for 
instance  Gaz  et  Electricite  de  France,  Radiotelevision,  Re-
nault),  and others  have  the character of a  monopoly. 
If however  industrial  or commercial  activities  are carried  on 
by  a public undertaking, only the legislature can confer mon-
opoly  status upon such activities.3  A  de facto  monopoly  can 
come into being where the State acquires  interests in  private 
commercial undertakings and assists them by special measures. 
Moreover, where the private sector competes with public un-
dertakings  in  the  'domaine  public'  the  executive  has  the 
power to promulgate rules for  the carrying-on of these activ-
ities,  in  order to  secure  optimal  use of the 'service  public'. 
This can go so far  as  to withhold any  requisite  permit from 
competing  private  undertakings,  if competition  could  harm 
the public  undertaking.4  Also,  the right  to  freedom  of econ-
omic activity does  not in  practice impose any constraints on 
the setting-up of public  undertakings in competition with the 
private sector. Originally, this was only permissible if 'special 
circumstances,  such  as  the  ensuring  of appropriate  supply' 
justified such  measures.5  To  an  increasing  extent, however, 
the Conseil d'Etat has deemed it sufficient if any public pur-
pose could be achieved by a public undertaking.6 The right to 
freedom  of economic  activity  could  only  place  constraints 
upon public  authority  to the extent that it  acted  exclusively 
for  gain. 
Pursuant to Article 37  of the Constitution of 1958,  the exec-
utive is  directly authorized to  issue directives for the purpose 
of regulating the economy. In its judgment the Conseil d'Etat 
has  however  set certain  limits  to  this  law-making  power of 
the executive  in  that  it  has  numbered  the  'liberte  de  com-
merce et de l'industrie' amongst the fundamental guarantees 
under  Article 34  of  the  Constitution,  which  can  only  be 
regulated by  Parliament,? In this way  it  has  for  instance, de-
clared illegal  the issue of a permit to a film  company subject 
to the condition that a State official held the right to take part 
in  all  meetings  and  to  suspend  the  implementation  of all 
decisions of company organs.s Although a statute of 1946 em-
powered the authorities to make the grant of licences subject 
to  conditions, the Conseil d'Etat  nevertheless  held  that con-
ditions  of this  kind  could only  be  imposed on  the basis  of 
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explicit statutory provision. Accordingly, any fundamental in-
tervention  in  this  sphere  of  free  economic  activity  will 
amount  to  regulating  a  fundamental  principle  within  the 
meaning of Article 34; examples of such intervention are  the 
introduction of marketing organizations  for  certain  products; 
price  restrictions,  quota  arrangements.  This  has  been  esta-
blished  explicitly  in  the judgment of the  Conseil  d'Etat  of 
28.5.1965  in  relation  to  the  quantitative  limitation  of petro-
leum imports.9 The executive will  therefore  retain  the power 
to  make provision, within the framework of the law, for  the 
more detailed implementation of measures for  the purpose of 
regulating  the economy. 
It is  still  an open question how  far  the 'liberte de commerce' 
sets limits to the power of the legislature to enact provisions 
for  regulating the economy.  In  view  of the necessity, widely 
recognized  in  France, of extending state  intervention  in  the 
economy, the hypothesis is  scarcely conceivable in which the 
Conseil  Constitutionnel  could  declare  unconstitutional  a 
statute for  regulating  the economy. 
The taking-up of a trade or profession, and the practice there-
of, and  economic activity, generally, are  subject  to  the reser-
vation  of 'ordre  public' 10.  There  are  thus numerous  restric-
tions  based  on  statutes  and  regulations  and  designed  to 
ensure the oversight of the way  in which businesses are con-
ducted, as  for  instance the Law  of 19  December  1917  on the 
setting-up  of undertakings  which  are  dangerous,  dirty,  and 
cause disturbance.  Restrictions can  be  made  for  moral, sani-
tary, economic or even general reasons relating to  public safe-
ty.  They range from  the absolute prohibition on the carrying-
on of certain kinds of trade (for instance no  person may carry 
on the business of banking if he has a previous conviction for 
an  offence  relating  to  money)  to  the  requirement  for  certain 
licences or particular evidence of competence to be given and 
finally  to  detailed  rules  for  particular  trades  (pharmacists). 
The  courts  distinguish  between  the  freedom  to  exercise  a 
trade or occupation ('liberte de l'activite professionnelle')11and 
the freedom  to  be  admitted  to  a  trade  or occupation  ('prin-
cipes  du  libre  acces  a ('exercise  par  les  citoyens  de  toute 
activite professionnelle ').12  In  regulating the freedom to be ad-
mitted  to  a  trade  or  occupation  the  executive  is  subject  to 
appreciably  more  stringent constraints than  in  regulating  the 
Dalloz,  Code  administratif,  1951,  p.  771. 
Cf.  Schmid,  op.  cit.,  p.  14, Burdeau,  op.  cit.,  37,  p.  437  et seq. 
3  CE  of  16.11.1956,  Societe  des  grandes  hui1eries  Perusson,  RDP  1957,  p.  351. 
CE  of  16.11.1956,  Societe  Desaveine,  Rec.  p.  440. 
Stahl,  op.  cit.,  p.  271;  Burdeau  op.  cit.,  p.  437. 
6  Loschak,  Les  prob1emes  juridiques  poses  par  Ia  concurrence  des  services  pu-
blics et des  activites prives  AJDA  1971,  p.  261  et seq.; Burdeau,  op.  cit.,  p.  440; 
Stahl,  op.  cit.,  p.  273;  Co/liard,  Libertes  publiques,  p.  718  et seq. 
1  CE of 28.10.1960, de Laboulaye, Rec.  p.  570, further references in  Stahl,  p.  275 
et seq. 
a  CE of 29.7.1953, Societe generale des travaux cinematographiques, Rec.  p.  430. 
9  CE  of  28.5.1965,  Societe  Mobil  Oil  fran~ise, Rec.  p.  310. 
1o  Cf.  for  police restrictions in detail:  Burdeau,  op.  cit., p.  425;  Morange,  op.  cit., 
p.  117  et seq.;  seq.;  Co/liard,  Libertes  publiques;  Wa/ine,  Traite  elementaire  de 
droit  administratif,  9th  ed.  1963. 
u  CE  of  28.10.1960,  de  Laboulaye,  Rec.  p.  570. 
n  CE  of  29.6.1963,  Syndical  du  personnel  soignant  de  Ia  Guadeloupe,  RDP 
'1963,  p.  1210;  in  general  Stahl,  op.  cit.,  p.  268  et seq. 
55 manner  in  which  a trade  or  occupation  is  carried  on.  Thus, 
the  Conseil  d'Etat  has  stated  in  several  judgments  that  the 
administration  may  not  prohibit  the  exercise  of a  trade  or 
occupation  or make  it  subject to  conditions or  to  administra-
tive  licences  having  no  statutory basis.!  In  regulating the ex-
ercise  of a trade or occupation, the administration  may  how-
ever  have  full  regard  to  'ordre public'.  It is  therefore  lawful 
to  stipulate the opening  hours  for  pharmacies  for  reasons  of 
public  health, to  prohibit  certain  activities  in  slaughterhouses 
for  the prevention of disease, or to  place dairies  under a duty 
to supply milk to  large families  at  the preferential State price.2 
It has  been  widely  assumed  from  these  judgments  that  the 
change  in  economic  and  social  thought  allows  extensive  res-
trictions  to  be  imposed  on the exercise  of a trade  or occupa-
tion.  There can  be  therefore  not  only  the  traditional  restric-
tions  in  the sense of supervision for  the avoidance of dangers 
but also  restrictions  on  grounds of social  justice.  The overall 
impression  from  French learned writing  is  that  the 'liberte de 
commerce  et de  l'industrie'  is  a freedom  which  is  controlled 
and  guided  to  a  considerable  extent.3  It  is  epitomized  by 
Roche  as  follows:  'Pur produit  du  liberalisme,  Ia  liberte  du 
commerce et de l'industrie sans etre abandonnee comme prin-
cipe  general  de  notre  droit  n'a  cesse  de  deperir  en  meme 
temps  que  l'Etat  etendait  son  controle  sur  l'economie'.4 
Ireland 
The  Irish  Constitution contains  no  provision  explicitly  guar-
anteeing  the freedom  of trade  and  occupation.  The freedom 
of property guaranteed under Article 43(1X2), which comprises 
'the general  right  to  transfer, bequeath and  inherit  property', 
may  have  some  relevance  to  freedom  of economic  activity, 
but the question cannot be considered to have been elucidated 
by  the courts.5  Freedom  of trade  and  occupation  could  per-
haps  be  protected  as  a 'personal  right  of tlie  citizen'  within 
the  meaning  of Article  40(3Xl).6  This  also  has  still  to  be 
elucidated by  the courts. Two cases  dealing  with  the exercise 
of a profession are  only  concerned  with  the power of profes-
sional bodies to exclude members, and thereby to make it  im-
possible  for  them to  practice  their  profession.  In  the case  of 
barristers a statutory  provision ousting the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary  courts  has  been  held  unconstitutional, though  only 
by  reference to  the fundamental rights of justice (Justizgrund-
rechte)  in  the  Constitution.7 In  another  case,  the  question 
whether Article  40(3)  contained 'a right  to  earn a living'  was 
expressly  left  open since in  the case in question  there was  in 
any case no infringement of such right.8 If  it be assumed that 
there is  a guarantee of freedom of economic activity in Article 
40(3)  of the Irish  Constitution, there  is  no  doubt  that  statu-
tory  restrictions  are  possible  to  a considerable  extent.  What 
'personal  rights'  are  protected  against  interference  by  hte  le-
gislature and the extent to  which  powers  are  available  to  res-
trict  such  rights cannot be  regarded  as  settled, having regard 
56 
to  the judgment of the Supreme  Court in  Ryan  v Attorney-
General,  which  was  considered  to  be  avant-garde  by  Irish 
learned authors.9  In  this  case,  the Court allowed little discre-
tion to  the legislature to  pass a statute which could affect the 
bodily  integrity  of the individual.  On  the other hand, in  re-
viewing  by  reference to  the guarantee of property (Article 43) 
legislation  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  the  economy,  the 
Court  has  in  some  decisions  accorded  the legislature consid-
erable  freedom.  The  Court's decisions  are  not, however, en-
tirely  consistent on  this  subject.IO  All  in  all, we  can speak of 
a constitutional guarantee  in  Ireland of freedom  of economic 
activity, but one in  relation  to  which the statutory powers  to 
regulate  have  not  been  clarified.  There are  in  fact  numerous 
statutes  regulating  the freedom  to  take  up  a trade or profes-
sion)! 
In Ireland there also exist several State monopolies which pre-
clude  any  activity  on  the part  of the private  individual, such 
as  the  production,  distribution  and  sale  of electricity.12  In 
other areas,  the  State  carries  on  economic  activity  but  does 
not exclude parallel  private sector activity. In large areas there 
is  competition  between  public  and  private  sectors, though  it 
would be wrong to speak of any appreciable restriction of free-
dom  of economic  activity  because  of the  existence  of the 
State-run  economic  undertakings.l3 
In  accordance with what has been said above on legal  protec-
tion  generally,  any  restriction  on  commercial  activity  which 
cannot  be  justified  by  statutory  provision  can  be  challenged 
in  court. In many cases,  particular statutes also make express 
provision for appeals within the administration and also to the 
courts.14 
Italy 
Trade or occupational freedom  is  not expressly  mentioned  in 
the  Italian  catalogue  of fundamental  rights,  but  can  be  de-
duced  indirectly  from  numerous  provisions  of the  Constitu-
tion,  particularly  from  the text  of Article  4(2): 
1  CE  of 22.6.1951,  Daudignac,  Rec.  p.  362;  CE  of 26.2.1960,  Ville  de  Rauen, 
Rec.  p.  154;  CE  of  15.10.1965,  Alcaraz,  Rec.  p.  516. 
1  Examples  and  references  in  Stahl,  op.  cit.  p.  270;  Burdeau,  op.  cit.,  p.  429. 
3  Cf.  for  instance,  Burdeau,  op.  cit.,  p.  437;  Morange,  Joe.  cit.,  Chron.  p.  117. 
4  Roche,  Liberu?s  Publiques,  3rd.  ed.  1974,  p.  85. 
'  Cf. Kelly,  Fundamental RightS and the Irish Law and Constitution, 2 ed.  1967, 
p.  ~4 et seq.; Barrington,  Private  Property  under the  Irish  Constitution, The  Irish 
Junst 8  (1973), p.  I et seq.; Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law 
(1966),  pp.  359-264. 
'  Boldt,  Die Grundrechte in der Verfassung  Irlands vom  29.12.1937, Diss.  Bonn 
1968,  p.  116. 
7  Boldt,  op.  cit.,  p.  114  et seq. 
8  McDonald  v.  Bard  na  gCon,  100  ILTR89  (1966),  Supreme  Court. 
'  1965,  IR  294,  Cf.  Kelly,  Fundamental  Rights  and  the  Irish  Law  and  Consti-
tution, 2 ed.  1967,  p.  36  et seq.;  also  Temple  Lang,  Private  Law· Aspects of the 
Irish  Constitution,  The  Irish  Jurist  6 (1971),  p.  23.7,  252. 
1° For a detailed  account  see  Barrington,  Private Property  under  the  Irish  Con-
stitution,  The  Irish  Jurist 8 (1973),  p.  3 et  seq. 
"  See  references  in  Boldt,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 
11  Hegarty,  The Control of Government and  Business,  in  King (ed.), Public Ad-
ministmtion  in  Ireland,  Vol.  3 (1954),  p.  191. 
13  Cf.  on  such competition FitzGerald,  State sponsored  Bodies, 2nd  ed.  1963,  p. 
30  et seq. 
14  Cf.  from  more  recent  legislation  s.  5 of the  Employment  Agency  Act  1971, 
No  27,  and  s.  10  &  II of the  Pawnbroker's  Act  1964,  No  31. 
s.  5176 'Ogni cittadino  ha il  dovere  di  svolgere,  secondo  le  proprie 
possibilita e  Ia  propria  scelta,  un'attivita o  una funzione  che 
concorra  a!  progresso  materiale  e  spirituale  della  societa'.l 
Along  with  Article  4,  Articles  41  (freedom  of economic en-
terprise) and  33  (freedom  of artistic and scientific  endeavour, 
and  the establishment of schools)  must  be  considered. 
The  right  to  freedom  of economic  activity  as  a  part  of the 
freedom  of trade  or  occupation  is  also  not  expressly  guar-
anteed by  the Italian Constitution, but Article 41(1) does  pro-
vide  for  the freedom  of private enterprise, a provision  which 
embraces  the  right  to  freedom  of economic  activity.2  This 
paragraph  1 may however be  misconstrued, if it  is  not  taken 
with  the  two  following  paragraphs  of that  Article,  and  with 
Articles  42  and  43  of the Constitution.  The combination  of 
these  provisions ·allows  a  very  considerable  limitation  to  be 
placed  on the freedom  of private enterprise, which cannot be 
set  forth  here in greater detaiJ.3  As  examples of the very  ex-
tensive  economic  activities  of the State  which  create  limita-
tions  on free  enterprise we  refer  only  to  some of the indus-
tries  which  are  operated  in  a semi-public  way:  EN1  (petrol), 
ENEL (electricity),  IRI  (banks, radio,  television, Alitalia,  mo-
torways, etc.). 
Article  43  seems  to  be  of special  significance  in  relation  to 
freedom  of economic  activity: 
'43.  A fini  di  utilita generale Ia  Iegge  puo riservare originar-
iamente o trasferire, mediante espropriazione e salvo  indenniz-
zo,  allo  Stato, ed  enti  pubblici  o a comunita di  lavatori  o di 
utenti determinate imprese o categorie  di  imprese, che si  rif-
eriscano  a  servizi  pubblici  essenziali  o a  fonti  di  energia o a 
situazioni di  monopolio ed abbiano carattere di  preminente in-
teresse  generale.' 
As  has  been  shown  above,  there  is  comprehensive  judicial 
protection  against  unconstitutional  statutes  and  unlawful 
administrative measures, which will  accordingly also be  avail-
able  in  cases  of infringements of freedom  of economic activ-
ity.  But as the legislature has given a considerable measure of 
discretion  to  regulate  this freedom,  the constitutional  protec-
tion  of the  individual  is  as  a  result  correspondingly  slight. 
Luxembourg 
By  a  constitutional  amendment  of 21  May  1948,  there  was 
incorporated  into the Constitution, inter  alia,  a guarantee of 
economic activity (gewerbliche Tatigkeit) as Article 11(6).  This 
took  place  as  a  result  of recommendations  by  the  Conseil 
d'Etat,  which  expressed  doubts  as  to  whether  the  right  to 
work,  the incorporation  of which  had  alone  been  envisaged 
prior thereto, would be apt to cover independent activity. The 
new  provision  reads: 
'La  loi  garantit  Ia  liberte  du  commerce  et  de  l'industrie, 
l'exercice  de  Ia  profession  liberale  et du  travail  agricole  sauf 
restrictions  a  etablir  par  le  pouvoir  legislatir. 
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Despite the twofold reservation this constitutional provision is 
of some importance. The legislature is entrusted with the task 
itself of defining  the  freedom  of economic  activity  and  of 
providing  for  the  limits  thereto  and  for  possible  derogations 
therefrom.4 State  intervention  in  the  economy  is  thus  pre-
cluded  in  so  far  as  the executive  can no  longer  itself define 
the substance  of the freedom  of economic  activity.  Existing 
statutes will however remain in  force until new legislation has 
been  passed, in  accordance with  Article  11(6)  of the Consti-
tution.5  Directives  having  the  force  of statute,  which  were 
issued  before  the constitutional  amendment, also  may conti-
nue  to  limit  freedom  of economic  activity.6 
Since  the  Constitution  guarantees  the  right  to  freedom  of 
economic  activity  without  elaborating  on  what  its  substance 
is,  those enacting ordinary  statutes enjoy considerable discre-
tion  to  define  and  restrict such right.  They  are  however pre-
vented from  abolishing it altogether.?  On the other hand, the 
courts  themselves  further  limit  any  limitations  on  a  funda-
mental  right  by  means of the principle  that restrictive  provi-
sions  must be  narrowly  construed.8  The  statutes  elaborating 
and restricting freedom of economic activity can empower the 
administration to  issue implementing regulations. These must 
however be within the ambit of the limitations which are pos-
sible by  statute. Administrative regulations cannot be founded 
directly  upon  the  power  in  the  Constitution  to  impose 
limitations.9 
Certain areas  may be excluded from the freedom of economic 
activity.  This  follows  from  Article  11(6)  of the Constitution. 
The learned  authors  in  Luxembourg  have  not  yet  discussed 
how  far  such  such  exclusion  may  go. 
The Netherlands 
There is  no  constitutional guarantee of trade or  occupational 
freedom  in  the Netherlands.  Nor do  writers on constitutional 
law  assume  the  existence  of  any  unwritten  constitutional 
principle  to  that  effect.IO  The State  Commission  for  Consti-
tutional  Reform  (Cals-Donner-Commission)  has  incorporated 
in  its  draft  constitution  a right  to  free  choice of occupation: 
•  Cf.  on  Article  4 Corte  Costituzionale,  sentenga.  45/1965 
1  Cf.  Corte Costituzionale, sentenga  16  December  1958  No  78  on the  concept 
of the  initiativa economica. 
l  Cf.  in this respect Mortati.  op.  cit., p.  1013 et seq.; Biscarelli di Rlif!/a.  op.  cit., 
p.  721  et seq.; both with extensive references to other authors; and also Lavagna, 
La  Costituzione italiana, commentata con  le  decisioni della Corte Costituzionale, 
Article  41,  paragraph  D (p.  555  et seq.). 
•  Thus Majerus,  op.  cit., p.  82. 
5  Thus, with reference  to  Article  120 of the Constitution, Conseil  d'Etat, judg-
ment of 29.5.1965,  Pas.  Lux.  XIX,  p.  528. 
6  Cour superieure  de  justice, judgment of 26.10.1955,  Pas.  Lux.  XVI,  p.  397. 
7  Cf.  the judgments on  the  right  to  strike defined  by similar legal  method (Ar-
ticle  11  (5) of the Constitution) Cour de  Cassation, judgment of 24.7.1952,  Pas. 
Lux.  XV,  p.  355;  judgment of 15.12.1959,  Pas.  Lux.  XVIII,  p.  90. 
8  Conseil d'Etat, Comite du contentieux, judgment of 2. 7.1958,  Pas.  Lux.  XVII, 
~- 319. 
Conseil  d'Etat,  Comite  du  contentieux,  judgment  of  12.7.1957,  Pas.  Lux. 
XVII,  p.  158. 
••  Cf. the works cited above by Be/infante, Kranenburg,  Oud.  Vander Pot-Donner. 
and  Stel/inga,  Grondtrekken van  het  Nederlands  Staatsrecht  1953. 
57 'Article 80(3):  Het recht van iedere Nederlander op vrije keuze 
van  arbeid  wordt  erkend,  behoudens  de  beperkingen  bij  of 
krachtens  de  wet  gesteld'. 
In  the  view  of the  Commission,  this  provision  covers  work 
either as  an employee or  on  one's own  account.  This article 
contains  an  extensive  reservation,  which  lacks  substantive 
definition: the right is recognized subject to reservations to be 
effected by statute or powers derived thereunder. Accordingly, 
choice of occupation  will  no  longer be  subject  to  restrictions 
based on general powers.  It will  however remain possible for, 
say,  a  local  authority  to  regulate,  by  virtue of its  powers  of 
administrative autonomy, the actual  carrying-on  of trades  or 
occupations. I  The delegation  of the power  to  impose  restric-
tions  is  considered  to  be  lawful  also  for  the  future.2  It  is 
worth  noting  that  this  proposed  provision  for  fundamental 
rights  is  placed  amongst  the social  fundamental  rights, with 
the consequence that even according to the draft of the State 
Commission, judicial review  of ordinary  statutes by  reference 
to  this  constitutional  provision  will  not  be  permitted. 
Until the new constitutional provision is  promulgated, the re-
gulating  of the freedom  of economic  activity  in  the  Nether-
lands  is  completely  in  the hands  of those enacting  ordinary 
statutes.  We  cannot  set  forth  in  detail  here  the  extent  to 
which  in  this way  interference occurs in practice. What is cer- . 
tain however is that in  the current state of the law  most areas 
of economic  activity  are  open  to  the  individual,  but greater 
and  increasing  interference  cannot  be  ruled  out. 
United Kingdom 
Freedom of economic activity  is  guaranteed under the British 
constitutional system as  part of the freedom  of conduct gen-
erally,  as  described  above.  The  right  to  do  whatever  is  not 
prohibited also applies to the economic activity of the individ-
ual.  It is  true however  that  freedom  of economic  activity  is 
not one of those fundamental rights which have acquired par-
ticular features in  constitutional practice.  Thus only occasion-
ally  in learned writing is  there mention of 'economic liberty'.3 
Street  in  his  fundamental  study of fundamental  rights  in  the 
United Kingdom4 deals with these questions under the head-
ing  of 'freedom  to  work'. 
The  fact  that  freedom  of economic  activity  is  guaranteed as 
part  of the freedom  of conduct  generally  does  of course  not 
imply  that any  person  may  take  up  and  carry  on any  trade, 
since  the  legislature  now  increasingly  regulates  economic 
activity.  The extent to  which  this  should and  may  occur  is, 
having  regard  to  the  legal  situation as  described,  not a ques-
tion  of constitutional  law  but  a  political  question.  The  two 
major parties have held  and continue to  hold different views 
on  it.S  There is  however a  long  tradition  of regulating  trade 
for  reasons of public order. Thus, a licence is  required for  the 
taking-up  of many  occupations.6  The  right  to  authorize  the 
taking-up  of a trade  or profession  may  also  be  transferred to 
professional  or trade  bodies. 
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Where  there  are  no  statutory  rules  relating  to  the  issue  of 
licences the general right to freedom of economic activity can 
develop  to  the  fullest  extent.  An  example  of this  is  the 
appearance  of what  are  referred  to  as  radio-cabs  in  British 
cities, in addition to the duly  licensed taxis.  A licence is only 
necessary  for  a driver  who  plies  for  hire  on  the streets, but 
not for  one who  is  summoned by  radio.  Thus the radio-cabs 
have  become  established  as  a  flourishing  trade. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  major  parts  of the  economy  have 
been  nationalized,  especially  after  the  Second  World  War.? 
This nationalization extends in  particular to the coal and steel 
industry, the supply of electricity and gas, and to major parts 
of the transport  industry.  Coal, electricity  and gas  are  public 
sector monopolies and accordingly  no trade can  be carried on 
in  these areas.  In the transport industry, the area available  to 
the  private  sector  has  been  altered  by  statute  on  several 
occasions,  and  has  been  a  subject of political  controversy.s 
Judicial  protection  is  in  principle  available  if the  administra-
tion interferes without lawful cause with freedom of economic 
activity.  Various  statutes  provide  for  particular  appellate 
procedures.  Even  where  such  a  procedure  is  not  explicitly 
provided for,  the courts can still review the administrative act 
in  question.  This will  always  be  the case unless judicial con-
trol  has been expressly excluded. From time to time however, 
there  is  criticism  that  in  this  regard  legal  protection  is  defi-
cient  in  certain  respects.9 
In  view  of the  fact  that it  is  not possible  to  speak of a con-
stitutionally  secured  freedom  of  economic  activity  in  the 
United  Kingdom  and  that everyth:ng  depends  on numerous 
and varied provisions, both statutory and extra-statutory, this 
short  survey  is  sufficient  for  our  purposes. 
Assessment 
Freedom  of economic  activity  of the  individual  has,  as  the 
preceding  conspectus  shows, been  expressly  regulated  under 
the Constitutions of the Federal  Republic of Germany and of 
Luxembourg.  Rudimentary  or  at  least  obscure  points  of ref-
erence  for  the .protection of freedom  of economic activity  are 
I  This is deduced from  Article 168 of the Gemeentewet: 'Aan hem(- de  Raad) 
behoort het maken van de  verordeningen, die in  het belang der openbare  orde, 
zedelijkheid  en gezondheid  worden  vereischC'. 
1  Staatscommissie,  Eindrapport, op.  cit.,  p.  220  er  seq. 
l  Mirche/1,  op.  cit., p.  343  et seq. 
4  Cf.  Street,  Freedom, the  Individual  and  the  Law,  1963,  p.  9 et  seq. 
s  Cf. on the one side Utley. the Principles of  State Intervention, A Conservative View, 
Public Law, 1957, p.  203, and on the other side Shore,  The Principles of State_ Inter-
vention, A Socialist View, idem.  p.  218.  On the problem of statutes confemng on 
the executive a discretion in questions of management of the economy, cf.  Ganz, 
The Control of Industry by Administrative Process, Public Law  1967, p.  93  et seq. 
6  Cf.  the survey  in  Williams,  Control by  Licensing, Current Legal  Problems  20 
(1967),  p.  81  et seq.;  Street,  op.  cit., p.  238  et  seq.  . 
'  Cf.  the survey m Tivey,  Nationalization in BritiSh  Industry, 1966, espec1ally  p. 
38  er seq.; Ke(f-Cohen,  British Nationalization 1945·1973,  1973, especially  p.  19  et 
seq. 
•  Cf.  Tivey,  op.  cit., p.  46  et  seq. 
9  Cf.  Williams,  op.  cit.,  p.  102  et  seq. 
S.  5176 to be  found  in the Constitutions of France, Ireland and Italy. 
No  relevant constitutional provisions  appear in  the Constitu-
tions  of Belgium,  Denmark,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Netherlands; but  for  the Netherlands  there is  at  least a  pro-
posal  for  the enlargement  of the Constitution. In  the case of 
all  countries  of the European  Communities  it  is  thus estab-
lished  that  within  the  framework  of  an  economic  system 
oriented  towards a market economy  important areas  of com-
mercial  venture and activity are  privately owned and open to 
entry  by  the  individual.  It  is  also  beyond  doubt  that  the 
extent of State intervention  and  regulation  varies  from  State 
to  State, but that no State refrains  from  intervening in  many 
different ways in the economic process and in  the freedom of 
economic  and  commercial  activity. 
The right to choose freely  and exercise a trade or occupation, 
especially  in  the commercial  field,  can  be  considered  a com-
mon feature of the legal  systems of the Member States of the 
European  Communities.  The  EEC  Treaty  also  proceeds  on 
the assumption, inter alia,  in its provisions relating to freedom 
of movement and establishment, that the individual is  free  to 
choose  and  determine  his  occupation  largely  on  his  own 
responsiblity.  Any comprehensive regulation of commercial or 
professional  life  would  moreover  be  incompatible  with  any 
legal  system based  on liberties, and would  go  to the heart  of 
the principle of personal development. For these reasons, any 
catalogue of fundamental  rights for the European Community 
could  hardly dispense with the fundamental  right of freedom 
to  carry on a trade or occupation (whether as  an employee or 
on one's own account).  Formulating such a right  should  not 
present  any  fundamental  difficulty;  existing  fundamental 
rights  at  the  national  level,  the  rules  contained  in  ordinary 
statutes, and the views  arrived  at  by  the courts, such as  the 
French  Conseil  d'Etat, could  be  of assistance. 
It is  at  the  same time  inevitable that  the national  legislature 
as  well  as  Community  authority  will,  to  the  extent of their 
competence in  that  behalf, intervene in  the freedom  of trade 
or occupation for  regulatory purposes. This  is  happening con-
tinuously, as  a glance at  the national official  gazettes and the 
Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  will  show. 
These interventions occur at  different levels and with varying 
degrees  of intensity.  In  many  States,  State  monopolies  and 
nationalizations remove important areas from  the ambit of the 
individual's right to choose freely  an economic activity.  In all 
States,  there  are  certain  occupations  and  activities  which  are 
reserved to persons in  the service of the State. Many activities 
may only be taken up by government authority or permission. 
In  the exercise of most  trades or occupations various aspects 
of the  public  interest  must  be  kept  in  mind. 
The !any  forms  of State intervention in  the freedom  of trade 
or occupation  are  governed  by  different  motives  and  aims. 
Sometimes the intervention is  prompted-as is  the case  with 
nationalization-by  general  ideas  of a  just  and  democratic 
economic  system.  On other occasions  the  factors  governing 
the extent and purport of the restrictions placed  on the free-
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dom  of trade or occupation  are  public  safety  and  order,  the 
protection of particular occupational  are  public safety and or-
der, the protection of particular occupational groups, the pro-
tection  of the  immediate  environment  and  of the  environ-
ment  generally.  These are  different  concerns which can  take 
various forms,  but whose basic justification or reasonableness 
can  hardly  be  disputed, and  they  cannot, in  my  view, be  set 
out in  any  catalogue of fundamental  rights as  limitations  on 
the freedom of trade or occupation in a manner which is com-
prehensive and at the same time sufficiently precise.  There is 
therefore  hardly  any  alternative  to  making  any  incorporation 
of a fundamental  right  relating  to  freedom  of trade or occu-
pation  within  a  European  catalogue  subject  to  a  reservation 
which  would  permit  Member States  and Community organs 
alike  to  make rules, to  the extent of their competence at  any 
given time, as  to the limitation on the freedom of trade or oc-
cupation  requisite  for  the  life  of the  Community. 
2.  Protection of the legal right to rely 
on an established legal position 
As  mentioned above,  it  is  sensible, in  this  discussion of cer-
tain  fundamental  rights  taken  by  way  of example,  to  select 
also  an  unwritten  right  or a legal  principle serving  to  protect 
the individual.  As  is  shown  by  the judgments for  instance of 
the French Conseil d'Etat or the German Bundesverfassungs-
gericht  or  even  the Court of Justice of the European  Com-
munities,  it  is  by  no  means  the  clearly  defined  traditional 
fundamental  rights  which  always  play  the  most  important 
part  within  the  daily  work  of the  administration  and  the 
courts; in  practice  it  is  rather the  expression  of general  prin-
ciples,such  as  legal  certainty and  constitutionality  of admin-
istrative action  that  can  be  more  important  to  the  individual 
than  for  instance  the freedom  of belief and  conscience.  The 
importance of general constitutional principles will  increase as 
sovereign authority intervenes more and more at  national  and 
supranational level  for the purpose of regulating the economic 
process. 
One  of the  most  important  questions  in  any  constitutional 
system is  that of the legality  of State interference with  rights 
of the  individual  which  are  already  established.  Part  of the 
question  has  been  clearly  answered  in  the  field  of criminal 
law:  most States  accord  protection  as  a fundamental  right  to 
the maxim nullum crimen,  nulla poena sine lege; it even appears 
in the ECHR (Article 7).  Here we are not concerned with  this 
prohibition  on retrospective  criminal liability,  but other prob-
lems  are  of importance  for  European  Community  law.  For 
one  thing,  it  is  of great  importance  to  know  how  far  the 
legislature  (including  the  law-making  authority  at  European 
level)  may  impose  on  citizens  liability  of a  retrospective  na-
ture; this is  of special  importance in  ~seal legislation.  Equally. 
important is  the question of the extent to which the rights of 
the individual  once  acquired  or established  may  be  set aside 
ab  initio or in  the future, whether by  the legislature or by  the 
executive; in relation to concessions, licences, etc. this may be 
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individual.  This question  of the protection of the legal  right 
to rely on the continuance of the legal  position, and of estab-
lished  rights  of the  individual,  will  be  explored  below  by 
means of comparative legal  studies. This problem also  is  too 
complex  to  be  treated  here  without  over-simplification  and 
certainly  also  incidental  inaccuracy.  However,  a  brief review 
should convey  the  possibilities  and  the  limitations  of what 
could  be  secured  by  an explicit  fundamental  right. 
Belgium 
There appears to be  no  prohibition in  Belgium on alterations 
to the legal status quo to the detriment of the individual. The 
restrictions  of Article  11  of the Constitution  ('Nul  ne  peut 
etre  prive  de  sa propriete  que pour cause  d'utilite  publique, 
dans les  cas et de Ia  maniere etablis par Ia  loi, et moyennant 
une juste et prealable indemnite') are  not capable of general-
ization.  The right of property itself is  subject to restrictive re-
gulation  in  accordance  with  the concept  of the  individual's 
commitment to society (Sozialbindung): and as to the right  to 
compensation  under constitutional  law,  the  protection  it  af-
fords  seems  only  to  extend  to  immovable  property,  since 
those who· enacted  the Constitution clearly  took propriete  to 
mean only  propriete  immobiliere.l  There are,  however, ordi-
nary  laws  which provide  for  compensation for  deprivation of 
moveable property.2 Moreover, the Conseil d'Etat may recom-
mend that compensation be paid  for  damage suffered by  rea-
son of lawful  acts  on the part of the State.  At any  rate  we 
can  find  no general  prohibition  or substantive restriction  on 
the power of the State to  interfere with  the rights of the  in-
dividual. 
There seems to be  no  bar to  the  retrospective  application  of 
statutes. Even in the case of retrospective fiscal  legislation, its 
constitutionality is  not questioned.  At worst, it  is  considered 
bad  politics) 
As to the power of the administration to revoke, 9r to modify 
to  the detriment of the  individual,  licences  lawfully  issued, 
there is  little in relevant  Belgian  learned writing  to permit of 
precise  conclusions.  It seems  however to  be  recognized  that 
the administration may  modify or revoke concessions on the 
basis of a statutory provision, if they relate to the 'gestion pri-
vee de service public', that is, the discharging of a task of the 
administration  by  private  persons.  This covers,  for  instance, 
the operation of railway or bus services.4  Moreover, it would 
appear that the withdrawal or modification of licences is  law-
ful, at least on the basis of statutory provision, in cases where 
in  principle  there  is  freedom  of economic  activity.  But  this 
question is  not the subject of any coherent expose in Belgian 
learned  writing,  with  the  result  that  it  is  difficult  to  make 
unequivocal  statements  thereon. 
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Denmark 
A  general  prohibition  on the alteration of the legal  position 
to the detriment of the individual exists neither as  part of the 
Constitution nor in other statutes. Only in individual statutes 
are there provisions prescribing to any extent whether and in 
what  circumstances  an  administrative  act  can,  or  must,  be 
revoked and when not. Similarly, it is  only in certain statutes 
that provision  is  made as  to  the extent to which an admin-
istrative act  may be  accompanied  by  a  power of revocation.5 
For the rest, the general principles established by  writers and 
by  the courts will  apply.  In this respect the following  distinc-
tions are  to be  drawn:  Constitutive administrative acts (kon-
stitutive Verwaltungsakte) governed by statute may be altered 
or revoked only to  the benefit of the citizen. The reservation 
of a  power  of revocation  is  unlawful  in  the absence  of any 
enabling statutory  provision.  Constitutive administrative acts 
which  are  in  the  discretion  of the  administrative  authority 
may, if they  impose a  liability  on the individual, be revoked 
at will;  but they  may  also  be altered  to  his detriment if the 
statute provides for  the imposition of liabilities which exceed 
those imposed by  the act  in question.  Discretionary adminis-
trative  acts  which  benefit  the  individual  may  be  revoked, 
unless, exceptionally, the reliance placed by the citizen on the 
continuance of the status quo must prevail. When acting with-
in scope of any discretion  conferred upon  it, the administra-
tion may  reserve a power of revocation.  Declaratory (feststel-
lende) administrative acts  may  only be altered  to the benefit 
of the person concerned. The revocation of an administrative 
act cannot be justified by an error of fact-this is a risk which 
the administration must bear-nor by  an error of law,  if the 
administration  mistakenly  considered  itself to  be  under  an 
obligation,  or  by  changes  in  the law  brought  about  by  the 
passing of a  new  statute. If however a substantial change in 
the external circumstances  has occurred, or if the public  in-
terest  so  requires,  revocation  is  possible,  provided  regard  is 
had to the interests  of the individual. 
In the case of what are termed police licences, whereby a stat-
utory  fetter  placed  on the general  freedom of conduct is  re-
moved in the individual case in question, the interests of the 
individual and the public interest in security and order oppose 
each  other.  If there  is  a  threat  to  public  security  and order, 
the licence can as a rule be revoked or modified.  But in cases 
where the legal position has changed appreciably, where there 
have been errors of fact  or of law  on the part of the admin-
istration, and where new statutes have been passed, the public 
•  Cf.  Dor  and  Brass,  Les  novelles,  Vol.  2,  p.  83  et seq.;  Wigny.  Cours  d~ droit 
constitutionnel,  p.  186;  id.  Droit constitutionnel,  p.  288;  Cour de  ~uon,  6 
April  1960, Revue critique de jurisprudence beige, 14 (1960), p.  257-308 wtth note 
by  Dabin. 
z  Cf.  Mast,  Precis  de  droit  administratif beige,  1966,  p.  144. 
,  Cf.  Wigny,  Droit constitutionnel, pp.  127,  833  et seq ..  835  et seq. 
Cf.  Buttgenbach,  Manuel  de  droit  admini~tratif, 1954,  pp.  191,  201  et seq. 
Cf.  the  list  in  Andersen,  Dansk  Forvaltmngsret, 5th  ed.  1966,  pp.  494,  498. 
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conditionally  may  be  withdrawn.  This principle  will  however 
apply only to  a limited extent if the citizen concerned has al-
ready  incurred  particular expense  in  connection  with  the  li-
cence,  e.g.  as  with  construction  and  trading  licences.1 
With  the  exception  of Article 3  of the  Penal  Code,  which 
states  that  any  provision  increasing  penalties  shall  not  have 
retrospective  force,  the Danish legal  system contains no  gen-
eral  prohibition  on  the  retrospective  application  of statutes. 
Where the legislature deems it necessary, it  may give statutes 
such retrospective effect.  There is  however a presumption that 
a  statute  is  only  to  have  effect  for  the  future.2  Regulations 
and administrative provisions can, as  a rule, only have retro-
spective effect  if the statute in  question  makes  provision  for 
this.3 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The  comprehensive  judicial  protection  of  the  individual 
against State interference in the Federal Republic of Germany 
has led to a large number of decisions on the question wheth-
er and to what extent legislature and  administration  may  in-
terfere  with  rights  of the individual  which  are  already  estab-
lished, and may modify  the legal  position, and also  to  a pro-
cess of ever-increasing differentiation, which  makes it  difficult 
to  draw  the line correctly  between  those interferences  which 
are  lawful  and those which are  not.  In  this regard  the text of 
the Constitution provides  no  help for  the organs of State and 
for  legal  science;  and  it  has  been  left  to  the courts,  in  par-
ticular the Bundesverfassungsgericht, to  deduce the appropri-
ate  rules  from  the constitutional  principle  of the rule of law. 
At the  level  of ordinary  statutes, there  are  a  variety  of dif-
ferent  rules  for  the  various  areas, such as  for  the revocation 
of licences under the law  relating  to  trade, for  the withdrawal 
of approval  in  the case of a doctor or a pharmacist, etc.  The 
courts have  furthermore  evolved general  unwritten  principles 
of administrative  action  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of law 
which  must  also  be  observed.  The  most  important  distinc-
tions  in  the current law  of the Federal  Republic  of Germany 
will  be  described  below. 
The retrospective amendment of statutes to  the detriment of 
the individual is,  according  to  the judgments of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht,  fundamentally  incompatible  with  the 
princple of the rule of law  in the Constitution, and  is  there-
fore  unlawful. This seemingly simple principle presents many 
difficulties  in  practice.  Thus one speaks of a true and a false 
retrospective effect, and  distinguishes  between  the respective 
categories; and in relation to amendments of statutes the mat-
ter does  not always  depend on the date  upon  which  the sta-
tute is published, but a limited measure of retrospective effect 
is  permitted  in  cases  where  the  individual  must  have  been 
able to foresee  his  position being adversely affected and could 
make  arrangements accordingly.  A  recent  decision4  summar-
izes  the  relevant  principles  as  follows: 
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'Onerous  statutes  which  interfere  with  transactions  already 
completed  in  the  past,  and  thus  have  a  true  retrospective 
effect,  are  generally  contrary  to  the Constitution  since  they 
offend against the requirements of legal  certainty and protec-
tion of legitimate expectation which form  part of the principle 
of the rule  of law.5  A statute is  said  to  have  false  retrospec-
tivity  when  it  does  not  affect  past  transactions  and  legal  re-
lationships,  but  affects  not  merely  future  ones,  but  also,  for 
the future,  those  not  yet  completed, thereby  devaluing  after 
the event the legal  position as  a whole. 6 Such  statutes are  in 
principle  permissible.  The concept  of protection  of legitimate 
expectation  may, however,  in  this case  set  limits,  depending 
on  the  facts  of the  particular situation, to  the  power of the 
legislator.  6 
The citizen cannot invoke  the protection of legitimate expec-
tation  as  an  expression  of the principle of the  rule  of law  if 
his expectation of the continuance of a legal  situation cannot 
fairly  claim  to  be  respected  by  the  legislator.  The  relevant 
considerations here are, on the ooe hand, the extent to which 
his  legitimate  expectations  have  been  disappointed,  and,  on 
the other hand, the importance of the public good  which  the 
legislator is  seeking to secure.  They must be  balanced against 
each  other.? 
In  German constitutional law,  seen as  a whole,  there is  thus 
in  principle a prohibition on giving  retrspective effect  to  sta-
tutes  which  impose  a  liability,  but this  prohibition  is  some-
what mitigated by the consideration afforded  to the protection 
of legitimate expectation  and  to  overriding community  inter-
ests.  The  principle  of th  rule  of law  is  not  opposed  to  stat-
utory  amendment  pro  futuro;  but  other constitutional  provi-
sions  and  principles,  particularly  the  protection  of property, 
can  prevent statutory  interference  with  the established  rights 
of the  individual. 
Even  more complicated is  the legal  position in  relation to  the 
power  of the administration  to  interfere  with  the established 
rights  of  the  individual,  or  to  disappoint  his  expectations 
when they are  well  founded  in law.  Here, various  overlapping 
legal  considerations  have  a  part  to  play:  the  lawfulness  or 
otherwise  of the existing  situation, the  protection  of the  le-
gitimate expectations of the individual, and the weight of the 
community  interests  at  stake.  In  the case  of rights  acquired 
contrary to  law, the following distinctions are drawn:  benefits 
contrary to  law  which  are  acquired  by  fraud, or  by  the fault 
of the individual in  question, may  be  revoked  retrospectively; 
payments made or services  rendered  by  the State contrary  to 
law  without any  fault  can  however only  be  withheld for  the 
1  Cf. on all  the above the comprehensive comments in  Andersen, op. cit., p.  485 
et seq. 
z  Andersen,  op.  cit.,  p.  27. 
l  Ross,  op.  cit., p.  499. 
4  BVerfGE  39,  128  (143  et seq.,  145  et seq.);  cf.  also  BVerfGE  39,  156  (166  s) 
and, among earlier cases, e.g.  BVerfGE  30,  272  (285  et seq.). 
5  BVerfGE  30,  392  (401);  consistent case  law. 
'  BVerfGE  30,  392  (402);  consistent case  law. 
7  BVerfGE 14, 288 (301); 22, 241  (249); 24, 220 (230); 25,  142 (154); 25, 269 (291); 
31,  222  (228  et seq.). 
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in  exceptional  cases  the  administration  must, in  accordance 
with decided cases, even allow  a situation contrary  to law  to 
continue, if in  the case  in  question  the  protection  of legiti-
mate expectation so  requires.  These  rules  have  chiefly  been 
evolved  in  relation  to  the payment  of pensions.  When  the 
administration  has  acted  lawfully,  the power to  revoke  con-
cessions, licences etc.  is  not without limitation, but such re-
vocation is  usually lawful  where preponderant interests of the 
community so require, and the legal provisions in question so 
permit.  The  pre-conditions  and  the consequences of revoca-
tion of benefits or  licences  by  the authorities will  vary  as  to 
the area of human activity affected.  It  is  easily perceived that 
for  the protection  of the community, a driving  licence  for  a 
motor vehicle may be withdrawn from  a person whose health 
is  such that he is  no longer fit  to drive, the approval  may  be 
withdrawn from  a doctor who  is  a danger to the public, and 
a  pharmacist's  licence  may  be  revoked  if  he  is  addicted  to 
drugs. An important provision is contained in  Article 51 (1) of 
the  Trade  Act (Gewerbeordnung): 
'Wegen  tiberwegenden  Nachteile  und Gefahren  ftir  das  Ge-
meinwohl kann die fernere Bentitzung einer jeden gewerblich-
en Anlage durch die zustandige Behorde zu jede Zeit  unter-
sagt werden.  Doch  muG  dem Besitzer alsdann ftir den erneis-
lichen  Schaden  Ersatz  geleistet  werden.' 
The first  sentence of this  provision can  perhaps  be  regarded 
as  a general principle of law, even though the principle of the 
rule of law  has caused it  to be  formulated explicitly  in a stat-
ute.  In a case of serious  conflict between  the interests of the 
community and rights  hitherto enjoyed by  an  individual, the 
latter must bow to  te former, although compensation  is  to  be 
granted  if necessary. 
It  should be clear that neither the principle of the rule of law 
whereby  the rights  of the  individual  are  to  be  respected  by 
public  authority, nor the exceptions therefrom  for  the benefit 
of the community can be precisely formulated in any succinct 
fundamenta( rights  provision;  but general  clauses  are  a  pos-
sibility.  According to  the law  of the Federal  Republic of Ger-
many  the courts, and  not only  the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
but particularly the administrative courts, have the duty to be 
vigilant  to  ensure both  respect  for  the constraints of consti-
tutional  law  by  the legislature and compliance by  the admin-
istration with the unwritten and written norms and principles 
of the  rule  of law.  This  duty  is  discharged  effectively,  with 
the  result  that a  body  of case-law  based  on fine  distinctions 
is  becoming  increasingly  difficult  to  relate  back  to  uniform 
principles. 
France 
As  to  the prohibition  on the  retrospective  effect  of the  acts 
of sovereign  authority:!  in  the  judgments  of  the  Council 
d'Etat it  has been  repeatedly stated that no administrative act 
may  have retrospective effect  prior to the date of its  publica-
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tion  or gazetting.2  The  reason  for  this  prohibition  on  retro-
spective effect  lies  in the principle of legal  certainty.  The cit-
izen  may  not  have imposed  upon  him any  liability  of which 
he could not have known at the time when he entered upon 
the activity  in  question.  This  prohibition, however does  not 
apply  where  a  statute  contains  an  express  provision  to  the 
contrary.3 The problem of retrospective effect must be distin-
guished from  the application of an administrative measure to 
a situation which in legal  terms had come into being prior to 
the adoption  of that  measure.  4 
As  to  the  retrospective  effect  of statutes:  under Article 2 of 
the 'Code Civil', thee is  a statutory prohibition on retrospec-
tive effect: 'La loi  ne dispose que pour l'avenir; elle n'a point 
d'effet  retroactir.  However,  from  ths  specific  prohibition  on 
retrospective  effect  for  the  purposes  of the  Code  Civil,  no 
general prohibition on retrospective amendment of statutes to 
the detriment of the individual may be deduced. The problem 
itself so far as we can see has not been more widely discussed 
in  learned writing.  This  is  due to  the fact  that until recently 
statutes  could  only  under  very  restrictive  conditions  be  re-
viewed  as  to  their compatibility  with the Constitution. From 
the  principles  relating  to  the retrospective  effect of adminis-
trative  acts  it  can  however be  inferred  that  there exists  no 
statutory  prohibition  on  retrospective  effect.  The  Conseil 
d'Etat has  allowed  exceptions  from  the prohibition on  retro-
spective  effect  of acts  of sovereign  authority,  whenever  the 
law  expressly  empowered  the administration  in that behaJf.5 
It  may  be  inferred  from  this  that  a  statute  itself could  be 
amended retrospectively  to the detriment of the individual.  A 
prohibition  on  retrospective  effect  for  statutes  would  not  in 
any  case  be  in  keeping  with  French  legal  tradition. 
As  to  revocation  of licences:6  French  law  proceeds  from  the 
principle that the administration can in  the public interest al-
ways adapt  its position to accord with new  situations.? Thus, 
regulatory administrative acts (' actes  reglementaires ') may  al-
ways  be  revoked.  The persons affected  have no  protection in 
respect  of any  reliance  they  have  placed  on the continuance 
of a  regulatory  provision.  An  individual  act  may  however 
only  be  revoked  at  will  by  the administration, if it  has  not 
created  a  right  (nicht  rechtserzeugend).  Acts  not  creating  a 
right  in this sense are  deemed to include authorizations ('au-
torisations ') and  revocable  measures (' actes  precaires et  revo-
calbes '). 8 There is  for  instance no right to the continuance of 
a  permit  for  the  carrying-on  of an  activity  within  the  'do-
maine public'. Furthermore, any act the object of which is  of 
a provisional  nature may  be  revoked.  Even an act  creating  a 
•  Debbasch,  op.  cit., p.  332 et  seq.; de Laubadere, Traite de Droit Administratif, 
6th  ed.  1973,  Vol.  I,  p.  300  er  seq.; Dupeyroux,  La  regie  de  Ia  non·retroactivitti 
des  actes  administratifs,  1954;  Letourneur,  Le  principe de  Ia  non-retroactivitti des 
actes  administratifs, Etudes  et  documents  1955,  p.  37  et seq. 
1  CE  of  25.6.1948,  Societe  I'Aurore,  D.  1948,  p.  437,  Note  Waline. 
'  CE  of  14.11.1962,  Dupre  de  Pomarede,  Rec.  871. 
Cf.  Debbasch,  op.  cit.,  p.  333  with  references  from  decided  cases. 
CE  of  14.11.1962  Dupre  de  Pomantide,  Rec.  871. 
'  Cf.  de  Laubadere,  op.  cit., p.  322  et  seq.;  Debbasch,  op.  cit.,  p.  333  er  seq. 
'  CE of 25.5.1954, Syndical national de  Ia  meunerie d seigle,  D.\955, p.  49; CE of 
27.1.1961,  Vaumier,  Rec.  p.  6'. 
s  Debbasch,  op.  cit.,  p.  334. 
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cation  is  possible  if important changes have  occurred  in  the 
factual or legal setting which militate against the continuance 
of the act. 
The retrospective  revocation  of an  act  which  has  created  a 
right is  impossible.  This is  not so in  respect of an act which 
has created no right. The revocation of an act contrary to law 
is  possible, if it has not resulted in the creation of a right.  In 
such  case,  revocation  may  be  effected  within  the  time  pre-
scribed  for objection, or in the course of administrative court 
proceedings.  The  principle  will  apply  that  wherever a  court 
may  quash  an  act,  the  administration  must  likewise  be 
entitled  to  do so. 
Ireland 
On the protection of rights which are already established un-
der Irish law, no more detailed statement can be derived from 
Irish learned writing or case-law. It can probably be assumed 
however  that the Irish  legal  system, in  so  far  as  it has  not 
been  amended  by  statutes passed  after  independence, conti-
nues to follow  the principles of English law, admittedly with 
the important additional  feature that a series of rights, which 
in the United Kingdom merely form part of the constitutional 
tradition  and  are  at  the  mercy  of the  legislature, are  consti-
tutionally secured in  Ireland.  A general prohibition on the al-
teration of the legal  position to the detriment of the individ-
ual,  or individual  particular prohibitions of this  kind, cannot 
really  be  deduced from  the Irish  Constitution.  Even the pro-
hibition  on  statutes  with  retrospective  effect  exists,  as  has 
been  said, only  in  relation  to criminal  law.  As  to  the possi-
bility  of the  revocation  of lawfully  issued  licences,  what  is 
said  in  relation  to  the  United  Kingdom  holds  good  here. 
Italy 
The question  as  to  the lawfulness  of alterations  of the_ legal 
position to the detriment of the individual, as  well  as of the 
revocation  or modification of lawfully  issued  licences  to  the 
detriment  of the  individual,  as  well  as  of the  revocation  of 
modification  of lawfully  issued  licences  to  the detriment  of 
the individual, arises  in a special  way  in the Italian legal  sys-
tem, in that the character of the right concerned has a major 
part  to  play.  The Italian  legal  system  differentiates  between 
four  kinds  of rights  or legally  protected  interests,  which  at-
tract differing measures of protection. The most strongly pro-
tected  are  the  'diritti  soggettivi  (privati  e  pubblici)'  that  is, 
subjective rights; they are defined as interests accorded by  law 
to the individual exclusively, and thus enjoying direct protec-
tion.'  These  subjective  legal  rights  cannot  be  affected  or 
amended  by  the State. 
The  second  group  of rights  and  legally  protected  interests 
comprises the 'diritti affievoliti'  or 'diritti esposti ad  affievol-
imento'  ,2  that is,  rights  from whch derogations  have been or 
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can be  made.  These are subjective  rights  which  could come 
into  conflict  with  the  interests  of public  administration.  As 
long as this conflict does not arise, these rights have the same 
protection as  subjective rights.  If however such conflict does 
arise,  the interests of the individual  are subordinated to  the 
public interest.3 This correlation of the right of the individual 
and the public  interest can arise  from  the moment the right 
comes into being  or only subsequently; in  the first  case  the 
rights  are called  'diritti affievoliti', and  in  the second 'diritti 
esposti  ad  affievolimento'.  An example of typical  'diritti  af-
fievoliti'  are  the  rights  arising  under  concessions;  and  an 
example of the 'diritti esposti ad  affievolimento'  is  the right 
of property, the 'affievolimento' of which may, in an extreme 
case, be expropriation. All fundamental rights to which a res-
ervation attaches can generally be taken as examples of 'diritti 
esposti ad affievolimento'. The protection of the 'diritti affie-
voliti'  is  equivalent  to  that  of the  'interessi  legittimi',  the 
third  kind of right  now  to  be  described  in  detail. 
The 'interesse legittimo' is  an interest of the individual which 
is  closely bound up with the public interest.4 If the public in-
terest is  a  preponderant one the right of the individual  must 
be subordinated thereto.  This means  that the administration 
may always  revoke or modify at  will  any alteration  in an  in-
dividual's right  where it  is  a  'diritto affievolito'  or an  'inter-
esse  legittimo', if this  is  in  the  public  interest.5  The  fourth 
group  of rights  is  what  are  called  the  'interessi  semplici'6 
which are not recognized  by  law.  The protection of these in-
terests  is  normally effected  by  the administrative  authorities 
but rarely  by  the administrative courts.? 
The position  is  therefore  that  the  rights  of individuals  may 
not be altered, if such rights are subjective rights, but that all 
other forms of rights  may be altered at  any time, if there is 
an over-riding public interest.  Whether any right is  a subjec-
tive  right  will  be  determined by  the court whose jurisdiction 
is  invoked; moreover, this can as  a  rule be elicited  from  the 
provision of law  regulating the right in question. Thus, for  in-
stance, all  fundamental rights to which a reservation attaches 
are  to  be  regarded  as  'diritti  esposti  ad  affievolimento'; 
whether in  any  given  case the limitation of the right  is  jus-
tified  is  for  the courts  to decide.  In  the case of concessions, 
approvals, etc.  any alteration in the rights granted to  the  in-
dividual is  always  lawful, if the public interest demands it.  If 
the public  interest,  for  instance,  requires  the revocation of a 
concession, this is  not, according  to Italian  legal  thought, an 
instance of the revocation of an unimpeachable administrative 
act  to the detriment of the individual, but is  rather the revo-
cation  of  -an  adminstrative  act  which  was  originally 
unimpeachable but which has become defective by  reason of 
•  Zanobini,  Corso ·di  diritto amministrativo,  I,  p.  187. 
1  Sandul/i,  Manuale di  diritto  amministrativo, p.  74  et  seq. 
l  Zanobini,  op.  cit., p.  189. 
•  Landi/Potenza,  op.  cit.,  p.  149,  Consiglio  di  Stato,  24.11.1962  No  13  and 
8.1.1966  No  I  in  II  ConsiJdio  di  Stato  1962,  I,  p.  1734  and  1966,  I,  p.  I. 
5  Cf.  Consiglio di  Stato, TV,  30.3.1966  No  182,  in  II  Consiglio di  Stato  1966,  I,  r·  478. 
Zanobini,  op.  cit.,  p.  192. 
7  Landi/  Potenza,  op. cit., p.  153. 
63 the  subsequent  disappearance  of the  proper  relationship  be-
tween  the  act  and  the requirements  of good  administration. 
The  legal  basis  for  any  such  revocation  is  the  principle  that 
the action  of the public  administration  must at  all  times  ac-
cord  to  the  greatest  possible  extent with  the  public  interest. 
The  question  whether  statutes  may  be  retrospectively 
amended  to  the detriment  of the individual  is  dealt  with  in 
Article 11  of the Disposizioni  sulla Iegge  generale (also  called 
preleggi),  which  states  that  the  provisions  of statutes  may 
only  affect  the future and may  not have any  retrospective ef-
fect.  (La Iegge non dispone che per I'avvenire: essa non  ha ef-
fetto  retroattivo).  Plainly  however this rule  does  not  apply  in 
an absolute  way.1 An  amendment  may  however  only  be  ef-
fected  by  a statute, that  is,  a source  of law  of equal  status, 
whereby  repeal  will  take  place  either implicitly,  by  virtue  of 
the lex posterior rule, or expressly  under the provisions of the 
new  statute.  A  legislative  amendment  is  also  possible  by 
means  of a  referendum (Article 75  of the Constitution, Arti-
cle 27  of the Law  of 25  May  1970, No 352).  Criminal statutes 
are  completely  excluded  from  any  retrospective  effect  (Arti-
cle 25 (2)  of the  Constitution) and  this  must  be  extended  by 
way  of analogy  to  disciplinary  measures.2 
It is  difficult  to answer  the question as  to  the possible effect 
of a statute, if the law  hitherto in  force  has led to the creation 
of what is  termed a 'diritto quesito' (acquired  right) which  in 
principle  should  not  be  affected  by  the  new  provision.  No 
such  diritto  quesito  will  arise  if the  previous  law  had  only 
conferred  on  the  individual  in  question  an  expectation,  or a 
legitimate  interest.  There  is  no  answer of general  validity  to 
the question when a diritto quesito arises; opinion  is  divided 
and  each  case  will  require  particular  scrutiny.3  All  we  can 
really  say  is  that only  criminal  statutes and  disciplinary  pro-
visions  are  subject  to  a strict  prohibition  of retrospective  ef-
fect;  in  all  other cases such effect  must as  a rule be  affirmed 
where there is  a preponderant public interest; however, where 
there are  rights  lawfully  acquired (diritti  quesiti), the individ-
ual  case must be examined. There are  however moves  to  ex-
tend  the absolute  prohibition  on  retrospective  effect  to  fiscal 
legislation,4 although  the constitutional  court  has  repeatedly 
declared  retrospective  fiscal  legislation  to  be  constitutionaLS 
Luxembourg 
The law  of Luxembourg does  not contain any  evident prohi-
bition  on  altering  the  legal  position  to  the  detriment of the 
individual.  Whether Article 16 of the Constitution6 belies  this 
appears  doubtful, since  hitherto the judgments of the courts 
in  relation  to  Article 16  have dealt  essentially  with  expropri-
ation  of immoveable  property  and  compensation  therefor. 7 
Here  we  must  refer  to  the  legal  position  in  Belgium,  which 
frequently  influences  the  Luxembourg  legal  system. 
Similarly  there  is  no  express  prohibition  on  the retrospective 
effect of statutes. Such effect  has  from  time to  time been de-
nied  by  the courts in  cases of individual statutes on the foot-
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ing that such effect was  not therein contemplated, but not for 
reasons  of principle.8  From  this  we  can  deduce  that  apart 
from  criminal  law  the  legal  system  of Luxembourg  contains 
no  general  prohibition  on such  retrospective  effect. 
In  terms  of constitutional  law  it  is  also  lawful  to  revoke  or 
modify  duly  issued  licences  to  the  detriment  of the  individ-
ual.  The courts do  however  require  express  statutory author-
ity  on  the  part  of the  administration.  According  to  the  de-
cided  cases,  the  administraton  is  not  entitled  to  revoke  a 
licence  at  will;  this  may  only  be  done  in  the  cases  contem-
plated  by  statute,  and  on  the  basis  of circumstances  which 
have  arisen  after  the licence  has  been  issued.9 
The Netherlands 
Save in  the more recent decided cases referred to below, there 
is  in  the Netherlands no prohibition on alterations of the legal 
position  to  the  detriment  of  the  individual.  Retrospective 
amendment  or  retrospective  enactment  of statutes  is  pre-
cluded by  Article 4 of the Law  containing General  Provisions 
in  relation to Legislation;IO but that Article is  a provision hav-
ing  no  more than the force  of an ordinary statute, and is  not 
formulated  as  a  general  constitutional  principle.II  The  said 
provision  is  not  directed  to  the  legislature but  to  the courts, 
who  have thereby placed  at their disposal  the presumption of 
construction  that  statutes  are  not  enacted  with  retrospective 
effect unless there is  specific  provision.I2  Statutes having  ret-
rospective  effect,  though  infrequent  in  the  Netherlands,  are 
none  the less  not  unlawfuJ.I3  In  the  context  of law  reform, 
however,  the adoption  into  the Constitution of the  principle 
of the  prohibition  on  retrospective  effect  is  being  urged.14 
The extent to  which  the administration  is  free  to  revoke  li-
cences  depends  on  the extent  to  which  it  was  under a duty 
1  Cf.  Consiglio  di  Stato  IV,  30.4.1955,  No  297  and  VI,  11.7.1956,  No  508  in  II 
Consiglio  di  Stato,  1955,  I,  p.  440  and  1956,  I. p.  1002. 
'  Zanobini,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 
3  Cf.  Romano. Corso di  diritto amministrativo,  p.  72  et seq.; Cammeo, Corso di 
diritto  amministrativo ristampa  1960),  p.  252  et seq.; Landi/Potenza,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
23  et seq.,  25;  Mortati.  op.  cit.,  p.  345  with  references  to  other  works. 
•  Cf.  the  references  in  Mortati,  op.  cit.,  p.  346,  Note  3. 
~  Cf.  Corte  Costituzionale,  9.3.1959,  No  9,  16.6.1964,  No  46,  and  many  other 
decided  cases. 
6  'Nul  ne peut etre  prive  de  sa  propriete que  pour cause d'utilite  publique dans 
le  cas et de  Ia  maniere  etablis  par Ia  loi  et moyennant  une juste et prealable  in-
demnite'. 
7  Cf.  Cour de Cassation, judgment of 4.6.1953, Pas.  Lux.  XV,  p.  493 on the sub-
stance  of ownership.  In  connection  with  expropriation: judgment of  26.11.1915, 
Pas.  Lux.  IX,  p.  487; Tribunal de Luxembourg, judgment of 15.6.1908; Pas.  Lux. 
VIII,  p.  14;  judgment  of  13.7.1955,  Pas.  Lux.  XVI,  p.  455;  judgment  of 
28.10.1953, Pas.  Lux.  XVI,  p.  29; judgment of 6.1.1960, Pas.  Lux.  XVIII,  p.  175. 
In  respect of the  guarantee  of ownership:  Mqjerus,  op.  cit.,  p.  62  et seq. 
•  Cour superieure de justice, judgment of 9.7.1959, Pas.  Lux.  XVIII,  p.  5;  Con-
seil  superieur  des  assurances  sociales, judgment of  12.2.1953,  Pas.  Lux.  XV,  p. 
467;  Conseil  arbitral  des  assurances  sociales,  decision  of  30.6.1959,  Pas.  Lux. 
XVIII,  p.  46. 
'  Conseil d'Etat, Comite du contentieux, judgment of 30.4.1952,  Pas.  Lux.  XV, 
P.  441. 
lo  Wet van  15  mei  1829, houdende algemeene bepalingen der wetgeving van het 
Koninkrijk  (AB). 
"  Oud,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  171. 
12  Duk, Terugwerkende Kracht, Geschriften van de  Vereniging voor Asministm-
tief  Recht,  54  (1965)  pp.  5  et seq.,  51. 
13  cr.  the  Jist  in  Oud,  op.  cit.,  p.  174. 
••  Thus Jeukens, Terugwerkende Kracht, Geschriften, loc. cit., pp.  53  et seq .. 94. 
s.  5176 to grant such licences.  A revocation  may  not  be  founded  on 
reasons which would not justify a refusal of the licence.  A li-
cence  the granting of which  is  not  regulated  by  statute  may 
be revoked, if the public interest requires such revocation and 
is  not disproportionate  to  the interests of the person  benefit-
ing  by  the licence.!  Modifications  of a licence  are  subject  to 
restrictions  in  so  far  as  they represent a substantial alteration 
in  the  elicence  originally  issued.2 
Certain statutes themselves contain provisions  relating to  the 
revocation  of licences,  such  as  the  Law  relating  to  the  Car-
riage of Persons, the Cinema Law,  the Law  relating  to  Places 
of Refreshment  and  Closing  Hours.3  In  these  cases  the  fact 
that the  issue  of a  licence  is  provided  for  by  statute means 
that  the  administration  is  similarly  bound  as  to  revocation. 
On  the  other  hand  a  licence  the  issue  of which  is  in  the 
discretion of the administration may  be  revoked  at  will.  Orig-
inally  the courts  accepted  such  revocation  at  wi11.4  More  re-
cent judgments however reveal  a change.  In these judgments 
there have been developed general  principles of administrative 
law  which  run contrary to  revocation at  will.  This revocation 
now  requires  the  presence  of real  grounds,5  or the  principle 
of legal  certainty  and of protection  of legitimate  expectation 
is  invoked.6  In  social  security matters  the  importance  of the 
rights  lawfully  acquired  by  the  insured  (' verkrgen  rechten ') 
has  been  held  to  preclude  revocation  at  wiiJ.? 
For the rest, the opinion seems to  be  gaining  ground  that in 
cases  of revocation  of licences  there has  to  be  a weighing-up 
of the  respective  public  and  private  interests.8  This  mr.y 
sometimes  mean that  while  the revocation  is  lawful  the  per-
son  affected  must  be  compensated.9 
United Kingdom 
Under  the constitution of the United  Kingdom  there can  be 
no  general  prohibition  flowing  directly  from  the constitution 
on the alteration of the legal status quo to the detriment of the 
individual.  None the less  there is  a kind  of constitutional tra-
dition  whereby  rights  lawfully  acquired  are  to  be  respected. 
This  is  shown in  the basic  inclination  of the  legislature  not 
to expropriate without compensation, and in the inclination of 
the courts not  to  construe statutes in such  a way  as  to  allow 
expropriation  without compensation.  10 
Nor can  there be any  rigorous  prhibition on retrospective stat-
utes  under  the  British  constitutional  system.  British  consti-
tutional  tradition  is  however reluctant  to  give  statutes retro-
spective effect.  In particular the reluctance to enact retrospec-
tive  criminal  statutes  is  a  well-established  part  of this  trad-
ition.  The question of the lawfulness of retrospective statutes 
has  recently  played a part  in  the controversy surrounding the 
Burrnah Oil case.  The House of Lords  had  in this case found 
in  favour of an  award of compensation for  loss  of certain  fa-
cilities  in  Rangoon as  a result  of hostilities.  The British  Gov-
ernment  thereupon  introduced  a  bill  in  the  House  of Com-
mons  which  prohibited  the  payment  of such  compensation 
and  which  had  retrospective  force,  that  is,  it  disentitled  the 
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plaintiffs  in  Burrnah  Oil  from  the  compensation  already 
awarded to  them. During the debates on the bill in the House 
of Lords grave reservations were voiced against the bill  on ac-
count  of  the  prohibition  on  retrospective  legislation.  The 
House of Lords  finally  passed  the bill,  but  it  was  clear  that 
this  was  only  because  of the particular  circumstances of the 
case,  because  ultimately  the  victims  of  the  hostilities  in 
Burma  would  have  been  placed  in  a considerably  better  po-
sition  than  those  in  the  United  Kingdom, who  had  no  enti-
tlement to  compensation. The prohibition on retrospective le-
gislation  as  a constitutional principle was  heavily  emphasized 
throughout  the  debate.!! 
Decisions made by  the administration within the ambit of its 
powers  are  in  principle  binding  on  the  administration.l2  On 
the other hand,  the  administration  cannot  bind  itself by  an 
act  which  is  ultra  vires.  Accordingly, such  an  act  may  always 
be  revoked.  A difficult question is  whether acts  which at the 
time they were promulgated were intra vires can be revoked by 
reason  of changes  in  the  factual  and  legal  setting.  Learned 
authors  assume  this  to  be  so.B  These general  principles  are 
however only applicable  in  so  far as  there are  no specific stat-
utory  rules. 
Assessment 
The  preceding  conspectus  has  demonstrated  some  basic  un-
derlying features but leaves a bewildering variety of individual 
questions.  Apart  from  the prohibition  on  retrospective  crimi-
nal  statutes, only  in  the case of the Federal  Republic  of Ger-
many  can  we  speak  of a prohibition  on  retrospective  legisla-
tion  that is  reasonably  clear  and  firm  and  also  subject  to  ju-
dicial  review.  In  all  other  Member  States  of the  European 
Community the legislature is considered to  have the power to 
enact  formal  statutes  having  retrospective effect  even to  the 
detriment of the individual. It is  true that in  various legal  sys-
1  Rapport  van  de  commissie  inzake  algemeene  bepalingen  van  administratief 
recht,  4th  ed.,  p.  108. 
2  Rapport,  op.  cit.,  p.  109. 
J  Rapport,  op.  cit.,  p.  102. 
4  Centrale  Raad  van  Beroep,  judgment  of  30.9.1924,  AB  1924,  No  4,  380; 
20.12.1957, Gem. St.  1957, 5469;judgment of 30.5.1961, RSV  1961,  No  135; Hoge 
Raad, judgment of 19.10.1936,  NJ  1937, No  154; Gerechtshof Amsterdam, judg-
ment  of 30.6.1961,  NJ  1962,  No  486. 
5  Centrale  Raad  van  Beroep, judgment of 22.12.1955,  AB  1956,  No  402  er  seq. 
6  Centrale  Raad  van  Beroep, judgment of 13.1.1959, AB  1959,  222; judgment of 
12.12.1969,  AB  1971,  No  130;  Gerechtshof te  's Gravenhage, order of 23.6.1971, 
NJ  1971,  No  308.  In  this  case  the  President of the  Court  in  interlocutory  pro-
ceedings  ordered  the  Government  to  continue  to  pay  subsidies. 
7  Centrale Raad van Beroep,judgment of 7.11.1963, AB  1965, No  180; judgment 
of  23.1.1964,  AB  1965,  No  594. 
•  Rapport,  op.  cit.,  p.  107. 
•  Koninklijk  Bes!uit  of  19.12.1969,  AB  1970,  No  3\8;  Koninklijk  Besluit 
8.4.1970,  AB  1970,  No  577. 
1° Cf.  Daintith,  op. cit., p.  300, and the example in  Wade,  op. cit., p.  180 er seq.; 
cf.  further  Street/ Wortley,  State and  Private  Property  in  English  Law,  Staat  und 
Privateigentum,  1960,  p.  131. 
11  Daintith,  op.  cit.,  p.  292;  Goodhart,  The  Burmah  Oil  Case  and  the  War  Da-
mage  Act  of  1965,  Law  Quarterly  Review  82  (1966),  p.  97  er  seq. 
12  Cf.  FaZIJI,  Reliability  of Official  Acts  and  Advice,  Public  Law,  1972,  p.  43  er 
seq.;  Ganz,  Estoppel  and  res  judicata  in  Administrative  Law,  Public  Law  1965,  r·  237  et seq. 
l  Ganz.  op.  cit.,  p.  253  et  seq. 
65 terns  there are  presumptions as  to  the substance of such sta-
tutes, namely that in  cases of doubt they are not to be given 
retrospective  effect,  and  that  other  doubts  have  been  ex-
pressed  against  the retrospective divesting of rights (compare 
for  instance  the  doubts  expressed  in  the  British  House  of 
Lords), and that to some extent there is  a demand, as in Italy, 
that  retrospective  fiscal  legislation  be  prohibited.  Such  pre-
sumptions, doubts and  demands can  be  seen as  evidence for 
the  fact  that  the  giving  of  retrospective  effect  to  statutes 
which impose a liability  is  constitutionally doubtful or repug-
nant; however, in  most  countries  it  is,  in  the final  analysis, 
left  to  the legislature to  decide whether for  reasons of public 
interest  there should  be  any  retrospective  effect. 
Even less  than a general  prohibition on retrospective effect  is 
it  possible  to  demonstrate and justify any  prohibition  on the 
withdrawal even by  statute of rights  of the  individual  which 
have  already  been  granted,  and  of vested  individual  which 
have already been granted, and of vested individual rights. On 
the contrary, the legislature is  in principle, and subject always 
to  specific  provisions  such  as  those  protecting  property,  not 
precluded in terms of constitutional law  from  interfering with 
rights  lawfully  vested, and in  this the question as  to whether 
compensation shall be granted is  very  much left to  the sover-
eign  decision  of parliament. 
As  regards  the interference with  vested or subsisting rights of 
individuals by  administrative measures, we find  in the various 
legal  systems discussed a bewildering variety of statutory pro-
visions, of general legal principles developed by the courts and 
by  learned  authors,  and  of particular  aspects  of detail.  As  a 
general  principle  it  may  well  be  accepted  that  the rights  and 
interests  of the  individual  must  as  a  rule  give  way  to  pre-
ponderant  community  interests,  that  is,  that the administra-
tion (usually  on the basis  of statutory  provision),  may  inter-
fere  with rights, revoke or modify  licences, if this is  urgently 
required  for  reasons  of public  interest, in  which case  liability 
to  pay  compensation is  probably  more the exception than the 
rule.  The prerequisites for,  and  the extent of, any  interference 
with  the rights of individual differ according to  the sphere of 
activity  in  question and  the interests  at stake and  cannot  be 
regulated  uniformly. 
The  fact  that  public  authority  is  enjoined  to  respect  the  re-
liance  placed  by  the individual  on  the existing  legal  position 
and  on the continuance of vested  rights  can,  on  the  whole, 
probably  be  seen  as  a  general  legal  principle  within  the  law 
of the Member States  as  well  as  in  the law  of the European 
Community; but it  can scarcely  be regarded as  a constitution-
ally  secured fundamental right.  The adoption into a European 
catalogue  of fundamental  rights  of any  prov-ision  in  this  re-
gard  would  certainly  encounter  considerable  difficulties  and 
require reservations expressed  in  general  terms.  This compar-
ative  legal  study has shown that national  law  cannot provide 
any  convincingly  formulated  precedents. 
66 
IV - Summary  and  outlook 
1.  Protection of fundamental rights 
under existing Community law 
The Treaties  relating  to  the  European Communities contain 
individual  provisions  and  reference  points  for  the protection 
of the rights of the individual, but they contain no concluded 
catalogue of fundamental  rights, nor do  the various  rules  of 
Community  law  scattered  throughout  the  Treaties  together 
amount  to  a  complete  protection  of all  fundamental  rights 
which  might  be  infringed  by  Community  authority. 
The  absence  of written  provisions  relating  to  fundamental 
rights  on  the  part  of the  Community  does  not,  however, 
mean that the Community  and  its  organs  are  not tXmnd  by 
fundamental  rights.  The  position  is  rather  that  Community 
law,  like  the law  of other international organizations and the 
written  law  of the  individual  States,  requires  to  be  supple-
mented by  unwritten legal  principles, which include, predom-
inantly,  fundamental  rights  and  human  rights.  These  legal 
principles, which supplement written Community law  and are 
of equal  status with primary  Community law,  can by  means 
of comparative legal studies be  identified out of the law of the 
Member  States  and  from  the  rules  of international  law,  in-
cluding  the  ECHR,  by  which  these  States  are  bound.  In  its 
judgments the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
has  with  increasing  precision  acknowledged  that  Community 
law  bears  the imprint of fundamental  rights  which  belong  to 
the legal  principles common to  all  Member States  and  which 
are  embedded  in  their  understanding  of law;  with  this  we 
would agree. The progressive development and deployment of 
general  principles  within  the  field  of fundamental  rights  is 
part  of the legitimate  duties  of the judicial  arm,  and  of the 
jurisdiction of the Court of justice, as  defined in the Commu-
nity  Treaties,  to  maintain Community law.  In  the nature of 
things  it  is  only  gradually  and by  the surmounting of uncer-
tainties  that judicial acknowledgment and  implementation  of 
unwritten legal  principles can lead  to  a secured canonical cor-
pus  of protected  fundamental  rights. 
In  spite  of the  uncertainties  and  deficiencies  in  the  safe-
guarding in practice of fundamental  rights under Community 
law,  it  cannot be  assumed that without the incorporation into 
written Community law  of a formal catalogue of fundamental 
rights,  the essential  rights  of the  individual  will  remain  un-
protected.  Written  Community. law,  the common legal  prin-
ciples of the Member States and the rules of international law 
relating  to  the  protection  of fundamental  rights,  seen  as  a 
whole, do  provide, so far  as can be foreseen, an adequate and 
reasonable  measure  of  proteetion  of  fundamentai  rights 
against  the  action  of Community  organs. 
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to a catalogue of fundamental rights 
in the European Communities 
Despite the fact  that the lack of written  provisions  of Com-
munity  law  within  the  field  of fundamental  rights  can  be 
made  good  by  evolving  general  principles  of law-which in 
my opinion would  be  adequate-a written  catalogue  of fun-
damental  rights  in  the  European  Communities  would  un-
donbtedly have many advantages. Such a catalogue would in-
crease the certainty of law, reduce the difficulties of law-mak-
ing  judicial  labour,  and  lend  weight  to  the  democratic  en-
trenching  of fundamental  rights  in  Community  law.  Such  a 
catalogue  of fundamental  rights  could  only  become  legally 
binding by  means of a formal supplement to the Community 
Treaties,  in  the form  of an  international  treaty  to  be  ratified 
according  to the law  of the  Member States. 
If it  is  desired, by  means of a  comparison of the guarantees 
of fundamental  rights  in  the  nine  Member  States, to  deter-
mine  their  common elements  and  to  draw  up  on this  basis 
a  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  under  Community  law, 
there are in principle two ways of doing this. It would be pos-
sible  to  concentrate on examining  what  fundamental  rights, 
irrespective of all  questions of their detailed  implementation, 
really  are  in principle recognized  in  the various States; an at-
tempt could then be  made, having regard  to  the requirement 
of the Community legal  order, to  find  appropriate  independ-
ent  formulations of 'European fundamental  rights'.  Alterna-
tively, the comparative method might attempt to examine, in 
respect of each fundamental  right individually, how  far  it  is, 
both in law  and in fact, protected in the States concerned. On 
this basis an attempt could then be  made to draft a catalogue 
of fundamental rights embracing the whole Community. Any 
investigation of this  kind would  require extremely extensive 
and time-consuming preparatory work, and its value from  the 
point  of  view  of development  of  the  law  might  well  be 
doubted. 
The  fundamental  rights  to  be  incorporated  into  such  an  in-
ventory cannot easily be defined. The priority would be to se-
cure  those  fundamental  rights  which  could  be  particularly 
vulnerable to attack by Community authority. Of the classical 
fundamental  rights,  few  seem  greatly  to  be  threatened  by 
Community organs.  Protection  is  primarily  needed  for  those 
fundamental  rights  which secure  the individual's freedom of 
economic development; in addition to  the principle of equal-
ity,  there  is  for  instance  the protection of property, the free-
dom  of trade  or occupation  and  the  freedom  of movement; 
moreover requirements of the rule of law  such as  that of legal 
certainty, or the principles of proportionality and of protection 
of legitimate expectation, need to be  safeguarded, although  it 
is  extremely difficult to frame these principles in  the form  of 
clear-cut  fundamental  rights. 
The fact  that some fundamental rights are particularly apt  to 
be infringed by  Community authority and are therefore to  be 
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protected as a matter of priority, should not, however, obscure 
the fact  that numerous other fundamental rights  can, if only 
in  exceptional  cases,  acquire  significance  under Community 
law;  any  catalogue  of fundamental  rights  purporting  to  be 
comprehensive  would  therefore  require  to  be  more  widely 
drawn. 
Even certain rights of the individual which a priori seem safe 
from  interference by  the Community may in particular cases 
require protection.  For instance, the criminal  law  principle of 
ne  bis  in  idem  may be of significance in connection with the 
imposition of sanctions in cartel law or in the law  relating to 
the discipline of those in the service of the Community. Press 
freedom  may  be  affected  by  measured  taken  for  economic 
purposes.  The  freedom  of conscience,  of  opinion,  and  of 
scientific  and  artistic  endeavour  may  require  protection,  at 
least  for  a  limited class  of persons, namely those in  the ser-
vice  of the Community.  Any  consideration  of the establish-
ment of a  catalogue of fundamental  rights  for  the European 
Communities must therefore deal  with  the question whether 
only  the  most  important  and  the  most  threatened  of  the 
fundamental rights are to be expressly guaranteed, or whether 
all  fundamental  rights  which  could  possibly  be  breached  by 
Community authority  should be included.  In the latter case, 
a  comprehensive  catalogue  would  have  to  be  drawn  up, 
whereas in  the case of a catalogue restricted merely  to a  few 
fundamental rights there would be a need to avoid giving the 
impression  that  all  fundamental  rights  not  expressly  men-
tioned were left  unprotected, even  if the general principles of 
law  of the  Member States  require  their protection. 
A  further question requiring an answer is  whether and, if so, 
to  what  extent,  social  and  democratic  fundamental  rights 
should  be  included  in  a  catalogue  of fundamental  rights. 
What is  the position of the right to work or the right of par-
ticipation in  the realizing of Community interests? In view of 
the  widespread  demand  for  extension of the  powers  of the 
European Parliament, the question of the establishment under 
the Treaty of a right of petition for  the indivual must be con-
sidered.  Recently  there  has  been  discussion  of the question 
whether the  nationals of a  Member State  should be  entitled 
to vote in elections at  local  level  in other States of the Com-
munity. Should a  provision to  this effect  be included in  any 
European catalogue of fundamental rights? In answering this 
question, regard would need to be had to whether the nation-
al  law  of individual  Member States  at  present grants  voting 
rights  to  foreigners,  or whether in  this respect  constitutional 
amendment would be necessary. Finally it  must be considered 
whether the system of legal  protection of the EEC Treaty  is 
in need of amendment intended to bring about increased pro-
tection  of the individual's  fundamental  rights. 
Comparative legal studies may certainly be of help in evolving 
a  catalogue of fundamental  rights,  but  such  help appears  to 
be of limited value.  The fundamental  rights discussed above, 
incompletely and by  way of example, show that while the le-
gal  systems of the Member States have much in common at 
the level  of principle,  there do  however remain  considerable 
differences  in  detail.  It is,  above  all,  impossible  to  dispense 
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trictions on fundamental  rights.  There will, in the majority of 
cases, be  no alternative  to  providing  for  possible  restrictions, 
since  conflicts  between  individual  interests  and  demands  of 
the  community  are  unavoidable  and  in  many  cases  have  to 
be  resolved  in  favour  of the  general  good.  In  view  of the 
heterogeneity  of the  activities  that  require  to  be  regulated, 
definitions of fundamental  rights can  rarely  be  drawn clearly 
and conclusively; accordingly, provisions in general terms will 
be  essential.  This  in  tum  will  involve  the  risk  that  the 
fundamental  rights  will  be  left  turning  in  the  void. 
3.  Outlook for future legal development 
It is  the duty of those having  political  authority to  weigh  up 
the  reasons  in  favour  of a  formal  catalogue  of fundamental 
rights  in  the  law  of the  European  Communities  against  the 
difficulties  and disadvantages of such a catalogue, and to  ar-
rive at their decision on the basis of such an appraisal. In con-
cluding  this  study,  it  only  remains  to  set  out  some  points 
which  will  have to  be  taken  into  account  in  that  appraisal. 
I do  not  believe  that  the protection  of the individual's  fun-
damental  rights  can  be  appreciably  improved  by  a catalogue 
of fundamental  rights  as  part of the  law  of the Community, 
in  relation  to  the protection currently available.  As  has  been 
shown, the general  legal  principles of the Member States and 
of international  law  are  capable  of making  good  any  absence 
of express provisions in the Treaties of the Communities. The 
Court of Justice of the European Communities has recognized 
and  has  assumed  this  duty.  It can  be  expected  the Court of 
Justice  will  follow  the path  it  has  already  taken and will  set 
to  right  breaches of fundamental  rights  by  other Community 
organs.  It is  hardly  conceivable  that  rights  of the  individual 
which  are  important and  deserving  of protection will  remain 
unprotected because of the lack of a catalogue of fundamental 
rights, since the general legal  principles of the Member States 
will  probably  contain  all  those guarantees  which  are  also  in-
alienably  part  of Community  law.  If the  protection  of fun-
damental  rights  is  entrusted  to  the  Court  of Justice by  way 
of general  legal  principles, Community  law  can  progressively 
be developed by judgments rendered  in accordance with prac-
tical  needs. 
A catalogue of fundamental  rights  in  the European Commu-
nity would on the other hand strongly emphasize the import-
ance attaching to fundamental rights, and dispel any  lingering 
doubts  as  to  their  relevance  to  Community  law.  It would 
moreover,  be  possible  to  go  beyond  the  present  position,  as 
determined by  general  legal  principles, and to  extend the pro-
tection  of fundamental  rights  by  a  political  decision.  When 
evolving a catalogue of fundamental  rights  it  should however 
be  kept  in  mind  that  recourse  to  general  legal  principles 
should  not  be  excluded,  since  even  the  most  elaborate  list 
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cannot  contemplate  all  possible  threats  to  the  individual's 
rights,  and  make  provision  for  them. 
This  illustrates, moreover,  that a European catalogue of fun-
damental  rights  may  involve  not  only·  advantages,  but  also 
dangers and even a retreat from  the legal  position already  at-
tained.  After the recent  decisions  of the  Court of Justice  of 
the European Communities! it is scarcely conceivable that sit-
uations involving fundamental  rights, which would  in one of 
the  Member States be  regarded  as  substantial and  inviolable, 
are  unprotected in  Community law.  In these decisions, regard 
is  had  to  the state of the  law  in  all  nine  Member States  so 
as  to  arrive  at  the  maximum  guarantees  for  fundamental 
rights.  If a European catalogue were  to  lay  behind this-and 
in view  of the difficulties of drawing up a comprehensive cat-
alogue,  this  is  certainly  not unlikely-the protection of fund-
amental  rights  might  in  the  end  be  weakened  rather  than 
strengthened  by  codification. 
If  any  binding  catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  is  to  be 
evolved, this would in any event require extensive preparatory 
work  and  discussion  at  Community  level  as  well  as  in  the 
Member States.  If the catalogue is  to  be  founded  on a broad 
basis of comparative law, considerable difficulties  will  have to 
be  overcome and detailed  examination will  be  necessary.  In-
itially  the question to  be  asked  would  presumably  be:  which 
fundamental  rights appear necessary or important, in  view  of 
the  structure  and  the  tasks  of the  Community?  With  this, 
one would also have to consider whether the catalogue should 
be  restricted to  protective rights, or should also contain social 
fundamental  rights  and  rights  of  democratic  participation. 
This should be  followed  by  detailed  studies-perhaps on  the 
basis  of a questionnaire-on the  way  in  which  these  funda-
mental rights are guaranteed under the current law  of the dif-
ferent  States  and  to  what extent they are  subject  to  reserva-
tion.  From  the  comparative  material  thereby  assembled  it 
would  then  be  necessary  to  distil  the  various  common  fea-
tures  and  differences.  In  any  event, the outcome must be  a 
matter for  political  decision.  It seems to  me doubtful whether 
comparative legal  studies going beyond mere  review  of princ-
iples  into more detailed scrutiny could facilitate  any  such de-
cision to any degree, since no catalogue of fundamental rights 
can, in  the final  analysis, do  without reservations couched in 
general  terms. 
In  my  opinion a different  means of strengthening fundamen-
tal  rights in Community law  should be considered. The grad-
ual  development  of fundamental  rights by  hte Court of Jus-
tice alone without any  formal basis in Community legislation, 
as  opposed to a formal  and binding catalogue of fundamental 
rights, is  open to criticism chiefly on the grounds the the ju-
dicial  authority  lacks  any  direct  democratic  mandate (Legiti-
mation) and that it  ought to  be entrusted with an  independ-
ent  law-making  function  only  within certain  limits.  This  ar-
gument  could  be  countered  by  the  other  Community  or-
I  · See  above  II, 3. 
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express  declaration  the  validity  of fundamental  rights  in  the 
European Communities and their protection by  the Court of-
Justice, without any  formal  treaty in  this  respect.  It could  in 
this  way,  even  without  formal  binding  force,  be  emphasized 
that the protection  of fundamental  rights  is,  in  the view  of 
all  Community  organs,  secured  under  Community  law  at 
present,  and  that such  protection  is  to  be  developed  by  the 
Court of Justice on the basis of general  legal  principles.  Such 
a declaration  would, in  my opinion, not  change  the existing 
legal  position,  but  could  none  the  less  help  to  deal  with 
existing  legal  uncertainties  and  dispel  misgivings. 
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